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This thesis investigates the behavior of investors and analysts participating in the financial 
market. In the first essay, we examine the effects of local stock returns on antidepressant usage 
using the Truven Health MarketScan® individual prescription drug data. There are three main 
findings. First, a one standard deviation decrease in local stock return increases local investors’ 
antidepressant usage by approximately 0.42 percent (an economic cost of approximately 19 
million dollars) in the subsequent weeks than what would have been in the absence of the 
decrease in stock return; in contrast, a stock price increase has no impact on antidepressant usage. 
Second, the effect of stock returns on antidepressant usage depends on an array of local 
socioeconomic characteristics including demographic structure, religiosity, political affiliation, 
political ideology, and personality traits. Third, local stock return fluctuations have significant 
effects on certain illnesses including insomnia, peptic ulcers, abdominal pains, and substance 
abuse which often result from depression. The results are consistent across a variety of 
robustness checks.  
 In the second essay, we examine the behavior of analysts. In July 2009, the Global 
Research Settlement (GRS), which was implemented to mitigate the conflicts of interests 
between analysts and investors, expired. The GRS mandated that sanctioned banks contract with 
Independent Research Firms (IRFs) to make independent research available to the banks’ 
customers. We find that after the GRS expiration, the probability that analysts employed at 
sanctioned banks to issue positive recommendations increased by 3.3 percent compared to a 
control group. Our findings show that, after the GRS expiration, sanctioned banks might have 
become more optimistic and conflicts of interests seem to again threatened the credibility of the 
xi 
 
research by sanctioned banks. Our paper calls into question the SEC's decision not codify to the 
GRS into permanent rules. 
 In the third essay, we examine the performance of analysts from Independent Research 
Firms (IRFs) and investment banks that cover firms in the financial sector. In particular, we 
evaluate six aspects of analyst performance: recommendation optimism, recommendation 
informativeness, earnings forecast optimism, earnings forecast accuracy, target price forecast 
optimism, and target price forecast accuracy. Using a sample of analyst recommendations and 
forecasts from 1994 to 2013, we document two important findings. First, compared to investment 
bank analysts, IRF analysts generally provide less biased, more informative, and more accurate 
recommendations and forecasts when covering firms in the financial sector. The only exception 
is the market reaction to pessimistic recommendations. The pessimistic recommendations issued 
by investment banks outperform those by IRFs. Second, conflicts of interests appear to play a 
significant role when investment bank analysts cover other bulge bracket investment banks. 
These results suggest that compared to their counterparts from IRFs, investment bank analysts 
are susceptible to institutional pressure related to underwriting business when covering firms in 
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1.1 Introduction
Sentiment is a human response to internal or external events, which results in both physical
and psychological changes in our behavior. Studies in the growing literature pertaining to
sentiment and the stock market often focus on how investor sentiment affects stock prices.1
The literature shows that people with pessimistic expectations about the future avoid buying
risky assets such as stocks. However, there is little research on how stock market fluctuations
affect investors’ psychological health. The only previous study that uses non-survey data
to investigate how stock returns affect people’s sentiment is Engelberg and Parsons (2016).
They examine the link between daily stock returns and hospital admissions related to mental
illness.
We believe that the effects of stock market fluctuations on investor sentiment is
an important question for two reasons: first, as depression could cause other illnesses, it
is important to understand and quantify how movements in the stock market affect investor
mental and physical health. This provides a more complete picture of the social and economic
effects caused by market volatility. The consequences of a stock market crash might extend
far beyond the lost wealth in stock assets. Second, our results support the finding that a
1Investor sentiment is the attitude of financial market participants toward a particular financial asset
or the overall financial market. There are several approaches to measure investor sentiment. According
to the first approach, investor sentiment is extracted from the financial market itself. Baker and Wurgler
(2006, 2007) use a macroeconomic approach to measure sentiment and discern waves of sentiment; they find
that investor sentiment has larger effects on the valuation of stocks difficult to arbitrage. In the second
approach, investor sentiment depends on content from newspaper and other media sources and researchers
use text mining technique to analyze them. Tetlock (2007) presents evidence using content from a Wall
Street Journal column and finds that media pessimism influences stock prices. The third approach proxies
investor sentiment using survey results (e.g. AAII Investor Sentiment Survey etc.). Puri and Robinson
(2007) find that people with positive beliefs about future tend to retire later and save more. The fourth and
last approach uses non-economic factors (e.g. health condition, internet search behavior, aviation disasters
etc.) to proxy for sentiment. Engelberg and Parsons (2016) find that a decrease in the stock market return
causes an increase in the number of hospital admissions.
shock to people’s future consumption impacts people’s current utility.2
This paper uses the Truven Health MarketScan Claims and Encounters Database
(MarketScan), a national dataset of prescription drug claims, to answer the following
question: how do local stock market returns affect local investors’ antidepressant usage?
We provide three major answers. First, we find that a one standard deviation decrease in
local stock return increases subsequent local antidepressant usage by approximately 0.42
percent. In contrast, increases in the local stock index do not seem to impact the usage of
antidepressants. Second, we find that the stock market effect on antidepressant usage varies
across an array of local socioeconomics characteristics. More specifically, we find that people
who: a) feel less productive, b) are more worried about money, c) receive less community
recognition, d) exercise less frequently, and e) are less religious experience a larger increase
in antidepressant usage when the stocks decline. A lower score on agreeableness and a higher
score on neuroticism and extraversion reinforce the negative sentiment when the stock market
declines. The effects of stock returns on sentiment are stronger for individuals aged 45-65
than those aged 35-45. Third, we find that local stock fluctuations also have significant
effects on certain physical illnesses that often result from depression. These illnesses include
insomnia, peptic ulcers, abdominal pains, substance abuse, and myocardial infarction.
Our results are robust across a variety of specifications. They are insensitive to: a)
variations in insurance plans and physician types, and b) to the inclusion of local housing
prices, local wages, and the local unemployment rate as control variables. As a test of
internal validity, we also find that declines in stock returns are uncorrelated with the usage
of antibiotics.
Our results are economically meaningful because antidepressants are among the most
commonly prescribed medications in the United States. We find that a one standard
deviation decrease in the two-week stock return results in 0.42 percent more prescriptions
2Utility functions are important in the field of economics and asset pricing. In the standard expected
utility framework, current utility is determined only by current consumption. Anticipation of future
shocks could still impact current utility, albeit only through the channel of current consumption. We use
antidepressant usage to proxy for a person’s utility, and we find that within 2 weeks after the stock shock,
more people start taking antidepressants. It is unlikely, that within 2 weeks, the anticipation over a future
consumption shock leads to a reduction in current consumption. Thus our results imply that investors
experience disutility today because of the anticipation over a future consumption shock. We think this is
an investor’s rational reaction to an anticipated shock. Our results are consistent with the recursive utility
function in Caplin and Leahy (2001).
2
of antidepressants filled (an economic cost of approximately 19 million dollars) than what
would have been in the absence of the prior decrease in stock return. The consequences do
not stop at the level of mental health; depression itself is a risk factor for suicide. Physical
illnesses that are often a result of depression might cause long-term complications, which
could cost the society much more than treating depression alone. We emphasize that one
should take into account the increased medical expenses associated with increased incidence
of depression and illnesses resulting from depression when trying to accurately quantify the
loss related to stock crashes.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive examination of
how stock market fluctuations affect investor’s psychological health. McInerney et al.
(2013), Cotti et al. (2014), and Schwandt (2014) use self-reported survey data (e.g.,
Health and Retirement Survey, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System) to study the
relationship between stock returns and self-reported depression.3 Using the MarketScan
data of prescription drug claims, this paper improves on past studies in the following ways.
First, pharmaceutical claims are not subject to the common problems in the survey data
(e.g. wording of questions, recall errors etc.).4 Second, all classes of antidepressants require
a prescription by physicians who could give an accurate and comprehensive assessment of
the patients’ mental health. Indeed, Cossman et al. (2010) and Chini et al. (2011) find
that prescription drug usage is strongly associated with the disease prevalence. Third, the
prescription data are of higher frequencies than the survey data,5 which facilitates the
discovery of the causality: a stock market decline results in more antidepressants prescribed
in following weeks. Fourth, antidepressants are one of the most commonly prescribed drugs
in the United States.6 The introduction of affordable generic versions of antidepressants
3Huck (2015) uses crime rates to proxy for people’s revealed utility and finds that stock returns impact
people’s utility.
4While all communications between a patient and a physician are protected by the law, the patient is more
likely to be aware of mental health related stigma when talking to a survey interviewer. Bharadwaj et al.
(2015) find that survey respondents are likely to underreport when asked about mental health conditions, but
are less likely to underreport when asked about physical health conditions. In addition, wording of questions
or interactions between the interviewer and interviewee could cause biased answers.
5The Health and Retirement Survey and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Surveys are
conducted bi-annually and annually, respectively.
6According to a CDC report, among Americans aged 12 and over, 11 percent of the population takes
antidepressant medication. The report can be accessed at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db76.htm.
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at lower prices improved the general public’s access to these medications.7 We believe that
prescription drug claims of antidepressants could proxy sentiment better than self-reported
measures.
Engelberg and Parsons (2016) use hospital admittance records of individual patients in
California from 1983 to 2011, and find an inverse link between same day stock returns and
hospital admissions. This study improves on Engelberg and Parsons’ research in the following
aspects. First, hospitalizations caused by mental illness are rare, while antidepressant usage
is quite common. Antidepressant usage is 89 times more common than hospital admission
caused by depression or anxiety disorders.8 Generally speaking, patients are only admitted
to inpatient stays when they are in critical conditions and might cause harm to themselves
or others. Therefore, Engelberg and Parsons (2016) are likely to underestimate the overall
effect of stock market declines on people’s psychological health, because they only study
hospitalized patients.9 Second, Engelberg and Parsons (2016) only have medical records
from California, whereas the MarketScan data cover the entire United States. Thus, we are
able to explore a wide array of heterogeneity in the effect of stock returns on antidepressant
usage due to differences in demographic structure, religiosity, political affiliation, political
ideology, and personality traits. Third, given that the data include all insurance records of
patients, we are able to identify patients suffering from various illnesses and examine the
effect of stock returns on the illnesses resulting from depression (e.g. insomnia, substance
abuse, etc.).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and
the estimation strategy. Section 3 reports the results of our main regressions. Section 4
investigates the heterogeneous effect of stock returns on antidepressants. Section 5 shows
how stock returns affect an individual’s physical health. Section 6 presents the results of our
7A 2008 report by the International Psychogeriatric Association finds that the price ranges from
$1.89-$4.42 for a one-month supply of 8 types of generic antidepressants in the U.S.. Antidepressant usage
does not vary by income status. A CDC report finds that there is no difference with respect to family income
in the prevalence of antidepressant usage.
8Using the MarketScan 2005-2006 full sample, we find records of 22,253 individuals who were hospitalized
with primary diagnosis of depression or anxiety disorder, whereas 2,002,217 individuals have at least one
pharmacy claim for antidepressants in the same period. Thus, with antidepressants used commonly among
Americans, we would have a large and representative dataset to work with.
9While Engelberg and Parsons (2016) find that a one standard deviation decrease in the local stock returns
increases daily hospital admissions by about 0.18 percent, this study finds that a one standard deviation
decrease in the local stock returns increases weekly antidepressant usage by about 0.42 percent.
4
falsification tests. Section 7 calculates the economic costs related to antidepressant usage.
We conclude in Section 8.
1.2 Data and estimation strategy
1.2.1 Data
We combine data from several sources, including MarketScan, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, to construct the final data set for empirical analysis.
1.2.1.1 Stock and macroeconomic measures
Daily stock price data are from CRSP. The quarterly headquarter location information of
publicly-traded firms is obtained from COMPUSTAT. We merge the stock price data with
firms’ headquarter location data and calculate the return of a value-weighted stock index
consisting of companies headquartered in each state using the merged dataset.
We collect macroeconomic measures from multiple sources. We collect unemployment
rates at the MSA-month level from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. We collect MSA-quarter wage rates from the Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 10
1.2.1.2 Medical claim data
The MarketScan database provides a national collection of inpatient, outpatient and
pharmaceutical claims in the U.S. The detailed claim data come from over 200 large,
self-insuring corporations and insurance carriers. This paper focuses on the 2005-2006
period. Due to the sensitive nature of health records, the individual-level data are
de-identified, and each individual is assigned a unique patient ID. The patient ID can
be used to link records across multiple data files and track patients over time, even
when they move to a different state or switch their health plans. Patient demographic
characteristics include the patient’s geographical location (i.e., census region, state, and
10See US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics website:
http://www.bls.gov/lau/ and Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages website:
http://www.bls.gov/cew/ for detailed statistics.
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MSA), age, gender, industry of employment, employment status (full-time versus part-time),
and relationship to the beneficiary (employee versus spouse/children of the employee).
We can group the type of health plans in the data into 8 categories: Basic/Major
Medical, Comprehensive, Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO), Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO), Non-Capitated Point-of-Service (Non-Capitated POS), Preferred
Provider Organization (PPO), Capitated or Partially-Capitated Point-of-Service (Capitated
or Partially-Capitated POS), and Consumer-Driven Health Plan (CDHP). The claims data
include a continuum of settings (e.g., inpatient, outpatient, and pharmaceutical). To
ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data, all claims have been paid and adjudicated.
During the analysis, we eliminate duplicated claims and claims with negative payment and
pharmaceutical claims with negative days of supply or quantity.
The full sample includes 13,344,000 individuals, which is approximately 4.5 percent of
the U.S. population in 2005.11 For our main analysis, we restrict the sample to individuals
aged 35 to 64 years old and exclude those covered under “gatekeeper plans.” We obtain a
sample of 4.9 million individuals. We focus on individuals aged 35-64 because the census
data shows that fewer people under 35 years old have stock holdings, and in the case that
they do have stock holdings, they have much lower stock holdings than the older cohorts.12
Thus, when the stock market declines, the financial loss is heavily concentrated among
investors older than 35 who have more exposure to the stock market. Individuals aged 65
or older are not included in the data.13 In the sample, 0.47 percent, 19.07 percent, and
15.89 percent of the individuals are covered under EPO, HMO, and POS plans (“gatekeeper
plans”). People with “gatekeeper plans” are excluded because patients in these plans need
to choose a Primary Care Physician (“the gatekeeper”) to manage his/her health care needs.
If the patient wants to visit a specialist, he/she need a referral from the “gatekeeper”, and
the referral needs to be approved by the insurance company before insurance covers the
cost of the visit to a specialist. Walsh and Egdahl (1985) and Mechanic et al. (1995)
11The U.S. population was 295.5 million in 2005.
12The percentage of families having direct or indirect stock holdings is 52.5%, 60.4%, and 58.9%
for age of the family head between 35-44 years old, 45-54 years old, and 55-64 years old. The
corresponding median value among families with stock holdings by the age of the family head
is $26,000, $45,000, and $78,000. For more detailed statistics on age and stock ownership, see
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1211.pdf.
13If an individual is 65 years old or above, his/her records are excluded from the MarketScan Commercial
Claims and Encounters Database but are part of the MarketScan Medicare Supplemental Database.
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argue that, to obtain psychiatric care, patients with “gatekeeper plans” have to accept the
risk that their Primary Care Physician (“the gatekeeper”) might label them as mentally ill.
Because many “gatekeepers” work for an Employee Assistance Program, the risk of health
information leakage is increased. Ojeda and McGuire (2006) find that depressed adults with
“gatekeeper plans” are significantly less likely to obtain mental health care than adults with
“non-gatekeeper plans”. Perneger et al. (1995) show that individuals with “gatekeeper
plans” have substantial unmet needs for psychiatric service. Another reason for excluding
data of patients under HMO plans is that they are capitated plans. In capitated plans,
physicians are pre-paid a fixed amount for each enrolled individual assigned to them each
period, which minimizes the incentive for the physician office to keep rigorous claim records.
Thus, the claim data associated with HMO plans are less accurate than data associated with
other plans. The mean age in the sample is 49.77 years. Males make up 46.27 percent of
the sample. Employed individuals are 63.49 percent of the sample. The remaining are either
spouses or children. Of the employed individuals, 8.51 percent work in finance, insurance
and real estate, and 75.37 percent are full-time workers. Later, we relax the insurance plan
restriction and increase the sample size to 8.0 million for robustness checks.
In our sample period, namely 2005-06, 192,518 individuals (or 3.92 percent of our
sample) had at least one pharmaceutical claim for antidepressants14 and one outpatient visit
claim indicating a primary or secondary diagnosis of depression or anxiety disorder.15 We
use International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9)
to identify depression or anxiety disorder.16 On average, each of these individuals filled
8.59 prescriptions for antidepressants in the 24-month period from 2005-2006, and each
14Records of pharmaceuticals dispensed at retail pharmacies, at specialty pharmacies, or by mail are all
included in the database.
15Physicians do not usually provide diagnosis on pharmaceutical prescription. Thus, to link the
pharmaceutical claims to the diagnosis, for each pharmaceutical claim, we search for related outpatient
service claims filed within a time window around the pharmaceutical claim for the same individual.
16Claims were identified as any primary or secondary diagnosis for the following ICD-9 codes:
296.2 (Major depression, single episode), 296.3 (Major depression, recurrent episode), 300.0 (Anxiety
disorder), 300.2 (Phobic disorders), 300.3 (Obsessive-compulsive disorder), 300.4 (Dysthymic disorder), 301.4
(Obsessive-compulsive personality disorder), 309.8 (Other specified adjustment reactions (PTSD)). See Wu
et al. (2012a), Shrestha et al. (2013), Vlahiotis et al. (2011), and Wade et al, (2014) for justification of using
this group of codes to identify depression and anxiety disorder. Among the disorders, major depression,
single or recurrent episode (52.70 percent) is the most common diagnosis recorded, followed by anxiety
disorder (27.79 percent) and dysthymic disorder (13.21 percent); the other disorders each make up less than
3 percent of the sample.
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prescription includes, on average, 40.05 day supply of antidepressants. We use National Drug
Classification code on the prescription claims to identify drugs within the antidepressant
therapeutic class. The therapeutic class is classified using the Red Book system in
MarketScan. Sertraline (Zoloft, Lustral, 13.9 percent) is the most frequently prescribed
antidepressant in our sample. Other commonly prescribed antidepressants include Bupropion
(Wellbutrin, 13.6 percent), Escitalopram (Lexapro, Cipralex, 13.4 percent), Fluoxetine
(Prozac, 11.9 percent), Venlafaxine (Effexor, 10.8 percent), Paroxetine (Paxil, Seroxat, 9.6
percent), Citalopram (Celexa, 5.8 percent), Trazodone (Desyrel, 5.6 percent), Amitriptyline
(Elavil, Endep, 5.3 percent).17
1.2.2 Estimation strategy
1.2.2.1 The econometric model
Following Engelberg and Parsons (2016), we use a linear regression model to estimate
the effects of stock returns on investor’s antidepressant usage.18 Because antidepressant
usage is also related to local economic conditions, seasonality, and unobserved geographical
characteristics, we control for these factors in our regression. Specifically, we estimate the
17The name of the generic version is listed first, with name of the brand version in parentheses. The
antidepressants are ranked by drug class, SSRIs (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) are prescribed in
55.2 percent of all cases, making them the most commonly used antidepressant classes. SSRIs are followed
by SNRIs (serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors, 14.8 percent), NRIs (norepinephrine reuptake
inhibitors 13.6 percent), TCAs (tricyclic antidepressants 8.9 percent), and SARIs (serotonin antagonists
and reuptake inhibitors, 5.6 percent). Antidepressants are not available over the counter. Pharmacies
require patients to present a prescription from a physician before dispensing antidepressants.
18The basis of our regression is the home bias within U.S. phenomenon (Coval and Moskowitz (1999)). It is
important to note that people might not be actively investing in stocks; however, their wealth is still affected
by the stock market because of passive investments (e.g., 401(k), Employee Stock Ownership Plan). An
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is an program that allows a company’s workforce to have ownership
interest in the company. According to the Employee Benefits Security Administration’s (EBSA) Office of
Policy and Research (OPR) at the Department of Labor, ESOPs have a total plan assets of $1.4 trillion.
In addition, ESOPs cover 14 million participants in the U.S.. For more detailed statistics about ESOP,
see http://www.nceo.org/articles/esops-by-the-numbers. Even for majority of people who do not have the
option to participate in an ESOP, financial research still documents home bias for local stocks. Using the
individual trading data of U.S. investors, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007) find that 17.1% of stock purchase
involve firms where the headquarter is located within 50 miles from investor’s household. Using the same
data, Seasholes and Zhu (2010) find that 30% of a household’s portfolio is invested in firms headquartered
within a 250 mile radius of the household. However, if household would do not exhibit home bias, this
fraction should be only 12%.
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following model:
log (Antidepressantsm,t) = β0 + β1 ·Market returns,(t−k,t)
+β2 ·MSA economic factorsm,t +MSAm +Montht + Y eart + εm,t (1)
where the natural logarithm of Antidepressantsm,t in MSA m during week t is specified as a
function of Market returns,(t−k,t) and a vector of MSA-level macroeconomic characteristics
MSA economic factorsm,t . Market returns,(t−k,t) is the market return from the closing
index of week t− k− 1 to the closing index of week t of a value-weighted index consisting of
publicly-traded companies headquartered in state s. MSAm is MSA fixed effects. Montht
is monthly fixed effects.Y eart is year fixed effect.
We use drug claim records to construct the dependent variable by aggregating the weekly
count of prescriptions of antidepressants filled by patients with depression diagnosis in
each MSA. The final data set includes more than 30,000 MSA-by-week observations. For
our primary variable of interest, Market returns,(t−k,t) , we use the Market returns,(t−1,t)
which measures the cumulative two-week return in the state stock index as the percentage
change from closing index Friday two weeks previously to the current Friday’s closing
index. Thus, in our main regressions, we allow returns up 2 weeks previous to influence
the current week’s antidepressant usage to account for the time new patients need to make
an appointment in advance. The market return is standardized using the trailing one year
standard deviation. β1 , the coefficient of our primary variable of interest, measures the
degree to which local stock variations affect antidepressant usage.
We include MSA fixed effects to control for time-invariant heterogeneity at the MSA
level (unobserved differences in the prescription medicine utilization rate in general across
MSAs, etc.). We control for monthly fixed effects for three reasons. First, seasonality may
affect the rate of depression. Rosenthal et al. (1984) finds that Seasonal Affective Disorder
(SAD) is a recurrent major depressive disorder that occurs more during the winter months
when the hours of daylight are decreased. Second, we expect more health care utilization at
the end of the calendar year. Employees can use a Flexible Spending Account (FSA) to set
aside a portion of pre-tax earnings to pay for medical expenses or other qualified expenses.
Individuals with an FSA must spend the money within the coverage period (most commonly
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defined as the calendar year). Thus, we expect more health care utilization at the end of
the calendar year to deplete the outstanding balance in the FSA. Third, we expect less
antidepressant usage in holiday months. Hartig et al. (2013) show that an increase in the
number of vacationing workers results in a decline in the number of people with mental stress.
Thus, monthly fixed effects account for seasonality of mental health and medical spending.
Yearly fixed effects control for unobservable factors that affect antidepressant usage across
years (e.g., long-term changes in health policies).
Our identification strategy assumes that stock returns are conditionally exogenous to
people’s decision to use antidepressants. Or put differently, stock returns and antidepressant
usage should be uncorrelated conditional on observed characteristics except for the fact that
stock market declines cause a decrease in people’s wealth. There are threats to the validity
of our identification strategy. If antidepressant usage is related to local macroeconomic
indicators, our coefficient for local stock returns, β1, may capture this indirect relationship
between local macroeconomic indicators and antidepressant usage. We respond to this
possibility by including controls for unemployment rate and local wage rate in each MSA and
week to account for economic factors that might also affect antidepressant usage. The data
in MarketScan are for individuals that are either employed or are the spouse/children of the
individuals employed. Thus, effects on the covered employee’s mental health through the
local unemployment rate might be limited. However, we think there are at least two reasons
why we should control for local unemployment rates. First, the covered employee might be
stressed and fear future job loss when seeing his/her colleagues losing jobs. The expectation
of future job stability might directly impact his/her current mental well-being, independent
of current job status. Thus, we might observe that local unemployment rates affect the
mental health of the employed population. Catalano et al. (1986) interview household
principal wage earners and find that job insecurity increases the likelihood of seeking
psychological help. Second, dependents (e.g., spouses) of covered employees could also suffer
from unemployment.19 In this case, the local unemployment rate directly influences mental
health through the channel of the dependents. Compared to the local unemployment rate,
MSA-by-quarter wage data measure local macroeconomic conditions more directly. It is
reasonable to think that local wage rates, which affect instantaneous utility, have a larger
19Using data from Denmark, Browning and Heinesen (2012) find that job loss is followed by increased risk
of suicide and suicide attempts.
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effect on the mental health of the employed population than the local unemployment rates,
which affect the expectation of future consumption.
1.2.2.2 The lag structure
In this section, we explain why we choose two weeks as the lag time for stock decline to affect
antidepressant usage. According to medical literature, individuals experience the following
stages after a shock in their stock wealth. First, individuals become aware of the change in
the stock market. The time needed to learn about the market situation increases with age.
Using our data, we find that older individuals respond to market returns more slowly than
younger individuals. Second, symptoms of depression appears; this stage could take some
time to develop.20
Third, after experiencing symptoms, patients make an appointment and wait to see a
doctor if he/she decides to seek professional help. Due the complexity of the U.S. health
care system, patients usually have to wait several days to see a physician. Forrest (2003)
finds that the average appointment wait time to see a specialist is 8.4 days for those with
“non-gatekeeper plans”. Finally, the patient obtains antidepressants. Based on the medical
literature, we think two weeks is a reasonable lag time between the onset of stock decline
and prescription of antidepressants being filled.
1.3 Impact of stock returns on antidepressant usage
1.3.1 Main results
Table 2 presents our main results. We add control variables gradually to the equation. The
specification in Column 1 is the most parsimonious. The estimated stock return effect is
-1.350 with a t-statistic of -3.478, which implies that the lower local stock returns in the
weeks t and t − 1 result in an increase in local antidepressant usage in week t. Moving to
the second column, adding year fixed effects only results in the coefficient β1 to decrease
slightly to -1.338 with a t-statistic of -3.449. When we include MSA fixed effects in the
20Although some people are aware of the stock market decline, their emotional well-being might only
responds to the stock market decline gradually or not at all. It is likely that our empirical specification
might not capture the change of health care usage of people whose emotional well-being responds slowly to
the stock market decline.
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third column, the coefficient β1 is -0.420 with a t-statistic of -2.505. Further including local
unemployment rate and local wage has limited impact on the estimate of β1. In the most
restrictive specification in Column 4, a one standard deviation decrease in local stock return
increases local antidepressant usage by approximately 0.42 percent.
In Table 3, we allow a cumulative return from more than one week previous to influence
the current week’s antidepressant usage to account for the prolonged time that new patients
need to make an appointment with a physician. Columns 1-3 of Table 3 test for the lagged
relationship between stock returns and subsequent usage of antidepressants. While the
dependent variable is the logarithm of antidepressant usage in MSA m and week t, we
test four-, three- and two-week returns to examine whether there is a lagged response to
shocks in local stock returns. We observe a strong relation between a decrease in cumulative
returns in the market index in weeks t and t− 1 and a subsequent increase in antidepressant
usage in week t. However, we find the effect does not last for more than two weeks. In
Column 4, we test for the instantaneous relationship between market returns and usage
of antidepressants during the same week. Again, we observe a strong relation between a
decrease in returns in the market index and an increase in antidepressant usage in the same
week. In Columns 5-7, we test for a possible leading relationship between stock returns and
the usage of antidepressants in the past. It is possible that taking antidepressants makes
people less risk averse, and results in bullish market sentiment. It may also be possible that
an increase in antidepressant usage is a proxy for worse physical and emotional health in
general, which results in a downward pressure on future productivity of corporations, leading
to subsequent stock market decline. When we allow future stock returns to influence the
current week’s antidepressant usage, antidepressant usage is not significantly associated with
subsequent stock returns. The estimates for β1 are all statistically insignificant at the 10
percent level.
Our results show a significant negative relationship between market returns in the
previous week and the current week and the current week’s antidepressant usage.
1.3.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we conduct a number of robustness tests to confirm that our results are not
driven by potential confounding factors or the estimation specifications.
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1.3.2.1 Alternative specifications for the dependent variable and the
independent variable
Table 4 presents alternative specifications for both the dependent variable and the market
return variable. In Columns 1-4, we subtract the average weekly usage for that MSA in the
past 2, 3, 6, and 12 months from the dependent variable. By subtracting the average weekly
usage in the past from the dependent variable, we adjust the dependent variable to control
for a possible persistent trend of antidepressant usage. The market return variable is the
same as Table 2. All estimates are statistically significant and range from -2.039 to -2.637.
In our main specification, we rescaled the market return by dividing its one year trailing
standard deviation. Because stock market volatility changes over time, it is possible that
a more volatile stock market in the past left investors numb to new stock shocks. In other
words, investors might get used to stock fluctuations and become insensitive to the current
stock returns. However, if the stock market in the past is peaceful, investors could be
psychologically unprepared for new stock shocks and exhibit panic behavior. In Columns
5-7 of Table 4, we rescale the market returns by the trailing standard deviation of different
periods: 2, 3, and 6 months. We find that scaling the market return by the volatility of
different periods has little impact on the estimate of β1. A one standard deviation decrease
in local stock return increases local antidepressant usage by 0.38 percent to 0.43 percent.
1.3.2.2 Antidepressant usage for patients without depression diagnoses
We count one incident of antidepressant usage as the patients receiving depression diagnosis
as the primary or secondary diagnosis. However, the majority of antidepressant prescriptions
are not accompanied by an outpatient visit resulting in a depression diagnosis (Pagura et
al.(2011) and Mojtabai and Olfson (2011)). In our main regression sample, there are 960,634
(or 19.54 percent of the sample) unique individuals who have at least one pharmacy claim
for antidepressant in 2005-2006. However, only 192,518 (or 3.92 percent of the sample)
unique individuals have at least one pharmacy claim for antidepressant as well as at least
one medical claim of an outpatient visit with a primary or secondary diagnosis of depression
or anxiety disorder. There are three explanations for the phenomenon that the majority
of antidepressants are prescribed without psychiatric diagnosis. First, stigmas related to
depression could explain the lack of diagnosis on some medical claims. It is likely that
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physicians avoid using the word depression on outpatient visit claims in an attempt to lower
the emotional burden of the patient and thus improve the patient’s medication adherence.
Sirey et al. (2001) show that patients’ stigma towards depression tend to show lower
antidepressant adherence and suggested that even early in the treatment, physicians should
pay attention to the attitude of patients toward the illness. Second, physicians might be
reimbursed more for treating non-psychiatric conditions and hence choose not to assign
psychiatric codes. Rost et al. (1994) show that, due to economic reasons, physicians routinely
substitute another diagnostic code for depression. Third, the MarketScan database only
provides content of the primary and secondary diagnosis listed on the outpatient visit claim.
More diagnosis codes could be listed on the claim but were not recorded in the MarketScan
database.
To capture all of the antidepressant usage, Column 2 of Table 5 extends the data to
include all prescriptions of antidepressants filled, regardless of the diagnosis. The result
indicates that stock returns also affect the antidepressant usage with any diagnosis: a
one standard deviation of stock return decline results in a 0.16 percent increase in local
antidepressant usage.
1.3.2.3 Antidepressant usage for patients covered by “gatekeeper plans”
In our main sample, we exclude individuals covered by “gatekeeper plans” (EPO, HMO,
and POS plans) because: first, individuals covered by “gatekeeper plans” are significantly
less likely to obtain mental health care than adults with other plans. Second, HMO plans,
as capitated plans, are associated with less accurate medical records. In this robustness
check, we include all antidepressants prescriptions associated with depression and anxiety
disorder diagnosis regardless of the patient’s insurance plan in our sample and re-run equation
(1). Column 3 of Table 5 presents the result showing that stock returns also affect the
antidepressant usage of individuals covered by all plans: a one standard deviation decrease
in the local stock return increases local antidepressant usage by approximately 0.45 percent.
1.3.2.4 Antidepressant usage for patients with continuous insurance coverage
In this section, we exclude individuals who are not continuously enrolled in a health plan
(45.87 percent of our sample). There are two reasons why we conduct this robustness check.
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First, interruptions in health plan enrollment could be caused by other depression-triggering
incidents such as unemployment, divorces, marriages, or death of a family member. Second,
by excluding the new enrollees and those who drop out of a health plan, we are able to
examine the change in psychological health of the same group over time. Column 3 of Table
5 presents the results when we re-run equation (1) using the continuously enrolled sample.
The estimate is similar to our main results: a one standard deviation decrease in the local
stock return increases local antidepressant usage by approximately 0.52 percent.
1.3.2.5 Antidepressant usage for patients diagnosed by primary care physicians
Both specialists and primary care physicians can prescribe antidepressant to patients.21
Because specialists and primary care physicians might follow different criteria when
prescribing antidepressants, we investigate the relationship between antidepressant
prescriptions and stock returns in the subsample in which diagnoses were made by primary
care doctors, who prescribe the majority of the antidepressant prescription in our sample.
In Column 5 of Table 5, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of
weekly antidepressant usage patients diagnosed by primary care physicians only. The
estimation results remain consistent: a one standard deviation decrease in the local stock
return increases the local usage of antidepressant prescribed by primary care physicians
approximately 0.58 percent
1.3.2.6 Impact of stock returns on the antidepressant usage among the newly
prescribed users
In this section, we examine the antidepressant usage among patients who are newly
prescribed antidepressants. By examining the new patients, we can distinguish between
onset of depression and reoccurring depression. In Column 6 of Table 5, we exclude refills
of antidepressants. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of antidepressant
prescription to patients who are newly prescribed antidepressants in each MSA and week.
The independent variables are the same as Column 4 of Table 2. We find that investors are
more likely to be prescribed antidepressants after stock declines: a one standard deviation
21MarketScan data have provider-level information; thus, we are able to distinguish between specialists
and non-specialists (including primary care physicians). Patients seeing specialists include patients either
treated at mental health facilities or by a psychiatrist.
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decline in the local stock return increased local antidepressant usage of those who are newly
initiated to antidepressants by 0.56 percent.
1.3.2.7 Impact of stock returns on the patient’s starting dosage of
antidepressants
In the Column 7 of Table 5, we use prescribed dosage of antidepressant as an alternative
proxy for sentiment. More severe depression usually requires a higher dosage. Keller
et al. (1982) suggest that physicians should be aware of recommended medications and
doses for treating depression. We first define the daily dose of antidepressant for each
prescription as the quantity of medication prescribed multiplied by the strength of medication
divided by the days supplied. For the purpose of this robustness check, it is necessary to
compare dosages between different antidepressants. We use the recommendations from the
American Psychiatric Association (APA) Practice Guideline for the Treatment of Patients
with Major Depressive Disorder to establish the equivalent dose for the most commonly used
antidepressants.22 We define the daily equivalent dosage as the daily dose of antidepressant
for each patient calculated previously divided by the recommended starting dose from the
APA Practice Guideline for each type of antidepressant.23 Because specialists follow clinical
guidelines more closely, they are more careful with prescribing antidepressants, and are
able to prescribe more accurate dosages than primary care physicians (Kniesener et al.
(2005)). For this regression only, we restrict our sample to patients treated by specialists. In
addition, we exclude refills of antidepressants prescribed to the patients in this regression,
because physicians tend to increase the dose for patients who did not respond to the initially
prescribed dose (titration) (Wu et al. (2012b)). In this case, the dependent variable is
the weekly mean of the daily equivalent dosage of antidepressants prescribed in each MSA
and week. The independent variables are the same as Column 4 of Table 2. In Column 7
of Table 5, using the antidepressant dosage data to examine the relationship between the
22See APA Practice Guidelines, Page 34, Table 6 for the recommended dosage of medication.
http://psychiatryonline.org/pb/assets/raw/sitewide/practice guidelines/guidelines/mdd.pdf.
23Although the MarketScan data indicate whether a prescription is for the generic version or the brand
name version of an antidepressant, we do not distinguish between the brand name version or generic version
of the same antidepressant. It is likely that the effects are similar. Vlahiotis et al. (2011) find no significant
difference of discontinuation pattern of antidepressants between patients treated with a brand name version
versus a generic version.
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severity of depression and stock returns, we find patients are more likely to be treated with
antidepressants at a higher starting dosage after days of large stock declines: a one standard
deviation decline in the local stock return increased the starting dosage to 2.90 times the
APA standard from a baseline of 2.18 times the APA standard. We believe it is best to
be conservative, so for the robustness checks, we use a sample consisting of patients newly
started on antidepressants who have no claims for any antidepressants 90 days (wash-out
period) prior to the start of the first observed antidepressant prescription. The regression
results are similar.
1.3.2.8 Impact of stock returns on number of psychotherapy procedures
performed
Our main results show that declines in the stock market increase antidepressant usage. Given
that depression and anxiety disorders are commonly treated with either antidepressants
or/and more expensive psychotherapy, one could argue that the increase in antidepressant
usage might not be a perfect proxy for the shift of sentiment in investors. Instead, it could
simply represent the use of antidepressants by investors to substitute for the more expensive
psychotherapy offered by psychologist when investors’ wealth is declining. In addition,
some physicians might not prescribe antidepressants at the first visit. Thus, examining
the incidents of psychotherapy treatment is important. 24
Psychotherapy could be very effective in helping a person improve. Blattman et al. (2015)
find that cognitive behavioral therapy, one type of psychotherapy, helps criminally-engaged
Liberian men to increase self-control. As a result, the local rate of crime and violence fell
significantly. According to Spielmans et al. (2011), psychotherapy, which has fewer side
effects, could be as effective as antidepressants in treating depression.
We examine cases in which patients with depression or anxiety disorder diagnosis receive
psychotherapy (e.g., psychoanalysis, group psychotherapy, and family psychotherapy) and
find that 193,596 individuals (of 3.94 percent of our main regression sample) received
psychotherapy in an outpatient setting in 2005-2006. On average, each received 12.19
psychotherapy treatments in the 24 months. Among patients who received psychotherapy,
24Because the MarketScan data are from insurance carriers and large, self-insuring companies, individuals
in the sample are all covered by insurance and only need to pay the copayment and deductible amount for
psychotherapy treatments. Thus, the cost for the psychotherapy might be less of a concern in this case.
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approximately 70 percent were diagnosed with depression as the primary diagnosis. The rest
of the patients suffered from other disorders, such as anxiety disorders and post-traumatic
stress disorder. We re-estimate our model using the number of psychotherapy procedures.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the weekly number of psychotherapy procedures
administered in each MSA and week.25 In the last Column of Table 5, we present
the regression results using the number of psychotherapy procedures administered as an
alternative proxy for the sentiment of investors. The results remain consistent with our main
results: a one standard deviation decrease in the local stock return increases the number of
psychotherapy procedures performed by approximately 0.21 percent.
1.3.2.9 Impact of stock returns on antidepressant usage of fulltime workers
One potential source of bias arises from the possibility that the mental health of some
people in our sample is driven mainly by the threat of unemployment rather than
stock returns. Because the data in MarketScan are from insurance carriers and large,
self-insuring companies, the majority of individuals in the data are either employed or are
the spouse/children of the individuals employed, for whom unemployment is less of a threat.
However, 24.63 percent of individuals in our sample are either employed part-time only or
are covered under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA)
provision. COBRA is a law that mandates an insurance program offering some employees
continued health insurance coverage after leaving employment. Since Haliassos and Bertaut
(1995) find that people working in industries with high unemployment risk have substantially
lower probability of owning stocks, we expect that the mental health of individuals working
part-time or under the COBRA provision are driven mainly by the threat of unemployment
and the pressure of finding a new job, whereas stock returns might be less of a concern for
them. In Column 2 of Table 6, we limit our sample by including only individuals employed
full-time and their spouse/children. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the weekly
antidepressant usage of patients who are full-time workers or their spouse/children. The
result is consistent with our main regression in Table 2.
25To identify the procedures, we use the CPT-4 (Current Procedural Terminology, 4th Edition), provided
in the MarketScan outpatient service record. Each incident of psychotherapy is identified with Current
Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes 90801 to 90861. In addition, the patient must be diagnosed with
depression or anxiety disorder.
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1.3.2.10 Controlling for local natural disasters and terrorist attack incidence
We are concerned that our results could be driven by natural disasters and terrorist
attacks. These shocks could cause depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991) and Galea et al. (2002) show that more people suffer
from PTSD and depression after the Loma Prieta earthquake and after the September
11 attacks. Galea et al. (2002) also find that people who live close to the location of
an attack have a significantly higher prevalence of PTSD. Using the Disaster Declaration
File by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),26 we first identify the weeks
surrounding each terrorist attack and natural disaster and then generate state-week indicator
variables for the attacks and disasters. In Column 3 of Table 6, including the indicator
variables for terrorist attacks and natural disasters generates quantitatively and qualitatively
similar results: a one standard deviation decrease in the local stock return increases the
antidepressant usage by 0.43 percent.
1.3.2.11 Controlling for local housing prices
We are concerned that our results could be driven by the housing market instead of the
stock market. Lin et al. (2013) find that declines in housing value cause an increase in
antidepressant usage in the elderly population in the U.S. To address this potential threat to
our main results, we include the local monthly Freddie Mac Housing Price index (FMHPI)
as a control in Column 4 of Table 6. The FMHPI measures the average price changes in
repeat sales or refinancing of single-family homes in 363 metropolises. The results remain
consistent.
1.3.3 Non-linear relationship between stock returns and
antidepressant usage
In this section, we examine the possibility of non-linearity of the relationship between stock
returns and antidepressant usage. It is likely that a sharp stock drop leads to especially
high stress levels among investors and that extreme stock gains result in a reduction in
antidepressant usage. To investigate the non-linearity, we break the stock returns into
26The complete list of natural disasters and terrorist attacks is available at
https://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year.
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positive and negative returns and assign positive and negative returns indicator dummies.
We also break the returns into quintiles and assign quintile indicator dummies. We estimate
the following equation:
log (Antidepressantsm,t) = β0 + β1 ·Market returns,(t−1,t) ·Dummy returns,(t−1,t)
+β2 ·MSA economic factorsm,t +MSAm +Montht + Y eart + εm,t (2)
where we interact Market returns,(t−1,t) with dummies for positive and negative market
return, respectively, to examine whether people stop using antidepressants when stock prices
go up. We find that the usage of antidepressant goes up when the stock return is negative.
When the local two-week market return is negative, a one standard deviation decrease of
stock return results in a 1.14 percent increase in antidepressant usage as shown in Column
3 of Table 7. In comparison, when stock prices go up, no reduction in antidepressant usage
is observed. Next, Dummy returns,(t−1,t) breaks our variable of interest in the previous
equation into quintiles. We interact the quintiles dummies with the market return variable.
We find that only changes of market return in the bottom two quintiles affect usage of
antidepressants. More specifically, when the local two-week market return is in the bottom
quintiles, then a one standard deviation decrease of stock return increases antidepressant
usage by 1.23 percent, as shown in Column 5 of Table 7.
1.4 The effect of stock returns on antidepressant usage
depends on socioeconomic characteristics
1.4.1 Different age cohorts
Investors of different age cohorts might respond to stock returns differently. This section
examines the heterogeneous effect of stock returns on the antidepressant usage of different
age cohorts. Specifically, we answer two questions: first, which age cohort responds more to
market returns: the older or younger age cohort? Second, how fast is the response? Medical
literature suggests that elderly adults are at higher risk for depression. Using a sample of
Mexican-origin individuals, Angel et al. (2003) show that the relationship among perceived
economic stress and various health measures and cognitive indicators are stronger for elderly
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adults. Using U.S. mortality records, Hempstead and Phillips (2015) find that for people
under 64, the suicide rate between 1999 and 2010 increased for the older cohorts but not
for the younger cohorts. They also find that the most common suicide circumstances were
related to job, financial, or legal problems. In the Andersen healthcare utilization model,
Andersen (1995) identifies the three factors that contribute to the use of health services:
predisposing, enabling, and need factors. Age is a predisposing factor. According to this
model, an individual’s age influences his/her use of health service (Andersen (1995)). As
suggested above, we expect that the stock market may lead to a heterogeneous effect on the
antidepressant usage of different age cohorts.
To test the impact of stock market declines on antidepressant usage among different
age cohorts and whether some age cohorts react faster to stock market declines than other
cohorts, we divide our sample into the following categories: 35 to 45, 45 to 55, and 55
to 65. Table 8 presents the results. The different age cohorts have varying sensitivity to
stock market declines. The effect of stock returns is found to be significantly negative on
antidepressant usage among the 45-55 and 55-65 cohorts, whereas the effect is insignificant
for the younger cohort aged 35-45. The reaction time for the 45-55 cohort and the 55-65
cohort are different. The 45-55 cohort needs up to two weeks to react to the stock market
decline, whereas the response time of the 55-65 cohort to stock market declines is up to 3
weeks. A one standard deviation decrease in the local two-week market return results in a
0.38 percent increase in antidepressant usage in the 45-55 cohort, whereas a one standard
deviation decrease in the local three-week market return results in a 0.09 percent increase
in antidepressant usage in the 55-65 cohort. The older cohort may be a “slow responder”
to stocks market declines for two reasons. First, elderly people might read financial news
less often and thus not be aware of the newest stock market prices. Statistics show that the
median age of a Wall Street Journal reader is 45.4.27 Second, elderly people might not recall
the content of the news. Frieske and Park (1999) studied memory of news stories in young
and older adults by presenting print, audio and TV news to them. They find that older adults
recall a significantly lower proportion of the news content than their younger counterparts.
Our results indicate that the effect is insignificant for the antidepressant usage of the 35-45
age cohort, which is not surprising because the youngest cohorts own less stock; thus, their
27The information on the average age of readers is available at
http://www.megamediamarketing.com/demographics.html.
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wealth is less affected by the stock market. Another possible reason is that most people in
the 35-45 cohort are at least 20 years away from retirement and will continue receiving a
salary from work until then, which is their main source of income, thereby resulting in lower
level of stress when they face poor performing stock market.
1.4.2 Different level of stock ownership
We also explore whether the relationship between the stock returns and people’s sentiment
is different for MSAs with different levels of stock ownership. We use two proxies for stock
ownership: first, the proportion of people in an MSA working in the finance industry. The
industry of employment is given in MarketScan. Second, the local per capita dividend
income, which consists of payments made by corporations headquartered both in the U.S.
and abroad to U.S. residents.28
Table 9 presents the regression analysis that allows for heterogeneous response of
antidepressant usage to stock returns across MSAs with different levels of stock ownership.
In Column 1, we divide all MSAs into two groups based on the proportion of people working
in the finance industry below or above the national median. We generate a high (low) stock
ownership dummy which equals to 1 for all MSAs with the proportion of people working in
the finance industry above (below) the national median, and 0 otherwise. We interact the
stock returns with the two low/high indicators. In Column 2, we repeat the process for our
second proxy for stock ownership: per capita dividend income. If people living in regions with
high stock ownership on average are more likely to be affected by the stock returns, the effect
on antidepressant usage should be stronger in those regions. This is exactly what we find in
Columns 1-2 of Table 9. Stock returns only affect the antidepressant usage in regions where
the stock ownership proxy is above national median. Individuals in that group experience a
0.268-0.38 percent increase in antidepressant usage when the local stock return declines by
one standard deviation. There is no effect of the stock returns on the antidepressant usage
of people with low stock ownership. However, given the data limitations, these two measures
are not perfect proxies for stock ownership. Thus, the results should be interpreted with
28Dividends paid by mutual funds are not included in the calculation of Per Capita Dividend
Income. Per Capita Dividend Income is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis(BEA), Regional Income




1.4.3 Regional differences in subjective well-being, political
affiliation, and religiosity within the U.S.
Researchers have studied how different cultures affect financial outcomes. For example,
Ahern et al. (2012) find that national culture affects the volume of cross-border mergers.
We hypothesize that the effects of stock returns on antidepressant usage is influenced by
different cultures. To identify the differences across geographical areas, in this section, we
use the Gallup State of the States poll to measure state level differences across several
well-being, political, and religious measures. In the next section of our paper, we examine
how differences in personality traits influence the effects of stock returns on antidepressant
usage. The Gallup poll is commonly used in economic research. Kahneman and Deaton
(2010) use the Gallup poll to study people’s emotional well-being and life evaluation. The
results of the Gallup State of the States poll are based on telephone interviews with a random
sample of 177,000 adults above 18 years old, living in the 50 U.S. states and D.C. The detailed
questions in the survey are listed in the appendix. We merge the MarketScan data with the
Gallup State of the State poll results.
In Panel A and Panel B of Table 10, we explore how these regional well-being, political,
and religious differences across states within the U.S. affect the stock market-sentiment
relationship. We examine who worries the most about stock market declines by comparing
the mental health sensitivity of different cohorts to stock returns. First, we examine how
personal well-being affects antidepressant usage in response to stock returns. Griffin et
al. (2002) find that lower control over one’s own work increases the risk of developing
depression and anxiety for both women and men. Musick and Wilson (2003) find that
exposure to volunteer work lowers depression levels for the elderly population. Craft and
Perna (2004) find that exercise can improve the symptoms of depression. We expect that
productivity, work that helps the community, and frequent exercise mitigate the negative
sentiment that people experience when the stock market declines. In particular, as suggested
before, productive work could help people divert their attention from the stock market
conditions, and more toward the positive aspects of life. Likewise, people could turn to
community and friends for emotional support. In Columns 2-6 of Panel A, we divide states
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into two categories according to each measure of well-being: below or above the national
median. We then interact the market return with low/high score dummies. We find that
people: a) with worse overall well-being, b) who feel less productive, c) who are more worried
about money, d) who receive less community recognition, and e) who exercise less frequently
experience an increase in antidepressant usage when the stock market declines. Individuals
belonging to these groups on average experience a 0.39 percent -0.46 percent increase in
antidepressant usage when the local stock return declines by one standard deviation. There
is no effect of stock returns on the antidepressant usage of people: a) with better overall
well-being, b) who feel more productive, c) who are less worried about money, d) who
receive more community recognition, and e) who exercise more frequently. People who are
more worried about money tend to be depressed when facing losses in stock value. One
implication from our study is that, for people whose self-esteem is linked closely with the
value of stocks, it may be best to avoid risky investments because the emotional suffering
caused by negative stock returns might be too large to bear. The grief experience might
drive them to make poorer investment decisions in return. This panic behavior caused by
grief experience could drive the whole stock market further down. In this aspect, our paper
also contributes to the literature of human behavior and stock crashes (Shiller (1999)).
Second, we examine how religion affects the way people’s antidepressant usage responds
to stock returns. McCullough and Larson (1999) find that people with high levels of general
religious involvement are at reduced risk for depression. He states that the reasons for a lower
risk of depression among religious people include more social connections that result from
attending church, the mental activity that comes with helping others, and coping strategies
learnt to address negative aspects of life, including one’s own mortality. We expect that the
factors mentioned above help religious people address the financial stress. In Columns 7-8 of
Panel A, we divide states into two categories according to their religious score: below or above
the national median. The results show that that people in less religious states experience an
increase in antidepressant usage when stock prices decline: a one standard deviation local
stock decline results in a 0.30 percent increase in antidepressant usage. In comparison, we do
not find the same effect for people living in more religious states. Our results are consistent
with those of Callen and Fang (2012), who find that firms headquartered in more religious
regions exhibit lower levels of stock price crash risk.
Finally, we look into how political affiliation and ideology affect how mental health
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responds to stock returns. With respect to Republicans/Democrats, we have no prior
reason to believe that there is any difference in their level of happiness. With respect to
Conservatives/Liberals, Okulicz-Kozaryn et al. (2014), using surveys conducted between
1970 and 2002 by the European Commission in 16 Western European countries, find that
conservative individuals are happier than liberals. However, their results might not be
extended to the U.S. In Columns 2-7 of Panel B, we do not find significant heterogeneity
in antidepressant usage responsiveness to stock returns between individuals with different
political affiliation; however, people in states with more conservative populations respond
slightly differently to stock returns than their counterparts living in states with more liberal
population. People living in states with higher levels of liberals experience a slight increase
in antidepressant usage when the stock market declines. There is no effect of stock returns
on the antidepressant usage of people living in states with higher level of conservatives.
1.4.4 Regional differences in personality traits within the U.S.
In this section, we use the five-factor model of personality to identify the cultural differences
across geographical areas. The five-factor personality traits are neuroticism, extraversion,
agreeableness, openness, and conscientiousness. The five-factor model describes human
personality in general. The state-level personality traits data are from Rentfrow et al. (2013),
who aggregate the survey responses of 1.5 million individuals. They find that personality
traits tend to be similar for people residing within the same geographical area. We merge
the MarketScan data with the state-level personality traits from Rentfrow et al. (2013).
In Table 11, we explore how these differences in personality traits across states affect
the stock market-sentiment relationship. First, we examine how neuroticism affects
antidepressant usage in response to stock returns. Neuroticism is the tendency to be
emotionally sensitive and instable. Ormel et al. (2013) find that people with a high score of
neuroticism exhibit low tolerance for stress and experience anxiety and depression often. We
expect that neuroticism reinforces the negative sentiment when the stock market declines. In
particular, as suggested before, people who score high on neuroticism could interpret minor
frustrations as extreme difficulties. In Column 2 of Table 11, we divide states into two groups
according to whether the measure of personality traits, neuroticism, falls below or above the
national median. We generate a high (low) score dummy for neuroticism which equals to
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1 for all state with the score for an above (below) the national median, and 0 otherwise.
We then interact the market return with low/high score dummies. We find that people
living in states with above median neuroticism score, on average, experience an increase in
antidepressant usage when the stock market declines. Individuals living in states with above
median neuroticism score, on average, experience a 0.79 percent increase in antidepressant
usage when the local stock return declines by one standard deviation (Column 2 of Table
11). There is no effect of stock returns on the antidepressant usage of people living in states
with low neuroticism score on average.
Second, we examine how extraversion affects the way people’s respond to stock
returns in terms of antidepressant usage. Extraversion is the tendency to be talkative,
outgoing, and energetic. Weiss et al. (2009) find that high extraversion combined with
high neuroticism results in the “overly emotional” style. This “overly emotional” style
is associated with a higher risk for major depression. Thus, we expect that a high
extraversion score reinforces the negative sentiment caused by financial stress. In Column
3 of Table 11, the result shows that that people in states with higher extraversion score
on average experience an increase in antidepressant usage when stock prices decline: a one
standard deviation local stock decline results in a 0.67 percent increase in antidepressant
usage. We do not find the same effect for people living in states with lower extraversion
score on average.
Third, we look into the way the agreeableness score affects how mental health responds
to stock returns. Agreeableness is the tendency to be well-tempered, compassionate, and
cooperative. Dunkley et al. (1997) find that for both men and women, low agreeableness is a
predictor for self-blaming. In Column 4 of Table 11, we find that people in states with lower
agreeableness score, on average, respond differently to stock returns than their counterparts
living in states with higher agreeableness score on average. People living in states with lower
agreeableness score, on average, experience an increase in antidepressant usage when the
stock market declines: a one standard deviation local stock decline results in a 0.61 percent
increase in antidepressant usage. There is no effect of stock returns on the antidepressant
usage of people living in states with higher agreeableness score on average.
Finally, we examine how openness and conscientiousness affect how mental health
responds to stock returns. Openness is the tendency to be inventive, imaginative and curious.
Conscientiousness is the tendency to be organized, structured, and dependable. With respect
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to openness, Bienvenu et al. (2004) find that high openness to feelings is associated
with slightly higher risk for Major Depression. With respect to conscientiousness, we have no
prior reason to believe that it is a risk factor of depression. In Columns 5-6 of Table 11,
we find people living in states with higher openness score, on average, show an increase in
antidepressant usage when the stock market declines. There is no effect of stock returns on
the antidepressant usage of people living in states with lower openness score on average. We
do not find significant heterogeneous effect of stock returns on antidepressant usage in terms
of different conscientiousness scores.
1.5 Depression as a risk factor for other illnesses
1.5.1 Illnesses resulting from depression treated in outpatient
settings
In this section, we show that stock returns affect not only mental health by causing
depression, but also physical health. In Table 12, we present the relationship between the
number of outpatient diagnoses of insomnia, peptic ulcer and abdominal pain (irritable bowel
syndrome) and stock returns. All three diseases are often results of depression.29
Insomnia, peptic ulcers, and abdominal pain are all common medical conditions. The
National Sleep Foundation’s 2002 Sleep in America poll shows that nearly 60 percent of
adults in the U.S. experience symptoms of insomnia a few times a week.30 Sung et al.
(2009) find that the one-year prevalence rate of peptic ulcer is between 0.12 percent and 1.50
percent. Quigley et al.’s (2006) surveys of individuals establish the prevalence of abdominal
cramping/pain. Their results show that the prevalence of abdominal cramping and pain
is 24 percent in the U.S. In the MarketScan sample, 353,000 individuals are diagnosed
with abdominal pain from 2005-06. On average, each of those individuals visits outpatient
facilities 3.81 times because of the pain in the two-year period. Ohayon et al. (1998) and
Patten (1999) show that insomnia and peptic ulcers, respectively, are strongly associated
with depression.
29Because a primary care physician can successfully treat insomnia, peptic ulcer and abdominal pain and
there is often no need to seek specialist to treat these conditions, we include individual in this regression
regardless of the type of their insurance plans, including “gatekeeper plans”.
30See WB&A Market Research: 2002 Sleep in America Poll for the detailed results of the survey.
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The relationship between abdominal pain and depression is more complicated. The
primary symptom of irritable bowel syndrome is abdominal pain. Because there is no imaging
or lab test to diagnose irritable bowel syndrome, the syndrome is often misdiagnosed as
general abdominal pain. Masand et al. (1995), Lydiard (2001), and Blanchard et al. (1990)
find that irritable bowel syndrome is common in patients who suffer from depression. In
addition to the fact that abdominal pain is associated with depression, there is another way
that pain in general is related to depression: the fear of incurring the stigma of depression.
Pelz and Merskey (1982) interviewed patients with problems related to pain. They find
that interviewees on average test positive for mild depression only when the questionnaire
avoids the term “depression”. If, however, the questionnaire uses the term “depression”, the
interviewees test negative for depression. Since the difference in wording causes discrepancies
between the two test results, Pelz and Merskey (1982) conjecture that the stigma surrounding
depression causes patients’ unwillingness to admit to symptoms in the interviews. Thus, it is
entirely possible that some patients who visit doctors and complain about pain are actually
experiencing depression symptoms; the stigma surrounding depression results in the biased
diagnosis.
We define the dependent variable as the logarithm of the number of weekly incidences
of insomnia, peptic ulcers, and abdominal pain in each MSA and week.31 Table 12 presents
the results for three types of comorbidity of depression. We find that people are more likely
to have an outpatient visit with a diagnosis of insomnia and peptic ulcer within two weeks
of experiencing negative stock returns and are more likely to have an outpatient visit with a
diagnosis of abdominal pain within one week of experiencing negative stock returns. A local
31Each outpatient visit as a result of insomnia is identified with a primary or secondary diagnosis of
ICD-9 code 307.42 (Sleep disorder, persistent), 307.41 (Insomnia, transient), 327.0 (Organic insomnia),
780.51 (Insomnia with sleep apnea, unspecified), or 780.52 (Insomnia, unspecified), whereas stomach ulcer
and abdominal pain-related outpatient visits have a primary or secondary diagnosis of ICD-9 codes 531-534
(Gastric ulcer, Duodenal ulcer, Peptic ulcer (site unspecified), and Gastrojejunal ulcer) and ICD-9 codes
789.0 (Abdominal pain), respectively. For detailed explanation on how to use the MarketScan data and
ICD-9 code to identify insomnia-related visits in outpatient settings, see Wiechers et al. (2014). Insomnia
and peptic ulcer are usually treated with prescription medications; we therefore impose the restriction that
the outpatient visit for insomnia and peptic ulcer must be accompanied with a prescription to be counted as
an incidence in our regression. We do not impose the same restriction for visits related to abdominal pain
because this condition is not usually treated with prescription medications. For example, irritable bowel
syndrome is often treated with restricted diet and fiber supplements. See Thompson et al. (1999) for a
detailed discussion of treatment recommendations for functional bowel disorders and functional abdominal
pain.
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two-week stock decline of one standard deviation results in a 0.24 percent and a 0.53 percent
increases in insomnia and peptic ulcer diagnosis, respectively. A one standard deviation
local weekly stock decline results in a 0.47 percent increase in contemporaneous diagnosis of
abdominal pain. The faster response of the increase in abdominal pain incidence after stock
market declines could be caused by the urgency of abdominal pain and timely access to care.
This result shows a strong relationship between depression and illnesses often resulting from
depression and stock returns. Since Kamstra et al. (2000) find that poor sleep is associated
with lower subsequent stock returns using daylight saving time change, in this aspect, our
paper contributes to the literature of sleep and stock returns.
1.5.2 Illnesses resulting from depression treated in inpatient
settings
In this section, we investigate how stock returns relate to the incidence of more serious
illnesses often resulting from depression, which physicians cannot treat in outpatient settings.
The advantage of analyzing critical illnesses resulting from depression in inpatient settings is
that patients with critical illnesses have lower price elasticity of demand and are unlikely to
delay being hospitalized. Thus, inpatient data reflect the disease prevalence more accurately
and timely. We use daily analysis because both substance overdose and myocardial infarction
require emergency health treatment.
1.5.2.1 Impact of stock returns on substance abuse incidence
Substance abuse disorder is one of the most common psychiatric disorders in the U.S. For
substance abuse patients, inpatient stay allows the patient to leave the old environment
and focus on the treatment without temptations and distractions to use the substance.
Depression is a risk factor for substance abuse. Grant et al. (2004) find overwhelming
evidence that substance abuse disorders are associated with mood and anxiety disorders.
The association between substance abuse and depression is consistent with the notion that
patients suffering from depression are likely to rely on substances to “self-medicate.” The
substances might relieve depression symptoms temporarily and cause temporary feelings of
euphoria according to the self-medication hypothesis (Markou et al. (1998)).
The MarketScan database covers care in hospital stays (inpatient service). For
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each hospital stay, MarketScan summarizes information related to the hospital stay and
identifies a principal diagnosis for the stay, which is often the discharge diagnosis on the claim.
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of daily incidences of substance abuse
in each state.32 The independent variable is the daily observations of the value-weighted stock
returns of firms headquartered in the same state. The return of stocks on a non-trading day is
set to zero. In addition to the controls and fixed effects we used for previous regressions, we
also include a day of the week fixed effect, because certain days of the week could have
higher incidence rates of inpatient admission. In Table 13, we use inpatient admission
data to examine the relationship between substance abuse and stock returns. We find that
people are more likely to experience inpatient stays with a diagnosis of substance abuse
after days of negative stock returns. A one standard deviation decline in the local four-,
three-, and two-day stock return results in a 1.26 percent, a 0.76 percent, and a 0.87 percent
increase in inpatient stays with a diagnosis of substance abuse. This result again shows a
consistent relationship between depression and illnesses often resulting from depression and
stock returns.
1.5.2.2 Impact of stock returns on circulatory disease incidence
In this section, we investigate the impact of stock returns on incidences of inpatient stays
related to myocardial infarction and all circulatory diseases. Myocardial infarction is
the leading cause of death in the U.S. Approximately half a million people die from the
disease each year in the U.S.33 Halaris (2009) shows that high comorbidity exists between
depression and cardiovascular disease. People with depression are at significantly higher
32The regression results are similar when our dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of
incidences of illness in each MSA. Each hospitalization as a result of substance abuse, identified with ICD-9
codes 292 (Drug psychoses), 304 (Drug dependence), or 305 (Nondependent abuse of drugs), is counted as one
incidence. In this regression, we include individuals regardless of the type of their insurance plans because
insurance plans are unlikely the reason that deters patients from hospitalization for two reasons. First,
an inpatient stay has lower demand elasticity, and second, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA) passed in 1986 requires hospital Emergency Departments to provide an appropriate
medical screening examination (MSE) to individuals seeking treatment regardless of citizenship, legal status,
or ability to pay. See https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EMTALA/ for more
details of EMTALA.
33See American Heart Association Cardiovascular disease statistics, available at
http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=4478 (accessed March 2, 2009) for more
detailed statistics related to the incidence of myocardial infarction in the U.S.
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risk of developing cardiovascular disease. In another study, stress was a risk factor for
cardiovascular disease: Fiuzat et al. (2010) find an increased in the number of cardiovascular
deaths a few days after earthquakes. Sweet et al. (2013) find that higher debt is related to
increased risk of high blood pressure. Not only do negative sentiment and stress contribute
to the incidence of myocardial infarction, excitement and euphoria are also risk factors for
developing infarction. Dimsdale (1977) finds that intense emotions cause sudden death
through cardiovascular disease. Engel (1971) finds that some paradoxical situations, such
as relief from a dangerous situation, pleasure, reunion, or even triumph, also cause sudden
death. He hypothesizes that the overwhelming excitation triggers an exaggerated response
in the human body that is conducive to myocardial infarction, particularly in people with
pre-existing cardiovascular diseases. Using meta-analysis, Nawrot et al. (2011) find that
both positive and negative emotions are triggers for myocardial infarction.
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of daily incidences of myocardial
infarction and circulatory disease in each state.34 We include a variety of controls (local
unemployment rate and average wage) and fixed effects (geographical and time fixed effects).
Controlling for monthly fixed effect is of particular importance in this regression, because
the incidence of myocardial infarction is higher during winter months (Fiuzat et al. 2010).
Potential explanations offered include colder temperatures, increased level of air pollution,
short daylight hours, more respiratory-related symptoms, and increased food intake. In
Table 14, we include two stock return variables, one representing positive returns, the other
negative returns. We show that a rise in the stock market might be harmful due to the
intense emotional pleasure that comes with having more assets, which is too great to bear
for people with preexisting cardiovascular conditions. After local stocks experience a positive
return, the number of inpatient admissions affiliated with circulatory disease and myocardial
infarction both increase. A positive local four-, three-, two-, and same-day market return
results in a 1.20 percent, a 1.50 percent, a 1.62 percent, and a 1.91 percent increase in the
number of inpatient stays with myocardial infarction diagnosis. When stock returns fall into
negative territory, we do not observe the same phenomenon. Ma et al. (2011) and Schwartz
et al. (2012) examine stock returns and the incidence of cardiac death using regional data.
34Hospitalization as a result of myocardial infarction is identified with a primary diagnosis of ICD-9
code 410 (Acute myocardial infarction), whereas all circulatory disease-related admissions have a primary
diagnosis of ICD-9 codes 390 through 459 (Diseases of the circulatory system), which include myocardial
infarction.
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Ma et al. (2011) use data on coronary heart disease in Shanghai, China and the Shanghai
Stock Exchange Composite Index, whereas Schwartz et al. (2012) use data on cardiac death
in Los Angeles County and the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index. The only other study
using U.S. nationwide data on cardiovascular events is by Fiuzat et al. (2010), who use data
from the Duke Databank for Cardiovascular Disease. We extend their research by examining
positive and negative returns separately.
Because people with preexisting cardiovascular diseases are prone to myocardial infarction
due to excitement and the risk of myocardial infarction increases with old age (Graham et
al. (1997)), it is important for elderly investors to understand what type of portfolio best
suits them. Some elderly investors might benefit from very conservative investments. When
the stock market fluctuates, people with preexisting conditions may experience devastating
losses, like failing health and long-term complications after the acute phase of myocardial
infarction.
1.6 Falsification tests
To verify that the effects of stock returns on investors’ psychological health do not occur by
chance, we test the validity of our results by performing two falsification tests. First, we
consider whether stock market declines might cause increased drug usage in general. Thus, in
the first falsification test, we test whether stock market declines are associated with increases
in the usage of the antibiotics. In a CDC study, Hicks et al. (2013) find that antibiotics are
commonly prescribed. Four out of five Americans received antibiotics prescriptions in 2010.
The usage of antibiotics is likely to capture the effect of the stock returns on general drug
usage for reasons not linked directly to the effects of stock returns on sentiment. Second,
we consider whether the results are driven by the general economic situation around the
world. Therefore, we examine the effect of foreign stock markets on the antidepressant usage
of U.S. investors. The logic behind the second falsification test is that the market returns
in foreign countries should not affect U.S. investors’ psychological health because investors
exhibit home bias in their stock holdings, and most do not directly invest in foreign stocks
(Kang and Stulz (1997)).35
Table 15 presents the results for the two falsification tests. In Columns 1-3 of Table 14,
35Kang and Stulz (1997) find that the investments made by non-Japanese investors exhibit home bias.
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the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of antibiotic prescriptions. In
our data, Amoxicillin (32.2 percent) is the most commonly prescribed antibiotic, followed
by Azithromycin (19.9 percent), Fluconazole (5.7 percent), Doxycycline (5.5 percent), and
Cephalexin (8.9 percent). We find that stock returns do not affect the usage of antibiotics.
In Columns 4-12, we use the stock market returns of three major European countries:
the U.K., Germany, and France, because the markets in these countries are comparable
to the U.S. market in terms of maturity and efficiency. These countries are the three
most developed European Countries according to the International Monetary Fund’s World
Economic Outlook for 2014. The results show no significant association between foreign
stock returns and U.S. investors’ antidepressant usage.
1.7 Economic cost
A critical question of any research on wealth shock and people’s health is to identify the
magnitude of economic cost that is associated with the deterioration of people’s health
caused by the market decline. In this section, we estimate the medical cost associated with
the stock market decline. Our results in Column 3 of Table 3 indicate that a one standard
deviation decrease in local stock return results in a 0.417 percent increase in antidepressant
usage. During the 2005-2006 period, patients in the MarketScan sample spent $295,000,535
on coinsurance, copayment, and deductible related to antidepressant medications, and
$136,153,681 on coinsurance, copayment, and deductible related to outpatient visits resulting
a depression diagnosis. Thus, a one standard deviation decrease in local cumulative two-week
stock returns results in an additional $13,629,962 (=0.417 percent×(295.5 million /13.3
million)× $295 million×0.5) spent on antidepressants filled in year 2005 and an additional
$6,286,470 (=0.417 percent×(295.5 million /13.3 million)× $136 million ×0.5) spent on
outpatient visits resulting a depression diagnosis in year 2005.36
However, the estimated economic cost of $19.8 million (=$13.6million + $6.2 million) is
just the lower bound of the actual cost related to investor depression caused by the market
decline in year 2005. First, the medical expenses in this section only include the fees charged
to patients, but do not include fees charged to insurance carriers. Second, the medical
expenses only include the fees occurred in outpatient settings to treat depression, but do not
36The U.S. population was 295.5 million in 2005. The MarketScan sample covers 13.3 million patients.
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include the fees occurred in inpatient settings. Third, the medical expenses associated with
the treatment for illnesses often resulting from depression (e.g. substance abuse, insomnia,
etc.) are not taken into account. Fourth, economic costs associated with productivity loss
and life loss of patients and the work-day loss of patients’ families are not included in our
calculation.
1.8 Conclusion
Our paper provides evidence that local stock returns are a relevant factor in determining
investors’ sentiment. Using the MarketScan database, we find that a one standard deviation
decrease in the local stock return results in a 0.42 percent increase in local antidepressant
usage. The complete insurance records of the diverse population in our sample allow us
to examine the heterogeneous effect of stock returns on sentiment. We find that the effect
is particularly strong for individuals between 45 and 55 years old and 55 and 65 years old,
although individuals between 55 and 65 years have a slower response to stock market declines.
This effect of stock returns on sentiment is reinforced by higher stock ownership. Local
stock returns are also significantly related with certain physical illnesses, which are often
results of depression, including insomnia, peptic ulcer, abdominal pain, substance abuse and
myocardial infarction. These physical illnesses might cause long-term complications after
the acute phase. The true consequences of stock market declines may go beyond the lost
wealth in stock assets.
We examined how stock prices affect sentiment. This study contributes to the literature
on the mental health consequences of changes in wealth, which includes studies using surveys
(McInerney et al. (2013), Cotti et al. (2014), Schwandt (2014)) and studies using medical
records (Engelberg and Parsons (2016), Lin et al. (2013)). Our study is also related to
research on the impact of changes in wealth on interpersonal relationships (Dettling and
Kearney (2014), Lovenheim and Mumford (2013), and Farnham et al. (2011)). Finally, our
study is related to studies in neuroeconomics that use experiments to examine the brain’s
reaction to losses (Rick (2011)).
Our study adds to the literature in several ways. First, we use a commonly prescribed
medication as a proxy for an individual’s mental health and sentiment (antidepressants are
prescribed to 19.54 percent of individuals in our sample). Second, given the diverse data,
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we are able to examine the heterogeneity of the effect of stock returns on an individual’s
sentiment. A limitation of our study is that there are potential sample selection biases. For
example, the MarketScan dataset covers the healthcare claims of privately insured patients
and their families only. Although the privately insured comprise the largest group of U.S.
healthcare users (48 percent of the total U.S. population uses private insurance, 14 percent
of the population is covered by Medicare, 17 percent is covered by Medicaid or other public
insurances, and 5 percent of the U.S. population is not insured), we might not adequately
capture trends in the antidepressant usage by Medicare, Medicaid or other public insurance
users or the non-insured population. Also, all individuals in the MarketScan Commercial
Claims and Encounters database are under 65. It would be interesting to study other
populations if the data were available. At last, the MarketScan dataset we use covers
insurance records of 2005-2006 only. Thus, we can only examine the short-term effects
of stock returns on an individual’s mental health. A fruitful area for future research is to
explore whether stock returns cause long-term health consequences.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table summarizes the main variables. There are 4,917,091 non-gatekeeper insurance plan holders be-
tween 35 (included) and 64 (included) years of age in the MarketScan database from 2005 to 2006. Panel A
summarizes demographic characteristics of the individuals in the sample. Full-time worker is the percentage
of workers who are employed full-time in a MSA. Proportion of workers in finance industry is the percentage
of workers in finance industry in a MSA. Panel B summarizes medical variables. Antidepressant count by
MSA-week is the number of weekly prescription of antidepressants prescribed to individuals living in a MSA.
Antidepressant count with diagnosis by MSA-week is the number of weekly prescription of antidepressants
prescribed to individuals who are assigned a primary or secondary diagnosis of depression or anxiety disorder.
Psychotherapy count with diagnosis by MSA-week is the number of weekly procedures of psychotherapy per-
formed on individuals who are assigned a primary or secondary diagnosis of depression or anxiety disorder.
Panel C summarize the stock weekly returns and the macroeconomic variables. Weekly state index return is
the weekly, value-weighted return of stocks with firm headquarters in a state. One-Year Volatility of state
stock return is the standard deviation of weekly returns over the past 52 weeks. Unemployment is the MSA-
month unemployment rate. Average weekly wage is the MSA-quarter wage rate. Annual per capita dividend
income is the state-level dividend income divided by the states population.
Regression Sample (n=4,917,091)
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Panel A: Demographics Variables
Age (Years) 49.77 8.23 35 64
Male (%) 46.27 49.86
Full-time Worker (%) 75.37 43.08
Proportion of Workers in Finance Industry (%) 8.51 27.89
Panel B: Medical Variables
Antidepressant Count by MSA-week 162.81 286.11 1 3645
Antidepressant Count with Diagnosis by MSA-week 39.54 75.13 1 904
Psychotherapy Count with Diagnosis by MSA-week 55.21 130.31 1 1885
Panel C: Stocks and Macroeconomic Variables
Weekly State Index Return (Basis Points) 138.91 1975.24 -8577.52 59346.33
One-year Volatility of State Stock Index (Basis Points) 1281.74 1523.99 335.21 12553.04
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.33 1.92 2 25
Average Weekly Wage ($) 672.33 120.14 444 1840
Annual per Capita Dividend Income ($1,000) 2.19 0.71 0.94 6.11
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Table 2: Local Market Return and Local Antidepressant Usage
This table presents the regression results of antidepressant usage on market returns. We include non-gatekeeper
insurance plan holders between 35 (included) and 64 (included) years of age in the regression sample. Each
observation is a MSA-week cell. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of antidepressant
prescription to individuals living in a MSA during week t who are diagnosed with depression or anxiety
disorder. The main independent variable is the cumulative two-week return (t-1,t) of a value-weighted index
consisting of public companies headquartered in a state. The two-week return (t-1,t) is measured as the
percentage change from the closing index Friday two weeks ago to this Fridays closing index. The return
is scaled by trailing 1-year standard deviation of the state stock return. Each column represents a separate
regression. Month fixed effects, year fixed effects, MSA fixed effects, controls for unemployment rate and
average weekly wage are added gradually. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at MSA level.




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Return (t-1,t) -1.350*** -1.338*** -0.420** -0.417**
(-3.478) (-3.449) (-2.505) (-2.233)
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES
Control: Unemployment Rate YES
Control: Average Weekly Wage YES
Observations 38,336 38,336 38,336 32,161
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.926 0.912
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Table 3: Local Market Return and Local Antidepressant Usage: Different Lag
Structure
This table considers the effect between the market return from (t-3,t) through (t,t+3) on antidepressant usage
during week t. The dependent variable is the same as in Table 2. The main independent variable in columns
1-3 is the cumulative return from week t-k to t of a value-weighted index consisting of public companies
headquartered in a state. For example, the cumulative return in column 1 is the four-week return which is
measured as the percentage change from the closing index Friday four weeks ago to this Fridays closing index.
The main independent variable in column 4 is the return from week t of a value-weighted index consisting of
public companies headquartered in a state. The main independent variable in columns 5-7 is the cumulative
return from week t to t+k of a value-weighted index consisting of public companies headquartered in a state.
For example, the cumulative return in column 5 is the two-week return from week t to t+1 which is measured
as the percentage change from the closing index last Friday to next Fridays closing index. Thus, columns 1-3
test for the lagged relationship between market returns and subsequent usage of antidepressants, while column
4 tests for the instantaneous relationship between market returns and usage of antidepressants during the same
week. Columns 5-7 test for the leading relationship between market returns and usage of antidepressants in
the past. The return is scaled by trailing 1-year standard deviation of the state stock return. Each column
represents a separate regression. All other control variables and fixed effects are the same as in column 4 of
Table 2. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at MSA level. *, **, and *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP: Log(Antidepressant with Diagnosis(t))
(t-3,t) (t-2,t) (t-1,t) (t) (t,t+1) (t,t+2) (t,t+3)
Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Market Return of Various Periods -0.064 -0.261 -0.417** -0.409** -0.023 -0.192 0.153
(-0.397) (-1.400) (-2.233) (-2.176) (-0.121) (-1.036) (0.896)
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Control: Unemployment Rate YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Control: Average Weekly Wage YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 32,161 32,161 32,161 32,161 31,850 31,541 31,227








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Robustness Checks: Work Status, Disasters, and Housing Price
In this table, we include non-gatekeeper insurance plans holders between 35 (included) and 64 (included)
years of age in the regression sample. Table 6 column 1 replicates Table 2 column4. In Table 6 column 1, the
dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of antidepressant prescription to individual living in a MSA
during week t. In column 2, the dependent variable counts the weekly antidepressant usage of patients who are
full-time workers only, all independent variables, controls, and fixed effects are the same as in Table 2 column
4. In columns 3-4, we add a state-week dummy as indicator for the terrorists attacks and natural disasters
and Freddie Mac Housing Price index as a state-month control, respectively. All other control variables, fixed
effects, independent variables are the same as in Table 2 column 4. The dependent variable is the same as in
Table 2. Each column represents a separate regression. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at
MSA level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP: Log(Antidepressant with Diagnosis(t))
Baseline Full-time Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Return (t-1,t) -0.417** -0.451** -0.425** -0.538**
(-2.233) (-2.178) (-2.274) (-2.008)
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Control: Unemployment Rate YES YES YES YES
Control: Average Weekly Wage YES YES YES YES
Disaster Days Fixed Effects YES
Control: Local Housing Price Index YES
Observations 32,161 31,225 32,161 17,872
R-squared 0.912 0.894 0.912 0.905
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Table 7: Non-linear Relationship between Market Return and Antidepressant
Usage
Table 7 column 1 replicates Table 2 column 4. Columns 2-3 break the market return variable, the main
independent variable, into two parts, positive and negative returns. We interact the market return variable with
its positive/negative indicator dummies. Column 4-5 break the market return variable, the main independent
variable, into five parts (quintiles). We interact the market return variable with its quintile indicator dummies.
All control variables and fixed effects are the same as in Table 2 column 4. The dependent variable is the
same as in Table 2. Each column represents a separate regression. In parentheses are robust standard errors
clustered at MSA level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP: Log(Antidepressant with Diagnosis(t))
Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market Return (t-1,t) -0.417**
(-2.233)
Market Return (t-1,t) * Negative return dummy -1.102*** -1.136***
(-2.970) (-2.596)
Market Return (t-1,t) * Positive return dummy 0.068
(0.203)
Market Return (t-1,t) * Bottom Quintile dummy -0.933** -1.225***
(-2.498) (-2.757)
Market Return (t-1,t) * Quintile 2 dummy -2.366*
(-1.879)
Market Return (t-1,t) * Quintile 3 dummy -4.625
(-1.250)
Market Return (t-1,t) * Quintile 4 dummy 1.487
(1.383)
Market Return (t-1,t) * Top Quintile dummy 0.135
(0.394)
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Control: Unemployment Rate YES YES YES YES YES
Control: Average Weekly Wage YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 32,161 32,161 32,161 32,161 32,161














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects between People with Varying Stock Ownership
In this table, we use two proxies for the stock ownership of individuals. 1) The proportion of people in a MSA
working in the finance industry, and 2) local per capita dividend income. Table 9 column 1 breaks the variable
proportion of people working in the finance industry into two parts, below or above the national median.
We interact the main independent variable, the market return variable, with the lower/higher proportion of
finance industry worker dummies. Column 2 breaks the local per capita dividend income into two parts, below
or above the national median. We interact the market return variable with lower/higher per capita dividend
income dummies. All control variables and fixed effects are the same as in Table 2 column 4. The dependent
variable is the same as in Table 2. Each column represents a separate regression. In parentheses are robust
standard errors clustered at MSA level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
DEP: Log(Antidepressant with Diagnosis(t))
% in Finance Industry Per Capita Dividend Income
(1) (2)
Market Return (t-1,t) -0.209 -0.053
* Lower Proxy for Stock Ownership Dummy (-1.225) (-0.339)
Market Return (t-1,t) -0.268** -0.376**
* Higher Proxy for Stock Ownership Dummy (-2.147) (-2.304)
Month Fixed Effects YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES
Control: Unemployment Rate YES YES






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13: Illnesses Resulting from Depression Treated in Inpatient Setting: The
Case of Substance Abuse
This table measures the effect of the market return in days (t-3,t) through (t) on number of hospital admission
with substance abuse diagnosis on day t. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of hospital
admission with substance abuse diagnosis of individual living in a MSA on day t. The individual is above 35
years old. The main independent variable is the cumulative multiple day return (t-k,t) of a value-weighted
index consisting of public companies headquartered in a state. For example, in column 1, the return is the
one day return which is measured as the percentage change from yesterday’s closing price to today’s closing
index; in column 2, the cumulative return is the two-day return which is measured as the percentage change
from the closing index two days ago to todays closing index. The return is scaled by trailing 1-year standard
deviation of the state stock return. We include a day of week fixed effects. In this table, all other fixed effects
and control variables are the same as in Table 2 column 4. Each column represents a separate regression. In
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at MSA level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP:
Log(No. of Hospital Admission
with Substance Abuse Diagnosis(t))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Return (t) -0.838
(-1.634)
Market Return (t-1,t) -0.867**
(-1.976)
Market Return (t-2,t) -0.756**
(-1.974)
Market Return (t-3,t) -1.257***
(-3.407)
Day of Week Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Month Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Control: Unemployment Rate YES YES YES YES
Control: Average Weekly Wage YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,419 4,419 4,419 4,419
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2.1 Introduction
In 2002-2003, numerous incidents involving analysts show that they compromise the in-
tegrity of research in order to generate underwriting business for their employers.1 As a
consequence, a number of regulations, including the new National Association Of Securities
Dealers (NASD) Rule 2711 and the amended New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Rule 472,
were enacted to address and minimize the perceived conflicts of interests on the part of secu-
rity analysts and the investors. On April 23rd, 2003, an agreement was reached between the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the NYSE, the NASD, the New York Attorney
General’s Office (NYAG), and ten of the largest investment banks, the sanctioned banks,
in the United States. This agreement, known as the Global Research Settlement (GRS),
mandated that the ten of the largest investment banks, the sanctioned banks, to pay $432.5
million to contract with independent research.
On July 27, 2009, the GRS expired. Instead of codifying the GRS into permanent rules,
the SEC proposed to a New York federal court that parts of the GRS be stripped away.
Judge Pauley approved several changes and made funding independent research no longer
mandatory for sanctioned banks.2 Eliot Spitzer, former New York Attorney General, op-
posed the change and argued that the SEC should codify the GRS into rules that applied
to everyone.3 In a 2012 report to the Congressional Committees, the Government Account-
ability Office (GAO), an independent agency which provides to the United States Congress
audit, evaluation and investigative services, also recommended that the SEC review the
provisions of the GRS which are not currently codified into regulation and decide whether
those provisions should be adopted.4 The same report states that market participants and
observers interviewed by GAO admitted that the GRS was effective in mitigating analysts’
1For the complete litigation release see Litigation Release No. 18115, April 28, 2003, which is available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18115.htm.
2The judge also eased other restrictions involving the dealings between underwriters and analysts.
3Eliot Spitzen states “that was the moment when Wall Street should have been reformed and it seems
no one did anything.” See “SEC Didn’t Expand Upon Stock-Abuse Settlement,” The Wall Street Journal,
March 19, 2010.
4See “Report to Congressional Committees: Additional Actions Could Improve Regulatory Oversight of
Analyst Conflicts of Interest,” January 2012. In the report, Government Accountability Office (GAO) alleges
that ”by not formally assessing whether codifying any of the Global Settlement’s remaining terms provides
an effective way of furthering investor protection, SEC may be missing an opportunity to provide the same
level of protection for all investors.”
conflicts of interests.5
This study evaluates the impact of the GRS expiration on analyst recommendations and
their issuing institutions. To our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the effects of
the GRS expiration.6 Using a large sample of recommendations between January 2000 and
April 2013, this study aims to provide answers to the following research questions. First,
are sanctioned banks subject to conflicts of interests again after the GRS expiration? Sec-
ond, have informativeness of analysts’ recommendations changed after the GRS expiration?
Third, what types of independent research firms (IRFs) are more likely to survive after the
GRS expiration? To answer these questions, we first compare optimism of recommendations
issued by different groups of analysts before and after August, 2009. Then, we examine the
market reaction (informativeness) to the recommendations issued by analysts of different
institutions before and after August, 2009. Lastly, we investigate the survival of different
IRFs and examine factors affecting the survival probability of IRFs after the GRS expiration.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we document increase of optimistic
recommendations issued by analysts at sanctioned banks after the GRS expiration. Multi-
variate regression analysis confirms our findings: analysts at sanctioned banks become more
optimistic compared to the control sample after the GRS expiration. The results imply
that sanctioned banks issue inflated recommendations in the hope of securing future under-
writing business. By examining the optimism of recommendations issued by IRFs, we find
that funded IRFs (IRFs that received funds from the sanctioned banks) act more optimistic
compared to non-funded IRFs (IRFs that did not receive funds from the sanctioned banks)
after the GRS expiration, which might imply that funded IRFs issue positively skewed rec-
5Examples cited by interviewees as to why the GRS is effective include: “securities research is more
independent” (buy-side money manager) and “the regulatory reforms provide a compliance structure that
requires broker-dealers to manage their analyst conflicts” (state securities regulators). See details in the
Government Accountability Office “Report to Congressional Committees: Additional Actions Could Improve
Regulatory Oversight of Analyst Conflicts of Interest,” January, 2012.
6We argue that to determine whether GRS was effective and whether it is necessary to codify the GRS
into permanent rules, examining the effect of GRS expiration is important. To a certain extent, examining
the expiration of the Settlement is more important than examining the enactment of the Settlement, since
the market condition and the behavior of market participants might have changed since the enactment.
As Stiglitz (2009) states “...a great degree innovation has recently been directed at circumventing laws and
regulations designed to ensure the efficiency, equity, and stability of the financial sector.” If sanctioned banks
learned to circumvent the GRS over time, then codifying the GRS into permanent rules would not serve
its purpose. However, we show that sanctioned banks alter their behavior significantly following the GRS
expiration. Thus we do not find evidence that the GRS could be circumvented.
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ommendations in an effort to win renewed contract with the sanctioned banks.
Second, by examining the market reaction of recommendations, we find that after the
GRS expiration, pessimistic recommendations issued by sanctioned banks cause significantly
larger market reaction than those issued by the control group.7 However, this distinction
was not found for optimistic recommendations. The result indicates that situations at the
covered firm are indeed quite unfavorable when pessimistic recommendations are issued.
Among IRFs, optimistic recommendations by funded IRFs issued after the GRS expiration
cause smaller market reaction than those issued by non-funded IRFs. It suggests that after
the GRS expiration, the loss of the mandatory monetary support decreases research capacity
at funded IRFs. Pessimistic recommendations by funded IRFs, however, cause significantly
larger market reactions after the GRS expiration compared to those issued by non-funded
IRFs. This result could be explained by the reluctance on the funded IRFs’ side to issue
pessimistic recommendations after the GRS expiration. When issued, such recommendations
indicate quite unfavorable situations at the covered firm and induce larger market reaction.
Third, by examining the survival of IRFs, we find the number of IRFs increases after
the enactment of the GRS and decreases after the GRS expiration, with the GRS expi-
ration affecting the new IRFs (IRFs started after the GRS enactment) the most. Hazard
ratio analysis shows that after the GRS expiration, larger broker size and more innovative
recommendations contribute to longer survival time among IRFs. When we examine the
survival of new IRFs only, we find that the broker size and analyst experience matter the
most. Descriptive tests of characteristics and behavior of analysts employed at the funded
IRFs and at the non-funded IRFs confirm this pattern. For funded IRFs, we find that their
average broker size is significantly smaller after the GRS expiration, indicating that they lost
significant amount of business and are forced to downsize. On the whole, we find evidence
that the GRS expiration affects the market structure of the IRFs.
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. Our study is the first to evaluate the
changes brought by the GRS expiration. Sanctioned banks are again subject to the conflicts
of interests and issue inflated recommendations after the GRS expiration as they did pre-
GRS (i.e. before the GRS enactment). Our results thus call into question the SEC’s decision
7I.e. Investment Bank/ Brokers (IBBs), Major Institutional Brokers (MIBs), Major Regional Brokers
(MRBs), and Small Regional Brokers (SRBs) that are not sanctioned by the GRS. Section IV explains the
reason for this choice of control group.
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of stripping away parts of the GRS and not to codify the GRS into permanent rules. Second,
the expiration of the GRS also means no mandate for sanctioned banks to use independent
research and thus eliminates the need for many IRFs. Hazard ratio analysis show IRFs with
larger broker size, more experienced analysts, and more innovative recommendations are
more likely to survive. Thus, by altering industry landscape and consolidating the industry,
a settlement that is aimed to restrict one type of financial institutions (sanctioned banks)
might have an enormous impact on the structure and survival of other financial institutions.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. We document the changes in regulatory
environment and summarize the literature in Section 2. We discuss the sample and the
construction of variables in Section 3. Section 4 and Section 5 report the results of our
statistical test of recommendation optimism and market reaction, respectively. Section 6
investigates factors that influence survival of IRFs after the GRS expiration. In Section 7,
we present the robustness check of our paper. Policy implications are described in Section
8. We conclude in Section 9.
2.2 Regulation Background and Literature Review
2.2.1 Regulation Background
In 2002, a Wall Street Journal article reported that investment bankers maintain inappropri-
ate influence over research analysts at Merrill Lynch. In the internal e-mails, Merrill Lynch
analysts showed dissatisfaction with the performance of the stocks they had recommended
to investors. The Attorney General of New York, Eliot Spitzer, thus began investigating
investment banks on conflicts of interests issues. On April 28, 2003, an enforcement agree-
ment was reached on between the SEC, the NASD, the NYSE, and ten of the United States’
largest investment banks (sanctioned banks). The GRS applies directly to the sanctioned
banks by requiring them to pay fines and penalties totaling roughly $1.4 billion. Out of the
$1.4 billion, $432.5 million are used to fund independent research. The sanctioned banks
are required to contract with no fewer than three IRFs (i.e. “funded IRFs”).8 The funded
8See “Global Research Analyst Settlement Final Judgment Addendum,” which is available at:
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/finaljudgadda.pdf.
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IRFs must cover firms with market cap above $150 million.9 The independent research re-
ports produced by funded IRFs are then provided to investors of the sanctioned banks. To
maintain their independent status, all IRFs are not allowed to perform investment banking
business or brokerage service.
The GRS expired on July 27, 2009 and SEC proposed to a New York federal court
that parts of the GRS be stripped away. The U.S. District Judge Pauley approved the
changes.10 Thus the sanctioned banks are no longer forced to contract with IRFs and provide
independent research to their investors. Certain provisions of the GRS remained. Then, in
April 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act relaxes the existing FINRA
rule of 40 day of research quiet period for coverage by affiliated analysts immediately following
the IPO of an emerging growth company (EGC). The JOBS Act also allows affiliated analysts
to participate in communications with investment bankers and the management of the client
company, if the client company is classified as an EGC.11 According to the SEC, the JOBS
Act has no impact on the remaining provisions of the GRS for the sanctioned banks.12
The IRFs are especially hard hit by the GRS expiration because it came at a time when
the financial crisis was in full bloom and the future market looked bleak. Intense competitions
among IRFs also contribute to the failure of many IRFs, since oversupply of independent
research pushed down the prices each IRF can charge. After the GRS expiration, many IRFs
cease to exist. The surviving IRFs began to hunt for new revenue channels:
(i) They began to increase small cap stock coverage. With only 29% of small caps have
analyst coverage as of 2013, it seems to be a promising opportunity.13
(ii) They began to launch corporate access programs, by arranging meetings between
clients and corporate executives for a fee.
9For a detailed interpretation of the rules, see “Global Research Settlement: Staff Interpretive Re-
sponses,” November 2, 2004, which could be accessed through: http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-
noaction/grs110204.htm.
10The approval of rule change is discussed in “WSJ: SEC Didn’t Expand Upon Stock-Abuse Settlement,”
March 19, 2010.
11Dambra, Field, Gustafson, and Pisciotta (2016) find that analysts affected by the JOBS Act issue reports
of lower quality compared to reports issued by other analysts. For more discussions on analyst behavior and
JOBS Act, please refer to Corwin, Larocque, and Stegemoller (2016), and Wu, Wilson, and Wu (2015).
12For a detailed interpretation of the JOBS Act, see “Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act: Frequently
Asked Questions About Research Analysts and Underwriters,” August 22, 2012, which could be accessed
through: https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/tmjobsact-researchanalystsfaq.htm.
13For example, in May, 2008, London Stock Exchange contract Argus Research, Independent International
Investment Research Plc, and Pipal Research, three IRFs, to provide independent research on smaller caps.
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(iii) They moved into financial advisor function, by offering advice and sharing profit in
clients’ portfolio.
(iv) They set target hedge funds as their potential customers by not limiting their service
to valuation and research.
2.2.2 Literature Review
Various studies examine the relationship of analyst behavior and the GRS. Barber, Lehavy,
and Trueman (2007) find that IRFs produce more informative buy recommendations than
those produced by investment banks. In contrast, investment banks’ hold and sell recom-
mendations outperform those of IRFs, suggesting reluctance by investment banks to down-
grade stocks whose prospects dimmed during the bear market of the early 2000s. Kadan,
Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) document that following the GRS many banks have
migrated from the traditional five-tier rating system to a three-tier system. They find that
optimistic recommendations have become less frequent and more informative, whereas neu-
tral and pessimistic recommendations have become more frequent and less informative, and
the overall informativeness of recommendations has declined. The likelihood of issuing op-
timistic recommendations no longer depends on affiliation with the covered firm, although
affiliated analysts are still reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations. Our paper is also
related to Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2011), who find that analysts from various types
of institutions issue fewer strong buys following the enactment of the GRS. While downgrades
become more prevalent following the GRS, they are significantly less informative. They find
IRFs set up after the GRS are of inferior quality; they issue more optimistic and less innova-
tive recommendations that generate lower announcement period returns than independent
firms existing prior to the GRS. Dubois, Fresard, and Dumontier (2014) expand on this
theme and exploit the effect of the enactment of Market Abuse Directive (MAD), a directive
that resembles the GRS in the European Community. They find MAD reduced optimistic
investment advice across European countries. Buslepp, Casey, and Huston (2014) examine
the performance of funded IRFs during the GRS period which ends on July 26th, 2009. They
find that funded independent research is of lower quality than research by sanctioned banks
and research by non-funded IRFs based on future performance of recommendations and the
market reaction to the recommendations.
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Our paper expands upon the above mentioned research by providing evidence on the
impact of the GRS expiration. The sample periods end in June 2003, December 2004, and
December, 2007 respectively in Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007), in Kadan, Madureira,
Wang, and Zach (2009), and in Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau(2011). These three papers
look into the effect of the GRS itself and not the GRS expiration. We are able to add to the
results of Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) by showing that following the GRS expiration,
sanctioned banks issue more optimistic recommendations. Pessimistic recommendations, if
issued, cause significantly larger market reaction, implying that they their practices are
threatened by conflicts of interests. Some of the pre-GRS conflict-of-interest practices have
been discussed by Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007). Our results complement the findings
of of Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) by showing a reversal of what was observed
in their paper, namely an increase of optimism on the sanctioned banks’ side after the
expiration of the GRS. Our study complements that of Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau
(2011) by examining the survival of IRFs after the expiration of the GRS. We show larger
broker size, more innovative recommendations, and more experienced analyst lead to longer
survival time among IRFs. Our paper differs significantly from Buslepp, Casey, and Huston
(2014). Indeed, it is likely that sanctioned banks provide better quality research due to their
stronger research capacity as claimed in their paper. However we argue that the continuation
of GRS was necessary to enable investors to seek a second opinion at no additional cost.
The fear that investors will compare reports produced by analysts at the sanctioned banks
and reports produced by analysts at the IRFs could induce sanctioned bank to issue less
biased recommendations. A more detailed discussion of this issue is presented in the policy
implication section of our paper.
2.3 Data and Variable Construction
The data for this study come from the IBES database and include all recommendations
recorded from January 2000 through April 2013. The IBES database identifies the name of
the firm covered, the analyst issuing the recommendation, the institution that the analyst
worked for, the date and time of the recommendation issuance, and a rating based one a
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five-point scale (1=strong buy, 2=buy, 3=hold, 4=underperform, and 5=sell).14 We obtain
individual stock return data and market value-weighted index stock return data from the
CRSP. As in Iskoz (2003) and Agrawal and Chen (2008), market reaction to recommen-
dations are proxied using cumulative abnormal return (CAR) adjusted using Fama-French
three factors model. We calculate the (-1,0) announcement period return surrounding rec-
ommendation days. We exclude institutions that issued less than 50 recommendations from
2000 to 2013 and we focus on U.S. firms. We use September, 2002 as cutoff for the enactment
of the GRS following Kadan, Madureira, Wang and Zach (2009). We use July, 2009 as the
expiration time of the GRS.15
We identify different types of institutions to examine the effects of the GRS expiration
on the behavior of analyst at the institutions. Following Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy
(2006), we utilize Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research (NDIR) (1996 to 2006) to
classify institutions into five major categories: Independent Research Firm (IRF), Investment
Bank/ Broker (IBB), Major Institutional Broker (MIB), Major Regional Broker (MRB), and
Small Regional Broker (SRB). IRFs are institutions engaged solely in research, while IBB,
MIB, MRB and SRB (i.e., “non-IRFs”) provide research and engage in investment banking
business. For institutions missing in the NDIR and institutions which came into existence
after 2006, we supplement the NDIR classification method with information from SEC16 and
online resources such as firm’s websites to identify the types of institutions. We exclude
institutions if we are not able to identify their types with confidence.
We define affiliated banks as investment banks that acted as a lead advisor at any time
over the three years prior to the release of the recommendation following Clarke, Khorana,
Patel, and Rau (2011). Sanctioned banks are the ten investment banks sanctioned by the
SEC (i.e. Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P.
Morgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Smith Barney,
14In this paper, we focus our research on recommendations rather than other information produced by
institutions (i.e., earning forecast), since the GRS was designed to “restore investor confidence in analysts’
work” and “...As a result of the Commission’s examination findings, and given the serious concerns about the
conflicts of interest analysts face that may taint or bias their recommendations...” as seen in the “Testimony
Concerning Global Research Analyst Settlement,” by William H. Donaldson, Chairman of SEC, before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, on May 7, 2003.
15See “Report to Congressional Committees: Additional Actions Could Improve Regulatory Oversight of
Analyst Conflicts of Interest,” January 2012.
16See “Historical Archive of FOIA Broker-Dealer Company Information Reports” for the classification of
institutions, available at http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/bd-archive.htm.
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and UBS Warburg). An institution could be both a sanctioned bank and an affiliated bank.
By examining affiliated banks and sanctioned banks separately, we can test whether or not
analysts issue biased recommendations for related firms.17 For IRFs, we categorize them
into two exclusive subgroups: funded IRFs18 and non-funded IRFs. Sanctioned banks are
required by the GRS to contract with no fewer than three IRF. These IRFs are funded IRFs,
the rest of IRFs are non-funded IRFs. We also divide IRFs by their start date following
Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2011): IRFs that came into existence before the GRS
enactment are old IRFs, IRFs that started after the GRS enactment are new IRFs.
We are aware that institution/analyst characteristics could affect optimism of their rec-
ommendations and corresponding market reaction. We therefore define analyst experience as
the number of years since an analyst’s recommendation first appeared in the IBES database.
Broker size is defined as the number of analysts the institution employed in the year of the
recommendation issuance. We also define a binary variable to indicate the all star status of
an analyst, which takes the value of one if the analyst has earned the Institutional Investor
All-Star credential in the year of the recommendation issuance and zero otherwise.
Several studies have found association between innovative/ supported recommendation
and the market reaction to those recommendations. Michaely and Womack (2006) find that
recommendations that are issued concurrently with an earnings forecast produce larger price
drifts than unsupported recommendations. We define supported recommendation as those
accompanied by earning forecast release by the same analyst on the day prior to or the day
of the release of the recommendation. In addition, we define innovative recommendation as
recommendations accompanied by an one-year ahead EPS forecast revision, which is released
on the same day or on the prior day of the release of a recommendation, and the one-year
ahead EPS forecast revision is greater than (or less than) both the prevailing consensus of
EPS forecast and the analyst’s prior forecast.19 The definition of innovative recommendation
17Michealy and Womack (1999) find that analysts show significant evidence of bias when recommending
the companies their employer recently take public. Cliff (2007) examines the investment performance of
stock recommendations made by analysts employed by lead underwriters relative to analysts independent of
investment banking. He finds that both buy and hold recommendations from affiliated analysts underperform
relative to stocks recommended by independent analysts.
18As identified from Buslepp, Casy, Huston (2013), “Did they get what they paid for? The Global Analyst
Research Settlement and analyst research quality,” working paper, Appendix B, page 26.
19Low innovation recommendations are those recommendations accompanied by a forecast that is between
the analyst’s own prior forecast and the prior consensus estimate. While constructing the prevailing consen-
sus, we exclude forecasts issued by the institution the analyst works for. Earning forecast information are
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in our study follows the study of Gleason and Lee (2003), who find that highly innovative
forecast bring new information to the market and cause bigger price drifts.
We exclude some observations due to reshuffling caused by a transition process. The
transition process, in which traditional five-tier rating system was substituted by a new three-
tier or four-tier rating system, begins in 2002, with all ten sanctioned banks participating
in the transition. Most institutions moved from the traditional five-tier system to a coarser
three-tier or four-tier rating system over a short period of time. Kadan, Madureira, Wang and
Zach (2009) find that institutions reshuffle outstanding recommendations which the majority
of the reshuffled outstanding recommendations being downgrades from former “strong buy”,
“buy” or “hold” recommendations. They find the reshuffle of recommendations at the time
of the transition does not seem to convey new information to the market. To exclude the
reshuffle caused the transition between rating systems at each institution which opt for
this change, we identify the last date in which each recommendation type appears in the
IBES database for each institution, based on these dates, we infer the time periods during
which the institution used a three-,four-, or five-tier rating system. We then exclude all
recommendations issued by the institution doing its switch days.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on analysts at IRF, IBB, MIB, MRB, SRB, and MSB
in our sample. Across the full sample period, we find that non-IRF analysts have significantly
more experience than IRF analysts and are more likely to be employed at larger institutions.
Non-IRF analysts are also significantly more likely to be all-star analysts. IRF analysts are
more likely to support their recommendations with earnings forecasts and less likely to issue
high innovative recommendations. This suggests that, in general, analysts employed by IRFs
might have less knowledge of the firms covered and thus act as “followers” in the market.
Among the non-IRFs, we find that the number of analysts an institution employs is the most
for IBB, followed by MIB, MRB, MSB and SRB. This result gives us confidence about the
accuracy of our identification method.
retrieved from IBES detailed history database.
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2.4 Impact of GRS Expiration on Analyst Recommen-
dations
2.4.1 Descriptive comparison between the proportion of opti-
mistic recommendations issued by IRFs and non-IRFs
Numerous sources have documented that after the enactment of the GRS, sanctioned banks
seemed to avoid issuing inflated recommendations.20 Anecdotal evidence, however, shows
that after GRS expiration, sanctioned banks, by issuing inflated recommendations, revert to
pre-GRS practices. For example, in 2012, Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth
William Galvin stated Morgan Stanley’s investment bankers maintained an improper influ-
ence over research analysts. In this section, we investigate whether after GRS expiration,
sanctioned banks indeed revert to their pre-GRS practices. We hypothesize that, sanctioned
banks issue more optimistic recommendation after the GRS expiration than during the GRS.
Table 2 summarizes the levels and changes of upgrades and downgrades issued by an-
alysts at sanctioned banks and at non-sanctioned banks. We compare recommendations
issued by analysts in the Post-Reg (the period following the GRS expiration: August 2009-
April 2013) to the ones issued in Reg (the period between the enactment of the GRS and
its expiration: September 2002-July 2009) and in Pre-Reg (the preceding period: January
2000-August 2002) periods. Panel A reports evidence on the distribution of upgrades recom-
mendations. The GRS have an unambiguous impact on the proportion of upgrades — across
the board, both types of analysts significantly reduce the proportion of upgrade recommen-
dations. Before the regulatory changes, approximately 18.1% (23.9%) of recommendations
issued by sanctioned bank (non-sanctioned bank) analysts were upgrades. After the regu-
latory changes, this percentage fell to approximately 12.5% (15.8%), suggesting that these
firms make a deliberate decision to reduce the proportion of strong buy recommendations
to avoid any appearance of conflicts of interests after the enactment of the GRS. Analysts
at non-sanctioned banks also issue a higher fraction of upgrades in all the three periods:
Pre, Reg and Post, than their counterparts employed by sanctioned banks. After the GRS
20Madureira (2004) find that sanctioned banks issue more downgrades in 2002-2003, which suggests that
the GRS is productive in curbing effects of conflicts of interest. Guan, Lu, and Wong (2012) document a
significant reduction in the optimistic recommendations issued by sanctioned banks in 2004–2007.
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expiration, analysts at sanctioned bank (non-sanctioned bank) increase their upgrades by
2.50 percentage points (1.29 percentage points). This difference in the increase of proportion
of upgrades implies that sanctioned banks, previously restricted by the GRS, now have a
tendency to issue optimistic recommendations and might aim to act as future underwriter
for the firm.
Table 2, Panels B report further evidence on frequency of recommendations. In general,
we observe that sanctioned banks are becoming to be less pessimistic. Sanctioned banks
are issuing significantly less downgrades in Post period compared to Reg period, a 2.04
percentage points decrease, while the proportion of downgrades issued by non-sanctioned
banks decreases only by 0.72 percentage points in Post period.
2.4.2 How do analysts at sanctioned banks behave after the GRS
expiration?
The descriptive analysis does not control for other factors that might affect the recommen-
dations issued. It is clear that sanctioned banks status is not orthogonal to observable
institution characteristics. Moreover, it is possible that firms covered by sanctioned banks







= α + β1SBj × P GRSt + β2SBj + β3P GRSt (1)
+β4ABj + β5Expj + β6ASj + β7Log(BSj) + νi + γt + εijt
where Pijt is the probability of issuing an upgrade or downgrade for a covered firm i by
analyst j at time t. The dependent variable takes a value of one if the recommendation
is an upgrade and zero otherwise in Columns (1), (3), and (5) and takes a value of one if
the recommendations is a downgrade and zero otherwise in Columns (2), (4), and (6). For
dependent variables, we focus on upgrades/downgrades rather on strong/buy and under-
perform/sell for two reasons: (1) there are unproportionally fewer underperform/sell than
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strong/buy,21 while the number of upgrades and downgrades are fairly symmetrical, and (2)
some institutions rate firms on a five-tier rating or four-tier system22, while other institutions
rate on a three-tier rating. Therefore, recommendation based on levels (i.e. strong/buy and
underperform/sell) are not quite comparable. SBj is a binary indicator that takes a value of
one if the analyst works for one of the ten sanctioned banks in the GRS. P GRSt is a binary
indicator that takes a value of one if the recommendation is issued after the GRS expira-
tion. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all multivariate regressions to control for
firm characteristics not varying over time and time trend in analyst behavior, respectively.23
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The sample period runs from January 2007 through April 2013. We choose the year 2007
as the start of our sample used in multivariate regression for the following reason: (1) in
2005, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) developed rules requiring greater disclosure of
research service and products eligible to be paid with client commission. The rules came
into effect beginning early 2006, with a transitional period ending June 2006; (2) similar to
its UK counterpart, the SEC published guidelines regarding client commission and broker-
age/research services in 2006.24 In Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3, while we examine the
behavior of analyst employed at sanctioned banks, we restrict our sample to include only
recommendations issued by non-IRFs (i.e. IBBs, MIBs, MRBs and SRBs) as identified from
Nelson’s directory. IRFs, mostly small firm, might have fundamentally different structure
compared to sanctioned banks.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 present the marginal effects. The estimate of the inter-
action term represents the change that occurs in the difference in percentage of upgrades
21For example in the period between January, 2007 and April, 2013, we observe that Sanctioned banks is-
sued 54165 strong buy/buy recommendations and 10373 underperform/sell recommendations, which roughly
corresponds to a ratio of 5:1.
22After November 4th, 2002, Goldman Sachs switched to a three-tier system from a four-tier system, it no
longer issues strong buy recommendations.
23The number of observations in Columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4), (5) and (6) are slightly different due
to the fact that we use a conditional logit model to control for firm characteristics not varying over time. In
stata, observations are dropped if all positive or all negative outcomes are encountered within group using
conditional logit command.
24For the 2006 guidance, see “Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section
28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,” p.19, SEC, July 16, 2008. Also the 2006 guidance on
commission may be particularly important because the last time a substantive guidance on commission use
was issued was 21 years ago. In 1975, Congress enacted Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and abolished fixed commission rates.
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between the sanctioned bank and the control group (i.e. IBBs, MIBs, MRBs and SRBs that
are not sanctioned by the GRS) before the GRS expiration compared to the difference after
the GRS expiration. The estimate of β1 indicates that after the GRS expired, sanctioned
banks become more optimistic relative to the control sample: the probability that sanctioned
banks issue an upgrade increase by 3.3 percentage point relative to the control group.
This result suggests that conflicts of interest cause sanctioned banks that are no longer
restricted by the GRS after its expiration to issue inflated recommendations. This result is
consistent with the anecdotal evidence from senate committee hearing which suggests that
analysts are encouraged to write positively skewed reports in an effort to win underwriting
business.25 In addition, we control for broker size (BSj), experience (Expj),
26 and a All-Star
analysts dummy (ASj).
27 We also control for ABj, which is a binary indicator that takes a
value of one if the analyst works for an investment bank that acted as a lead advisor at any
time over the three years prior to the release of the recommendation.28 We do not include
ABj × P GRSt in our regression for the following reason: when the GRS expired, the U.S.
District Judge Pauley approved the several changes, including that sanctioned banks are not
required to fund IRFs after the GRS expired. However, the Judge declined to approve a
proposed modification related to interaction between the research and investment banking
arms of banks. According to the court, a firewall that forbids analysts and investment
bankers from talking without a rules-compliance officer must continue to be present.29
25See “Testimony Pertaining to the Hearing: Examining the IPO Process: Is it Working for Ordinary
Investors? Before The Senate Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance and Investment,” Lise Buyer, June 20,
2012.
26For the selection of control variable, we refer to Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006), Clement (1999),
Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2011) and Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009). .
27Stickel (1992) find that all-star analysts produce more accurate earnings forecast compared to those
produced by non-all-star analysts. .
28Michaely and Womack (1999) find that affiliated analysts, who work at banks which are underwriter for
a firm, tend to be more optimistic than unaffiliated analysts. Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009)
also find that before 2002, affiliated analysts are more reluctant to issue pessimistic recommendations than
unaffiliated analysts.
29See United States District Court Southern District of New York Court Order 03 Civ. 2937, 2939, 2940,
2941, 2942, 2943, 2944, 2945, 2946, 2948, 6909, 6910 for Judge Pauley’s full order.
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2.4.3 How do analysts at IRFs behave after the GRS expiration?
We further investigate whether some IRFs have become biased following the expiration of the
GRS. The expiration of the settlement meant no regulatory mandate to make independent
research a requirement anymore, thus eliminates the need for many IRFs. Spokesmen at
UBS and Goldman Sachs have clarified that their firms will not be renewing contracts to
continue the IRF relationships. However Merrill Lynch planned to continue to provide
independent research to their customers after July, 2009. Given the change in the industry
circumstance, we are interested in the optimism of recommendations and the informativeness
of recommendations issued by funded IRFs compared to those by non-funded IRFs after the
GRS expiration. How do IRFs that were funded before the GRS expiration react to the
new hope of contract renewal? After the GRS expiration, would funded IRFs craft their
recommendation to be more similar to those issued by the sanctioned banks (i.e. more
optimistic)?






= α + β1FIj(OIj)× P GRSt + β2FIj + β3OIj (2)
+β4P GRSt + β5Expj + β6ASj + β7Log(BSj) + νi + γt + εijt
where the dependent variable is defined as before. FIj is a binary indicator that takes a value
of one if the recommendations issuer is a funded IRF and zero otherwise. OIj is a binary
indicator that takes a value of one if the recommendation issuer is an old IRF (i.e. indepen-
dent research firm that came into existence before September, 2002) and zero otherwise. In
Columns (3)-(6), we restrict our sample to recommendations issued by IRFs only and exclude
recommendations issued by non-IRFs. Non-IRFs, mostly large banks, might have fundamen-
tally different structure compared to IRFs, many of which are small boutiques started by
former sell-side analysts. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 report the marginal effects. Here,
we compared the recommendations issued by funded IRFs to those issued by non-funded
IRFs. Because non-funded IRFs were, in general, not beneficiaries of the Settlement, the
expiration of the Settlement will have little or no effect on these firms. The estimate of
the interaction term, FIj × P GRSt, is not statistically significant for upgrades. But for
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downgrades, the estimated β1 is significant and negative. This suggests that after the GRS
expiration, the probability of funded IRFs issuing a downgrade decreases by 6.4 percentage
points compared to the non-funded IRFs. The result indicates that analysts at funded IRFs
are less likely to issue pessimistic recommendations compared to analysts at non-funded
IRFs after the GRS expired. Overall, we find evidence suggesting that funded IRFs cater
their recommendations to the sanctioned bank’s preferences in the hope of contract renewal.
We are also interested in the behavior of analysts at old IRFs and new IRFs after the
GRS expiration. Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2011) find that new IRFs issue more
optimistic recommendations than old IRFs with a sample that ends in December, 2007.
Would we find a similar trend using sample that begins in 2007 and covers the period after
the GRS expiration? Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 report the marginal effects. The
estimated coefficient of OIj × P GRSt, reveals that recommendations from old IRFs have
become more optimistic following the GRS expiration compared to new IRFs. After the GRS
expiration, the probability of old IRFs issuing an upgrade is 7.8 percentage points higher
compared with the new IRFs. Anecdotal evidence supports our finding. During the recent
financial crisis, some analysts who would like to issue objective hold/ underperform/ sell
recommendations are forced to quit their sell-side job at large banks and started their own
IRFs.30
2.5 Impact of GRS Expiration on Informativeness of
Recommendations
2.5.1 Descriptive comparison between the market reaction to rec-
ommendations issued by funded IRFs, non-funded IRFs and
sanctioned banks
In the previous section, we document that sanctioned banks and funded IRFs issue inflated
recommendations after the GRS expiration. Without the GRS, the conflict of interest faced
by analyst at sanctioned banks and funded IRFs become more pronounced. In this section,
30See “‘Sell’ For Research Renegades Becomes Business Off Wall Street,” Bloomberg, October 9, 2009, for
a discussion of the impact of sell-side analyst starting their own boutique.
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we examine whether the market is misled by the inflated recommendations or does the
market reaction indicate that the investors recognize conflicts faced by analysts after the
GRS expiration?
Table 4 reports the average cumulative abnormal return during the announcement period
for non-funded IRFs, funded IRFs and sanctioned banks. We calculate two-day cumulative
abnormal return surrounding the recommendation release, which begins the day prior to
the release till the end of the release day. The return is adjusted using Fama-French 3 fac-
tors model. Panels A and B of Table 4 present the market reaction to the strong buy/buy
and hold/sell recommendations. During the Reg period, strong buy/buy recommendations
of sanctioned banks significantly outperform those of the non-funded IRFs by 0.3%. This
outperformance vanishes (0.00%) and become insignificant in the Post period. This result
suggests that the gap of informativeness in recommendations issued by non-funded IRFs
and sanctioned banks is growing smaller. Strong buy/buy recommendations by non-funded
IRFs outperform funded IRFs significantly in both the Reg and the Post period by 0.5%
and 1%. Panel B presents the hold/sell recommendation returns for each of the security firm
categories. When examining hold/sell recommendation, non-funded IRFs again outperform
funded IRFs by 1.5% and 0.9% in the Reg and Post period. For the Reg period, hold/sell
recommendation by non-funded IRFs cause market reactions that are not significantly dif-
ferent from those by sanctioned banks. While in the Post period, downgrades by sanctioned
banks significantly outperform both non-funded and funded IRFs by 1.4%, suggesting that
the situation at the covered firm deteriorated enough when sanctioned banks choose to issue
hold/sell recommendation.
Panels C and D of Table 4 report the market reaction to recommendation up-
grades/downgrades. In both Reg and Post periods, for both upgrades and downgrades,
we find that compared to those by funded IRFs, recommendations by non-funded IRFs al-
most always result in greater abnormal return.31 We also observe that, in both Reg and
Post periods, compared to recommendation upgrade and downgrade by funded IRFs and
non-funded IRFs, those issued by sanctioned banks induce large daily abnormal return, pos-
sibly due to the strong research capability of sanctioned banks (Casey, 2013). Similar to
results on strong buy/buy in panel A, in panel C we also observe that in the Post period,
31We therefore find confirming evidence that support the findings of Buslepp, Casey, Huston (2014), which
shows research by funded IRFs is of lower quality than those by non-funded IRFs.
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the gap of informativeness in recommendations issued by non-funded IRFs and sanctioned
banks becomes smaller and non-funded IRFs are catching up. More specifically, during the
Reg period, the market reaction to upgrades recommendations issued by sanctioned banks
outperform those by non-funded IRFs by 1.5%. This difference decreased to 0.5% in the
Post-Reg period, suggesting that non-funded IRFs are catching up. For downgrades, the
gap of market reactions between sanctioned banks and IRFs became larger during Post pe-
riod than during the Reg period, again suggesting that the situation at the covered firm
worse enough when sanctioned banks, viewed to be prone to conflict of interest, choose to
downgrade the firm.
2.5.2 Market reaction to recommendations issued by sanctioned
banks after the GRS expiration
As in our previous section, we are concerned about confounding factors. Therefore, to access
the informativeness of the recommendations issued by various institutions and whether the
investors view recommendations issued by sanctioned banks as subject to conflict of interest
before and after the GRS expiration, we estimate the following model:
Rit(−1,0) = α + β1SBj × P GRSt + β2SBj + β3P GRSt + β4ABj (3)
+β5Expj + β6ASj + β7Log(BSj) + β8Rit(−22,−2) + β9Innijt + νi + γt + εijt
where Rit(−1,0), the dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, is the two-day cu-
mulative abnormal return surrounding the recommendation release. The return is adjusted
using Fama-French 3 factors model. Ri,t(−22,−2), prior month return, is the cumulative ab-
normal return from days -22 to -2. Innijt is a binary indicator that takes a value of one if the
recommendation is innovative.32 All other variables are defined in section IV. In Column (1)
of Table 5, we restrict our sample to upgrades, and in Column (2) of Table 5, to downgrades.
The coefficient of SBj × P GRSt shows that when sanctioned banks issue downgrades
32We define innovative recommendations as a recommendation that is accompanied by an one-year ahead
EPS forecast revision on the same day or on the prior day of the release of the recommendation, and the
one-year ahead EPS forecast revision is greater than (or less than) both the prevailing consensus of EPS
forecast and the analyst’s prior forecast.
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after the GRS expiration, the market reaction is significantly negative and 0.9 percentage
points larger in absolute terms than the market reaction of the control group (i.e. IBBs,
MIBs, MRBs and SRBs that are not sanctioned by the GRS). However, when sanctioned
banks issued upgrades after the GRS expiration, there is no significant market reaction
compared to the control group. This result suggests that investors perceive that after the
GRS expiration, analysts at sanctioned banks are pressured to publish favorable research
report for firms that paid or will pay them to underwrite their stocks. Given this perceived
tendency to issue inflated recommendations, favorable recommendations issued by sanctioned
banks after the GRS expiration are view to convey limited amount of information, while
pessimistic recommendations by sanctioned banks are viewed to convey important negative
information that could not be hidden any longer.
2.5.3 Market reaction to recommendations issued by IRFs after
the GRS expiration
In Section IV of our paper, we find that funded IRFs and old IRFs issue more inflated
recommendations after the GRS expiration. Given this change in the optimism of recom-
mendations, how will the informativeness of recommendations issued by various types of
IRFs change? We estimate the following model:
Rit(−1,0) = α + β1FIj(OIj)× P GRSt + β2FIj + β3OIj + β4P GRSt (4)
+β5Expj + β6ASj + β7Log(BSj) + β8Rit(−22,−2) + β9Innijt + νi + γt + ε◦ijt
where FIj is a binary indicator that takes a value of one if the recommendations issuer is
a funded IRF and zero otherwise. OIj is a binary indicator that takes a value of one if the
recommendation issuer is an old IRF (i.e. independent research firm that came into existence
before September, 2002) and zero otherwise. Columns (3)-(6) of Table 5 present the results.
The coefficients of FIj×P GRSt shows that after the GRS expiration, the informativeness of
upgrades issued by funded IRFs drop significantly by 1.7 percentage points compared to non-
funded IRFs, suggesting that lack of the monetary support required by the mandate harms
funded IRFs’ research capacity. However, downgrades issued by funded IRFs show surprising
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results: the coefficient of FIj × P GRSt shows that when funded IRFs issued downgrades
after the GRS expiration, the market reaction is significantly negative and 3.1 percentage
points larger in absolute terms than those issued by non-funded IRFs. This results should
be viewed in the context of results from our previous section. In our previous section, we
find that after the GRS expiration, analysts at funded IRFs cater their recommendations
to the sanctioned bank’s preferences in the hope of contract renewal. Given the reluctant
of funded IRFs to downgrade firms, if, however, funded IRFs issue downgrades, it indicates
the situation at the covered firm deteriorated enough that a downgrade is warranted.
The coefficients of the interaction term OIj × P GRSt in Columns (5) and (6) are sta-
tistically significant. When old IRFs issue upgrades after the GRS expiration, the market
reaction is 2.1 percentage points less than the market reaction to the new IRF. For down-
grades, the market reaction to recommendations by old IRFs is 2.7 percentage points less
in absolute terms than to those by new IRFs. The results suggest that for both upgrades
and downgrade, new IRFs are more informative than old IRFs after the GRS expiration.
This result expands on results documented by Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2011), who
find that the recommendations of new IRFs generate lower announcement period returns
with a sample ending in December, 2007. Consequently, their findings do not capture the
competition after the GRS expiration which wipes out many IRFs and results in the survival
of informative ones. It is important to note that the number of existing IRFs fluctuates in
our sample. In 2001, we identify 10 firms as IRFs. In 2005, we have 41 firms as IRF. And
in 2011, only 27 IRFs remain in our sample. Anecdotal evidence also show that supply of
independent research far outstripped demand and only IRFs of best quality. We will discuss
the factors of IRF survival in Section VI.
2.6 The GRS expiration affects survival of different
types of IRFs
In this section, we investigate the survival of IRFs following the GRS expiration. Prior to
the GRS enactment, there were 10 IRFs in 2001. A large number of IRFs were founded after
the GRS enactment. For example, 41 IRFs existed in 2005. The increase in the number of
IRFs indicates that some new IRFs might be founded to exploit the GRS for profits. Indeed,
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some of these new IRFs were contracted by the sanctioned banks.33 The number of IRFs
decreases slightly when it is close to the GRS expiration and decreases significantly after the
GRS expiration. There are 37 IRFs in 2008 and the number dwindled to 27 three years later
in 2011. We observe a greater change for the number of recommendations. In 2008, IRFs
issued 4025 recommendations, this number decreases to 2117 three years later in 2011, while
the number recommendations issued by non-IRFs stayed almost the same (21842 in 2008
vs. 18243 in 2011). When we look at funded IRFs, we observe an even greater change for
the number of recommendations. The number of issued recommendations by funded IRFs
decreased from 1003 in 2008 to 318 in 2011. This result clearly suggests that the IRF industry
was hit hard by the GRS expiration: many IRFs did not survive more than two years after
the GRS expiration. And those that survived issued fewer recommendations. Percentage of
total research commission spent on IRFs shows the same trend. Various sources report that
in 2001, independent analyst account for less than 10% of total research commission spent.34
This number grow to 18% in 2007-2008 and drop again to only 11% in 2008-2009. Given the
different trends funded IRFs, non-funded IRFs and non-IRFs experienced, we hypothesize
that competition after 2009 wipes out many IRFs and results in the survival of high quality
ones.
Table 6 shows the characteristics and behavior of analysts employed at the old IRFs
and at the new IRFs. In Columns (1) and (2), we report descriptive statistics for the new
and old IRFs during the period of September, 2002-July, 2009. Compared to old IRFs, new
IRFs employ fewer analysts (4.3 analysts versus 31.7 analysts) and employ analysts who are
slightly less experienced (4.0 years versus 4.4 years). Relative to their counterparts at old
IRFs, analysts from the new IRFs are also less likely to issue strong buy recommendations
(24.7% versus 45.7%) and less likely to issue high innovative recommendations (15.5% versus
18.3%), suggesting that the new IRFs act as “followers” in the markets in the September,
2002-July, 2009 period.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 report descriptive statistics for the new and old IRFs
33For a list of funded IRFs, see Table II in the appendix. Source: Buslepp, W., Casey, R., and G. R.
Huston, 2013, “Did they get what they paid for? The Global Analyst Research Settlement and analyst
research quality,” Working paper, Table Appendix B, page 26.
34See “Analyzing the Analysts: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Committee of Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representa-
tives.” U.S. Congress. House. June 14, July 31, 2001, for the percentage of commission spent on investment
banks and IRFs.
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after August 2009. In this sample, we have 8 old IRFs and 26 new IRFs, a 20% decrease
and a 35% decrease respectively from the September, 2002-July, 2009 period. After August
2009, we find that relative to their counterparts at old IRFs, analysts from the new IRFs
exhibit some distinctive characteristics: analysts from the new IRFs are more experienced
(6.3 years versus 5.9 years) and more likely to issue high innovative recommendations (22.8%
versus 14.5%). Although the new IRFs still employ significantly fewer analysts than older
IRFs (9.7 versus 46.1), the size of new IRFs doubled comparing to the period (9.7 versus
4.3). In the last two columns of Table 6, we further compare characteristics of new IRFs
overtime. We find an interesting trend: new IRFs employ more experienced analysts (6.623
years vs. 4.021 years) and issue more innovative recommendations (22.8% vs. 15.5%) after
August 2009 than in September, 2002-July, 2009. This suggests the GRS expiration affected
the new IRFs the most: more than one third of the new IRFs cease to exist. However, those
new IRFs that did survive after the GRS expiration are of high quality.
Table 7 shows the characteristics and behavior of analysts employed at funded IRFs and
at non-funded.35 In Columns (1) and (2), we report descriptive statistics for the funded
IRFs and non-funded IRFs in the period September, 2002- July, 2009. Funded IRFs are
significantly larger than non-funded IRFs (18.6 analysts versus 17.0 analysts). Relative
to their counterparts at non-funded IRFs, analysts from the funded IRFs have more of
experience (4.8 years versus 4.1 years), issue less strong buy recommendations (30.3% versus
34.8%) and more likely to issue high innovative recommendations (21.2% versus 15.4%),
suggesting that funded IRFs act as “innovators” in the markets between September, 2002
and July, 2009.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 report descriptive statistics for the funded IRFs and non-
funded IRFs after August 2009. After August 2009, we find relative to their counterparts
at non-funded IRFs, analysts from the funded IRFs still have more of experience (8.191
years versus 5.986 years), are more likely to issue high innovative recommendations (23.7%
versus 16.9%). However, unlike in the September, 2002-July, 2009 period, funded IRFs are
significantly smaller (13.8 analysts versus 32.9 analysts) and issued more strong buy recom-
mendations (40.9% versus 38.1%)36 after August 2009. On the whole, the result suggests the
35In the period September, 2002-July, 2009, we have 5 funded IRFs and 45 non-funded IRFs in our sample.
In the period after August, 2009, we have 5 funded IRFs and 32 non-funded IRFs (a 29% decrease from the
previous period) in our sample.
36We therefore provide confirming evidence that support the our findings in Columns (3) and (4) in Table
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GRS expiration affect the market structure of the IRFs, funded IRFs lost significant amount
of business and are force to downsize.
We estimate a hazard model for survival rate for an IRF. We use the hazard model for
forecasting IRF failure for two reasons: (1) it controls for each IRF’s period at risk, and
(2) it incorporates explanatory variables that change over time (Shumway, 2001). The Cox
proportional hazard model has the following form:
λ (t | X) = λ0 (t) e(β1X1+...+βpXp) (5)
where λ0 (t) is the underlying hazard function and λ (t | X) is the hazard at time t for an IRF
with time-variant explanatory variables X. Table 8 provides results from Cox proportional
hazard model. In panel A, the sample is from 2008-2013. In Columns (1) and (2), all
IRFs are included in the sample and the model is stratified by the new IRF 37 variable.
In Columns (3) and (4), only new IRFs are included in the sample. Columns (1) and
(3) give the estimates of hazard ratios corresponding to each variable. Z statististics are
presented in Columns (2) and (4). We find for IRFs in general, a larger broker size and
more innovative recommendations are important for survival. For every additional analyst
employed by the IRF, the risk of IRF failure falls by 44.1%. For new IRFs, the broker size
also matters for survival. Interestingly, in the sample of new IRFs, the survival rate is higher
if the average analyst is more experienced. For every additional year of average analyst
experience, the risk of new IRF failure falls by 28.4%. Anecdotal evidence, which shows
market values analyst experience, corroborate with our findings.38 The hazard model results
show that as independent research is no longer mandatory, only the IRFs of best quality
are able to survive after the GRS expiration.39In Panel B, we present the hazard results
for the time period from 2000-2013. We find for IRFs in general, the ability to issue more
recommendations is important for survival of IRFs. While the new IRFs survival longer if
they issue more recommendations and hire more experienced analysts. The factors affecting
the survival of IRFs are changing over time.
3.
37new IRF equals one for those independent research firms that came into existence after the Global
Settlement (September, 2002).
38See “Staying in the Game,” The Wall Street Journal, May, 16, 2011, for a discussion on analyst
experience.
39In addition, the expiration come at a time right after the financial crisis and the future market looked
bleak, which could have contributed to the decline.
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2.7 Robustness Checks
In previous sections, we examine the analyst recommendations issued before and after the
expiration to evaluate the impact of the GRS expiration. However, as is always the case
with studies not using randomized experiment, it is possible that confounding factors could
explain the findings. We conduct a number of sensitivity analysis to confirm that our results
are not driven by our estimation specification.
First, stock market conditions at the time of the issuance might bias our estimates.
Womack (1996) and Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) find that momentum affect
analyst optimism. So we include the prior month return in equations (1) and (2) as control.
The prior month return is the cumulative firm’s market adjusted return from days -22 to -2.
The results are similar to our main findings. Also, market reaction to recommendations could
be affected by market wide economic conditions. We follow Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau
(2011) and Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) and control for market volatility over
the prior month. The reestimation of equations (3) and (4) yield similar results.
Second, our results could be driven by higher moments of our control variable. Mikhail,
Walther, and Willis (1997) find that larger market reaction to strong buy recommendation
is associated with analyst with more experience. Thus, we control for not only analyst expe-
rience, but also its higher moments. Including a quadratic term of experience in equations
(1)-(4) produces similar quantitative and qualitative results.
Third, recommendations that are accompanied by earnings forecast might confound our
findings. Michaely and Womack (2006) find that recommendations that are issued concur-
rently with an earnings forecast produce larger price drifts. We thus control for supported
recommendation dummy in equations (3) and (4). The results remain consistent.
Fourth, our results may be unique to how we construct our market reaction proxy. In
equations (3) and (4), our dependent variable is R(−1,0), the two-day CAR adjusted by
Fama-French factors surrounding the recommendation release. When examining market
reaction following recommendations, Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) use the
three-day period (-1, 1) surrounding the date of the recommendation issuance. We follow
their specification and use (-1,1) as the announcement period in equations (3) and (4) and
find that our conclusion is robust to different announcement period length. Clarke, Khorana,
Patel, and Rau (2011) calculate the market reaction to recommendations as the market
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adjusted returns over (-1,0) window. They use the CRSP value-weighted index to proxy
for market return. We use their measure of market reaction as the dependent variable in
equations (3) and (4) and find similar results.
Finally, our results could be driven by different institutions that exist before and after
the GRS expiration. We therefore limit our sample to include only recommendations issued
by institution which are active both before and after the GRS expiration. The results are
similar.
Overall, our multivariate results in equations (1)-(4) appear to be quite robust with
respect to changes in independent variables, dependent variables, and sample selection.
2.8 Policy Implications
Our results show that after the expiration of the GRS, sanctioned banks appear to be more
biased and conflicts of interests threatened their credibility of research more seriously. Thus,
our study calls into question the SEC’s decision not to codify the GRS into permanent
rules. However, we are not arguing that IRFs have strong research capacities and issue
recommendations associated with large market reaction. Indeed, it is likely that sanctioned
banks have better access to corporate insiders and thus have more knowledge about the firms,
and provide better quality research. Indeed, at least two academic studies have examined the
quality of research provided by IRFs compared to the research by investment banks and reach
different conclusions.40 Instead, we are arguing that the double reporting system that was in
place before 2009 may have cause sanctioned banks to behave differently before and after the
GRS expiration. During 2003-2009, sanctioned banks were mandated to provide investors
with a research report by IRFs along with the research report produced by the analyst at the
sanctioned banks. It is possible that sanctioned banks issue more objective recommendations
before the GRS expiration due to the fear that investors could compare reports produced by
analysts at the sanctioned banks and the reports produced by analysts at IRFs and detect
40There are two view on the quality of the research provided by IRFs. According to the first, IRFs provide
better quality research than investment banks. Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) find that recommen-
dation upgrades by investment banks underperform those by IRFs, while recommendation downgrades by
investment banks outperform those by IRFs. An alternative view is that IRFs provide low quality research.
Buslepp, Casey, and Huston (2013) find that funded IRF provide research that is of lower quality than
research by the sanctioned banks, mainly because IRFs analysts have less experience.
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possible discrepancies. After the GRS expiration, investors are disadvantageous as their
access to free independent research has become more restricted.
According to the GRS, to ensure that investors get access to objective investment re-
search, each of the sanctioned banks is obligated to provide independent research to its
clients. More specifically, the sanctioned banks must notify customers on the bank’s web-
site, on customers’ account statements, and on the first page of research reports, that the
independent research is available to the customer at no cost. Both Morgan Stanley and
Citigroup failed to disclose the availability of independent third-party research in customer
account statements per the requirements of the GRS for some period of time.41 Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) takes enforcement actions against both of these
sanctioned banks for failing to adequately comply with disclosure requirements.
2.9 Conclusion
Our study directly evaluates the change brought by the GRS expiration. We document that
following the GRS expiration, analysts employed at sanctioned banks and IRFs that received
funds from the sanctioned banks issued positively skewed recommendations. In addition,
the downgrades issued by sanctioned banks are viewed to convey more information after
the GRS expiration, suggesting that situations are worse enough so that sanctioned banks
choose to downgrade the firm. Overall, our findings show that conflicts of interests become
a more serious problem and threatened the credibility of the research by sanctioned banks.
Our paper calls into question the SEC’s decision not to codify the GRS into permanent
rules. Another implication of the expiration of the GRS is that it eliminates the need for
many IRFs. By altering industry landscape and consolidating the industry, a settlement
that is aimed to restrict one type of financial institutions (sanctioned banks) might have an
enormous impact on the structure and survival of other financial institutions. Our paper
suggests that exploring the unintended consequences of laws on all market participants is a
promising avenue for future research.
41The funding to IRFs does not seem to contribute to Morgan Stanley’s violation of disclosure. It appears
that Morgan Stanley did pay IRFs for the research, but it did not disclose the availability of the research
to its investors as the press release specifies that “...Morgan Stanley also did not disclose in approximately
127,600 monthly account statements sent to customers from August 2007 to February 2008 that it had
available independent, third-party research.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of analysts recommendation. The sample period runs
from January 2000 through April 2013. The variables are defined as: Experience: is the number of years
since an analysts first earnings forecast on the I/B/E/S database. All-star: takes the value of one if the
analyst was named an Institutional Investor All-Star in the year of the recommendation, and zero otherwise.
Broker Size: is the number of analysts employed by the brokerage in the year of the recommendation release.
EPS Support: takes the value of one if the analyst issued an one- or two-year ahead EPS forecast on the
day or prior to the day of the release of a recommendation, and zero otherwise. High innovation: takes the
value of one if there is an one-year ahead EPS forecast revision greater than (or less than) both the prevailing
consensus of EPS forecast and the analyst’s prior forecast on the day prior to or the day of the release of a
recommendation, and zero otherwise. Strong buy: takes the value of one if the recommendation was a strong
buy, and zero otherwise. Results are presented for Investment Bank/ Broker (IBB), Independent Research
Firms (IRF), Major Institutional Broker (MIB), Major Regional Broker (MRB), Management Subsidiary
of Broker (MSB) and Small Regional Broker (SRB). ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%,
5% and 10%.
Panel A
Variable IBB IRF MIB MRB MSB SRB
Experience 5.376 4.626 4.931 4.681 5.027 7.080
Allstar 0.100 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000
Brokersize 71.280 22.360 26.330 21.950 18.000 7.997
EPS support 0.575 0.615 0.591 0.573 0.473 0.571
High innovation 0.173 0.167 0.175 0.167 0.108 0.190
Strong buy 0.188 0.372 0.216 0.231 0.054 0.222
Number of observations 253066 28650 22855 5478 74 2578
Panel B
Variable IRF Non-IRF Difference T-stat
Experience 4.626 5.342 0.716*** (28.49)
Allstar 0.000 0.095 0.095*** (54.67)
Brokersize 22.360 66.120 43.760*** (140.58)
EPS support 0.615 0.576 -0.039*** (-12.73)
High innovation 0.167 0.173 0.006*** (2.64)
Strong buy 0.372 0.191 -0.181*** (-72.53)























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Survival Analysis of Independent Research Firms
This table provides results from Cox proportional hazards model for survival analyst of independent research
firms IRFs during the period 2008- 2013 in panel A and during the period 2000-2013 in panel B. IRFs
are identified from Nelson’s directory. In columns 1 and 2, our sample include all IRFs and the model is
stratified by the new IRF variable, in columns 3 and 4, our sample include only NEW IRFs. New IRFs
are those independent research firms that came into existence after the Global Settlement (September, 2002).
The explanatory variables are defined as: Broker Size is the number of analysts employed by the brokerage.
Experience average years of experience for all analyst in the firm in a given year. High innovation
percentage of high innovation recommendations issued in a given year. Strong buy percentage of strong buy
recommendations issued in a given year. Number of recommendations is the number of recommendations
issued by an IRF in a given year.
Panel A: period 2008- 2013
IRF sample New IRF sample
(Cox Stratified Model) (Cox Model)
Variable Haz. Ratio Z stat Haz. Ratio Z stat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Brokersize 0.559*** (-2.865) 0.081** (-2.185)
Experience 0.991 (-0.109) 0.716** (-2.072)
High innovation 0.006** (-2.004) 0.006 (-1.471)
Strong buy 0.680 (-0.251) 273.405 (0.553)
Number of recommendations 0.923 (-0.630) 0.977 (-0.919)
Observations 109 75
Panel B: period 2000- 2013
IRF sample New IRF sample
(Cox Stratified Model) (Cox Model)
Variable Haz. Ratio Z stat Haz. Ratio Z stat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Brokersize 0.901 (-1.155) 0.946 (-0.376)
Experience 0.939 (-0.798) 0.822* (-1.857)
High innovation 0.338 (-0.696) 0.292 (-0.665)
Strong Buy 1.490 (0.235) 2.986 (0.492)




Analysts Coverage of the Financial Sector: Institutional
Pressure and Forecast Accuracy
Chang Liu∗
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3.1 Introduction
Recommendations and forecasts play an important role in shaping investors’ beliefs.
Investors can infer the fundamental value of a firm’s assets from the recommendations and
forecasts issued by analysts. Thus, analysts help to reduce the information asymmetry
related to firms. The recent financial crisis has raised concerns about the objectivity of
analyst recommendations and forecasts. Biased estimates of the health of a firm in the
financial sector could potentially misguide investors and affect the efficiency and stability of
financial markets. There has been extensive research focusing on the behavior of credit
analysts and on the role of credit agencies covering the financial sector (Brunnermeier,
2009).1 However, little is known about the behavior of equity analysts covering the financial
sector.2 When analysts are asked to cover other firms in the financial sector, can they still
be objective? It is possible that the ability of investment bank analysts to provide investors
with objective information about firms in the financial sector could be affected by conflicts
of interests. The conflicts of interests stem from the fact the underwriting business provides
a substantial portion of an investment bank’s revenue and investment banks rely on each
other to form syndications.
Numerous pieces of anecdotal evidence reported in the Wall Street Journal suggest that
analysts covering firms in the financial sector are pressured to bias their research.3 In
addition, in at least five Wall Street Journal articles, it has been shown that investment
banks employing pessimistic analysts have been retaliated against when the analysts issue
negative reports for other firms in the financial sector. The ways of retaliation include cutting
back on trading activity, loan activity, and investment banking business with the investment
bank and excluding the investment bank that employs the analyst from asset-backed deals.
Pessimistic analysts covering the financial sector also face personal retaliations, which include
1Brunnermeier (2009) argues that the models of many credit-rating agencies provided estimates that are
too optimistic about structured finance products.
2Hereafter we will use “analysts” to refer to equity analysts unless otherwise noted.
3For a detailed discussion on the allegations, see the article titles “Incredible ’Buys’: Many Companies
Press Analysts to Steer Clear Of Negative Ratings,” The Wall Street Journal, July 19, 1995, “Wall Street
On The Run,” Fortune, July 14, 2004, and “Bearish Call on Banks Lands Analyst in Doghouse,” The Wall
Street Journal, November 23, 1999, “Battle of the bank analysts,” Institutional Investor, November 1, 2002,
“The woman who called Wall Street’s meltdown,” Fortune, August 6, 2008, “It’s 2009. Do You Know Where
Your Bank Analyst Is?” The Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2009, and “Why Wall Street Can’t Handle the
Truth,” The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2011.
being barred from entering brokerage headquarters, being excluded from mailings, meetings
and conference calls with management of the covered firm, being discouraged by the analyst’s
own supervisor, and, finally, being fired.4 Some of the pessimistic analysts covering the
financial sector have left big banks and joined Independent Research Firms (IRFs).
We examine two empirical questions in this paper. First, we test whether brokerage type
affects the performance of recommendations and forecasts issued by the brokerages. We use
both Nelson’s Directory and the SDC Platinum Database by Thomson Reuters to classify
brokerages as IRFs or investment banks. In our study, investment banks are defined as
brokerages that engage both in research and in a material amount of equity underwriting
business. Specifically, we examine whether, compared to investment bank analysts, IRF
analysts offer less biased, more informative, and more accurate recommendations and
forecasts when covering firms in the financial sector. Second, we investigate the reason
for the worse performance of investment bank analysts when covering firms in the financial
sector. We examine the performance of investment bank analysts across different types of
firms being covered. We also examine whether the performance of investment bank analysts
is especially worse when they cover bulge brackets.
Our empirical results show that analysts at investment banks provide less objective
recommendations and forecasts for firms in the financial sector after controlling for a
comprehensive set of variables. We find that analysts at IRFs tend to be less optimistic
(more pessimistic) when covering firms in the financial sector. We also find that the
recommendations by IRF analysts covering firms in the financial sector tend to be generally
more informative and the forecasts by IRF analysts tend to be more accurate. The results
related to forecast accuracy are especially convincing. Compared to recommendations,
which could extend over a longer and unspecified horizon, it is relatively straightforward
to check the performance of forecasts by comparing the forecasts with the realization of
actual earnings. Opposite results are found when we restrict our sample to firms NOT
in the financial sector. We also provide evidence showing that analysts at investment
banks issue more biased recommendations and less accurate forecasts especially when they
cover bulge brackets, namely, investment banks with a large market share. These results
suggest that investment bank analysts are susceptible to institutional pressure related to the
4“Brokerage” refers to all financial institutions issuing recommendations or forecasts in IBES unless
otherwise noted.
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underwriting business. In summary, our results suggest that investment bank analysts issue
rosier recommendations and forecasts than their counterparts at IRFs.
We contribute to the literature by focusing on whether a third party, namely, an IRF,
provides better research when covering firms in the financial sector. Most previous studies
show that compared to analysts at IRFs, investment bank analysts generally achieve better
performance by issuing more influential recommendations and more accurate forecasts when
covering all sectors. In other studies, the performance of IRF analysts is no better than that
of their counterparts at investment banks. As for forecasts, Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2008)
find that the forecasts issued by investment bank analysts are, on average, more accurate
than forecasts made by other analysts. Gu and Xue (2008) find that the forecasts issued by
IRF analysts are less accurate ex post. Dugar and Nathan (1995) find that forecasts made
by investment bank analysts are associated with the same level of accuracy as those made
by their counterparts at non-investment banks.
As for recommendations, the literature has also shown that investment bank analysts’
upgrades are less informative in an earlier sample time period, while their upgrades and
downgrades are more informative using a more recent sample period. Barber, Lehavy, and
Trueman (2007), using a sample that runs from January 1996 through June 2003, find that
recommendation upgrades (downgrades) by investment banks underperform (outperform)
similar recommendations by IRFs. Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2011), using a more
recent sample that runs from November 2000 to December 2007, find that there is little
difference in the informativeness of recommendations by investment bank analysts and IRF
analysts prior to the Global Research Settlement. After the Global Research Settlement
(GRS), recommendation upgrades by IRF analysts are significantly less informative than
recommendation upgrades by other analysts. As for recommendation downgrades after
the Settlement, IRF analysts again generate the least informative downgrades among all
type of analysts. Using a sample that runs from 1996 to 2007, Casey (2013) finds that
recommendation upgrades and downgrades issued by IRF analysts are significantly less
informative, even when analyst ability, brokerage firm resources and portfolio complexity
are controlled for. Clarke, Jayaraman, and Liu (2015), using post 2006 data, find that
sanctioned investment banks revert to their old practices after the GRS expired in 2009.
However, the general findings on the performance of IRF analysts and investment bank
analysts might not apply to the financial sector for the following reasons. IRF analysts
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could play an important role when covering firms in the financial sector, since they
have fewer incentives to please other firms in the financial industry. Investment banks’
incentive to please other firms in the financial sector could be one reason why the superior
performance by investment bank analysts disappears. Especially when investment banks
cover other bulge bracket investment banks, conflicts of interests may play a significant role
and might affect the ability of analysts to provide investors with objective information.5
In that respect, our research extends Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2009), who
suggest that the relationship between investment banks in a syndicate might also create
a potential conflict of interest problem for analysts. Since investment banks frequently
work together on a deal (“syndicate”) (Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm, 2006), there
are opportunities to act as a “co-manager”.6 The investment bank chosen by the issuer as
the “lead” (or “co-lead”) underwriter(s) has some ability to influence the issuer regarding
selecting additional investment banks (“co-managers”) in syndicate. “Lead”(or “co-lead”)
underwriter(s) may reward this position to investment banks in a good relationship with
the underwriter(s). Compared to IRF analysts, analysts at investment banks could have
a stronger incentive to use optimism in order to help their employers maintain a good
relationship with other investment banks and win a co-manager position in lucrative future
deals. For analysts at investment banks, more accurate forecasts and more informative
recommendations do not always translate to higher revenues. Lastly, our study also
contributes to a growing body of literature that documents conflicts of interests faced by
analysts and shows that analysts, even experienced ones, are more optimistic toward their
brokerages’ potential underwriting clients (issuers) (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and
5Bulge brackets are the largest investment banks that have significant market shares in the equity
underwriting market.
6The equity underwriting business offers substantial revenues for investment banks. Ljungqvist, Marston,
and Wilhelm (2009) find that as the proceeds raised by U.S. issuers increase, the lead underwriter capacity
constraint might force it to share the fee revenue with other investment banks by forming a syndicate. In the
equity underwriting market, the “lead” underwriter or “co-lead” underwriters (when there are multiple lead
underwriters) controls the offering and leads a group of co-manager underwriters. All “lead” (“co-lead”) and
“co-manager” underwriters together form a syndicate. “Lead” (“co-lead”) underwriter(s) are chosen by the
issuer. Being a “co-manager” is still very important, as it could increase an investment bank’s chances of
becoming a “lead” underwriter in future deals, according to Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2009).
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Womack, 1999; and Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm, 2006).7
The results of our study are potentially important to academics, investors, and regulators.
In our paper, the biased recommendations and forecasts given to firms in the financial sector
stem from the fact that investment bank analysts are under pressure to maintain a good
relationship with other firms in the financial sector. Analysts at investment banks, despite
the establishment of the “Chinese Wall”, are potentially less likely to achieve the independent
status of IRFs. Our paper also suggests a possible solution to the objectivity problem in the
direction of regulatory and supervisory policies. The research by IRFs should be given more
weight and used more often by regulators of the financial sector.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample
and variable construction. Empirical results involving recommendations are presented in
Section 3, while the results involving forecasts are presented in Section 4. Section 5 attempts
to explain the reason for the inferior performance by investment bank analysts. We conclude
our paper in section 6.
3.2 Data Sources and Variable Construction
This section describes the data and variables used to examine how brokerage types influence
the performance of analysts covering firms in the financial sector.
3.2.1 Variables of Interest
3.2.1.1 Analyst Recommendations and Forecasts
The data on analyst behavior come from the Institutional Brokerage Estimation System
(IBES). IBES records the names of the firms covered by analysts. We collect data on
recommendations and forecasts issued by analysts for the sample period from January 1994
to December 2013 (although IBES provides information on analyst recommendations starting
from 1993, 1994 is the first year in IBES when reasonably complete data on recommendations
are available). We follow the convention in the literature and exclude observations without
7In addition, Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006) show that analysts are under pressure to issue biased
reports to help generate trades for the brokerage they work for. Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) find that
analysts affiliated with the acquirer advisor publish biased reports for both the acquirer and the target in
order to benefit the acquirer advisor.
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industry information, level of recommendations, or earnings estimate information. We also
exclude observations involving non-US firms issued by a team of analysts or by an anonymous
analyst (Sonney, 2009). We exclude observations involving a team of analysts because it
is problematic to account for their general and firm specific experience, number of stocks
followed, and forecast frequency. In the forecast database, we focus on annual forecasts of
firms’ earnings. In addition, we truncate the data of earnings, where earnings estimates fall
into the top or bottom 0.5% group. Lastly, we exclude reshuffled recommendations at the
time when brokerages moved from a five-tier to a coarser three-tier or four-tier rating system
(Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach, 2009). Firms are determined to be in the financial
sector and are thus retained in our sample if IBES indicates the firms as such or if the name
of a firm appears either in Nelson’s Directory or SDC as a financial institution. Our final
sample contains 100,024 recommendations and 212,577 forecasts issued by 3,613 analysts
covering the financial sector employed by 493 brokerages. With the data from the IBES, we
construct the following variables to measure the optimism (pessimism) of recommendations
and forecasts, the accuracy of forecasts, and the informativeness of recommendations:
Strong Buy/Buy and Hold/Underperform/Sell recommendations : IBES records each
recommendation with a number ranging from 1 to 5 (1=Strong Buy, 5=Sell). We follow
Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) and place strong buy and buy recommendations
together into the same group and place hold, underperform, and sell recommendations into
the other group. Thus, in our study, recommendations fall into one of the two groups.
Forecast Relative Optimism/Pessimism Score: Unlike recommendations, which tell us
directly how optimistic (pessimistic) the analysts are towards a particular firm, forecasts
have to be compared with a benchmark to measure their optimism (pessimism). Similar
to Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2009), and
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014), we use the distance between a forecast and the
benchmark (“consensus”) to measure its optimism (pessimism). We first calculate the
consensus as the mean of all forecasts issued for each firm-period by all other analysts
within the prior 12 month period. If we define the consensus as the median of all forecasts
for each firm-period, our results do not change. We then assign all forecasts for each
firm-period into two groups: forecasts that are greater than the consensus (the optimistic
forecast group) and forecasts that are less than the consensus (the pessimistic forecast
group). Lastly, we rank the forecasts within each forecast group from the most optimistic
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(pessimistic) forecast for a given firm-period to the forecast closest to the consensus.
Following Hong and Kubik (2003), we calculate the relative optimism (pessimism) score as
100 − 100 ∗ [(ranki,j,t − 1)/(number of forecastsi,j,t − 1)] . A higher relative optimism
(pessimism) score reflects a more optimistic (pessimistic) forecast. Similar to Cowen,
Groysberg, and Healy (2006), we require that there be at least three outstanding forecasts
issued by other analysts in the prior 12 month period for each firm-period; otherwise, the
relative score variable is coded empty. This ordered relative score variable, by controlling
firm and time factors, allows us to compare forecasts across different firms, analysts, and
time periods.
Positive and Negative Forecast Error : Polls conducted by Institutional Investor imply
that the ability to accurately forecast a firm’s earnings is a valued skill. We capture
each forecast’s accuracy by calculating its error. To do that, we measure the difference
between the forecast estimate and the earnings announced. To allow for comparison
between firms, we scale this number using the beginning of quarter stock price from CRSP.
Standardized forecast error = 100 ∗ (forecast EPS − actual EPS)/price . Similar to
the forecast relative score, we separate the standardized forecast error into two groups: a
positive forecast error group, in which the forecast estimate is larger than the earnings
announced, and a negative forecast error group, in which the forecast estimate is smaller
than the earnings announced. We separate the forecast error into two variables, since both a
very positive and a very negative forecast error point to inaccurate forecasts. We also refrain
from taking the absolute value of the forecast error, since using the absolute forecast error as
the dependent variable would be problematic for the regression by violating the underlying
assumptions of OLS. Lastly, we follow Gu and Xue (2008) and remove outliers that fall into
the top and bottom 1% of standardized forecast errors.
Market Reaction to Recommendations : Unlike forecast accuracy, which can be calculated
by comparing the forecast estimate to the earnings announced, to measure the information
content of recommendations, we need to look at their market reaction. The Cumulative
Abnormal Return (CAR) surrounding the issuance of recommendations are downloaded
from CRSP and Eventus. The CAR is determined using the Fama-French 3-factor model.
Following Loh and Stulz (2011), we use the announcement return of the event window (0,1)
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surrounding the recommendation issuance. Day 0 is the day the recommendation is issued.8
3.2.1.2 The Definition of Independent Research Firms
In our study, the IRF group consists of a variety of brokerages that do not engage in a
material amount of equity underwriting, and at the same time, they employ analysts who
issue recommendations and forecasts. To accurately classify brokerage types, we follow
the convention in the literature, specifically that of Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)
and Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2008), who use both Nelson’s Directory and SDC for the
classification of brokerage types and who follow a multi-step approach. Similar to Barber,
Lehavy, and Trueman (2007), when using SDC data, we only refer to the SDC equity
underwriting database to classify brokerages; we do not utilize information appearing in the
SDC debt deal or SDC merger and acquisition databases. Given the large magnitude of the
equity underwriting market, it is unlikely that there are many brokerages that engage solely
in debt or merger and acquisition deals and do not engage in equity deals. We obtain data
of equity underwriting activities of brokerages both in the U.S. and abroad from SDC. The
data we include in our sample cover equity offerings from January 1989 to December 2013.
The sample includes records of IPO deals and seasoned offerings involving both public and
private firms. In our SDC sample, we follow the convention in the literature and exclude
observations with missing information on deal size, observations with missing identifiable
underwriters, observations with missing SIC codes, and observations involving firms with a
SIC code in the 6000-6999 (financial industry) or 9000-9999 (government agencies) range.9
To link underwriters in SDC to brokerages that employ analysts in IBES, we use the IBES
identification file. Sonney (2009) and Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) rely on the
same technique to link the databases. In the SDC database, the subsidiary of a brokerage is
sometimes listed as the underwriter of a deal. To ensure that we use the names and codes
of the parent brokerage to link the two databases, we manually check each match.
To classify a firm as an IRF, we first manually match brokerages in IBES to institutions’
names in Nelson’s Directory. Brokerages listed either as Independent Research Firms
or Research Firms in Nelson’s Directory are initially classified as IRF; the remaining of
8According to Cliff (2004), recommendations are typically issued prior to market closing and often even
in the morning.
9If the underwriter is listed as NONE-RETAINED, NON-UNDERWRITTER, NOT-AVAILABLE,
NOTAPP, or DIRECTLY-PLACED, we assume the underwriter is not identifiable.
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brokerages are classified as investment banks. Next, we examine the brokerages classified
as IRFs during our preliminary classification stage and search their names in SDC. More
specifically, we examine whether brokerages classified as IRFs are initially involved in any
equity underwriting business and whether the equity underwriting business is material
(equity market share in a given year larger than 0.1%; “co-lead” underwriters given partial
credits). We are reassured about the accuracy of the information in Nelson’s Directory, since
we find only two brokerages that fit this description, and we reassign them as investment
banks. Third, we look at all the brokerages classified as investment banks in the previous two
stages and reassign those brokerages if their equity underwriting business is of a non-material
amount (equity market share in a given year less than 0.1%). We reclassify these brokerages
as IRFs, since they do not engage in a material amount of equity deal underwriting. Similar
to Cliff (2004), we allow IRFs in our sample to engage in a non-material amount of equity
underwriting business. In these infrequent instances, there is evidence that sometimes
brokerages with a small investment banking arm participate only to receive share allocations
for their customers. Similar to Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007), we do not distinguish
between brokerages issuing research while at the same time engaging in trading securities
from brokerages engaging solely in research. Brokerages identified by our three stage
procedure as IRFs could engage in trade commission generating activities. Through these
three stages, we are confident that the IRFs in our sample do not engage in a material amount
of equity underwriting business and do not receive a material amount of underwriting
revenue.
3.2.2 Control Variables
Besides the IRF indicator variable, there are several other variables related to the observable
characteristics of analysts, brokerages, firms covered, and timing of the research that could
influence the performance of analysts. In this section, we discuss how we construct these
control variables.
3.2.2.1 Analyst Characteristics
We construct several variables measuring analysts’ general and specific experience, coverage
breadth, and other characteristics that could affect their performance.
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Analyst general experience: We use the length of an analyst’s career as the proxy for
analyst general experience. We calculate the career length as the number of years the
analyst has been in the IBES database until a given year. Hong, Kubik, and Solomon
(2000) find that the longer the analyst’s career, the bolder his/her recommendations, while
inexperienced analysts tend to herd, since they are penalized if they are bold and inaccurate.
Also, analysts who are more accurate and more objective are more likely to remain employed
and thus exhibit a longer tenure in our sample.
Analyst-Firm Experience: Following Clement and Tse (2005), we code the measure
for analyst specific experience, analyst-firm experience, as the number of years the
analyst has covered a given firm in the IBES database. Trueman (1994) predicts that
analyst-firm experience is associated with bold forecasts, since most skilled analysts have
no one else to mimic and therefore do not exhibit herding behavior. Mikhail, Walther,
and Willis (1999) document that more accurate analysts are associated with longer
analyst-firm experience. According to Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006), analyst
optimism could be associated with analyst-firm experience. The longer the analyst follows
the firm, the more likely the analyst is acquainted with its management, and the more likely
the analyst is to refrain from damaging this relationship.
Analyst Breadth: Following Firth, Lin, Liu, and Xuan (2013), we construct the variable
analyst breadth, which is the number of firms for which the analyst issued at least one
recommendation during a given year. It measures the breadth of analyst’s coverage. Clement
and Tse (2005) find that forecast boldness increases with the number of firms covered by the
analyst. It can also measure the dilution of the analyst’s time and attention, since analysts
covering a large number of firms might not be able to allocate sufficient time to each firm.
All-Star : Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) find that all-star analysts are less
likely to bend to pressure from investment bankers. We thus control for all-star status
in our regression. Using the annual Institutional Investor All-America ranking, a ranking
based on a survey of fund managers, we construct an all-star indicator following Clarke,
Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007). This indicator equals one if the analyst is awarded with
the Institutional Investor All-America recognition in a given year, and zero otherwise.
Analyst Forecast Frequency : Following Clement and Tse (2005), we construct the analyst
Forecast frequency variable, which is the number of forecasts the analyst issued for a given
firm-period. Clement and Tse (2005) find that analysts who frequently issue forecasts are
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unlikely to herd. Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) find that forecast accuracy is positively
associated with analyst forecast frequency. They argue that forecasts are costly for the
analyst, since the analyst needs to spend time and resources to generate each forecast; thus,
the frequency of forecasts can capture the analyst’s efforts in a given firm.
3.2.2.2 Brokerage Characteristics
Using data from the IBES database, we first create the following three variables related to
brokerage characteristics:
Brokerage Size: Larger brokerages are usually more established, they offer better access
to data and training, and they attract more skilled analysts. Clement and Tse (2005) and
Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) find that analysts at larger brokerages are less likely to issue a
herding forecast, while analysts working at smaller brokerages who face a lack of resources
are more prone to herd. They also find that analysts employed by larger brokerages issue
more accurate forecasts. Stickel (1995) finds that the recommendations issued by analysts
at larger brokerages are more informative. To measure brokerage size, we count the number
of analysts working for the brokerage in the prior year and use it as a proxy for brokerage
research environment and research resources.
Brokerage Age: We count the number of years the brokerage has been in the IBES
database until the prior year and label this variable brokerage age.
Brokerage Breadth: We follow Cohen, Lou, and Malloy (2013) and use the number of
firms covered by the brokerage in the prior year as a proxy for the brokerage’s research
breadth.
Using data from the SDC database, we then create the two remaining brokerage
characteristics variables below:
Brokerage Reputation: The brokerage reputation variable measures the market share of
each brokerage in the equity underwriting market. Similar to Malmendier and Shanthikumar
(2014) and Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2009), when calculating the brokerage
reputation variable, we only consider the amount of equity raised by the brokerage as “lead”
underwriter. If the deals are “co-led” by multiple brokerages, equal partial credits are given
to each “co-lead” brokerage. The aggregated equity deal amount of each brokerage in the
prior year is then divided by the total equity market size in the prior year. The higher the
share of the brokerage, the more reputable it is.
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Brokerage Pressure: The brokerage pressure variable is similar in spirit to the fee pressure
variable proposed by Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006), which uses brokerage’s
underwriting fees earned from deals in the current year divided by the brokerage’s prior-year
fee income. Since in SDC, fee information is not available for many observations, we use
proceeds instead of the fee income to construct this variable. In our paper, the brokerage
pressure variable is calculated as brokerage’s prior year, t-1, underwriting proceeds as lead
underwriter divided by its underwriting proceeds in year t-2. In other words, the brokerage
pressure variable is the percentage change in deal proceeds relative to the previous year. If
deals are co-led by multiple brokerages, each brokerage is given an equal amount of partial
credit. Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) find that if the brokerage’s fee income rises
in the past two years, there could be less pressure on an analyst to provide biased reports.
Thus, rising fee income could be associated with less aggressive behavior on the brokerage’s
side. On the other hand, if the brokerage’s fee income decreases in the past two years, the
decreasing fee income might prompt the analyst to provide biased reports in an effort to
attract new deals and to reverse the decline for the brokerage.
3.2.2.3 Characteristics of the Firms Being Covered
In this section, we describe how we construct the variables related to the characteristics of
firms. By controlling for the variables in this section, we address the possibility that IRFs
and investment banks cover completely different firms.
Analyst Following : As in Feng and McVay (2010) and Casey (2013), we control for the
number of unique analysts following the firm in a given year.
Market Capitalization: We obtain market variables from CRSP. In CRSP, we exclude
observations with negative stock prices. Using the beginning stock price and share
outstanding per firm-year, we calculate the market capitalization (in thousand $) of firms
being covered. In the regression, we take the natural logarithm of the market capitalization
variable.
Leverage: We obtain accounting variables from Compustat. For each firm-year, we
download the end of the year total asset value and total long term debt value. We use
the value measured at the end of the previous year as the measure for the beginning of the
next calendar year. For Leverage, we refer to Casey (2013) and use the following equation:
Leverage = Long term debt total/Assets total.
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Earning Loss Indicator : Following Feng and McVay (2010), we construct the earning loss
indicator, which equals one if the earnings announced is negative in a given year and zero
otherwise.
Earning’s Shock : we construct the earning’s shock as the absolute change of earnings
from the previous year, scaled by the beginning of the year stock price. Earnings stock =
100 ∗ [abs(actual EPS − last year EPS)]/price.
3.2.2.4 Timing of Research Issuance
Horizon: We control for horizon, measured as the number of the days between the forecast
issuance date and the date of the earnings announcement. We control for horizon in our
regressions since the age of the forecast (horizon) is an important factor determining forecast
accuracy (Clement, 1999). Older forecasts are less accurate than newer forecasts. Prior
research also shows that analyst optimism declines when approaching the date of earnings
announcement (“walk-down phenomenon”) to enable the management to beat the forecast
estimate by a slight margin. Note that for recommendations, the value of the horizon could
not be determined; thus, we use the variables described below to control for the timing of
recommendations.
Friday Issuance: DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) find that due to investor inattention before
weekends, Friday announcements are followed by less immediate responses and more drifts.
Thus, I construct the Friday issuance indicator, which equals one if the recommendation or
forecast is issued on a Friday.
Proximity : When a recommendation elicits a larger market reaction, it could mean
that this recommendation is very informative. However, the CAR surrounding the
recommendation can also capture other confounding news about the firm. To ensure this is
not the case, in regressions involving analyst recommendations, I control for the fact that
some recommendations are issued within close proximity in terms of time to the earnings
announcement. Proximity 3 days (5 days) equals one if the recommendation is issued




Panels A and B of Table 1 provide descriptive statistics for the recommendations and
forecasts, respectively, in the IBES database given to firms in the financial sector. During
the 1994–2013 period, our sample covers more than 100,000 recommendations and
210,000 forecasts issued by 493 brokerages on more than 2531 firms. In total, 48.86% of
recommendations are strong buy/buy recommendations; the rest are hold/underperform/sell
recommendations. The average Fama-French 3-factor model adjusted CAR (0,1)
to strong/buy recommendations is 0.87%. For hold/underperform/sell recommendations,
it is -1.19%. On average, 7.71 and 8.76 analysts follow a firm in the recommendation and
forecast samples, respectively. Untruncated positive (negative) price-standardized forecast
errors have a median of 0.5917 (-0.3387), with the mean quite affected by outliers.
3.3 Recommendation Optimism and Informativeness
Tests and Results
3.3.1 Recommendation Optimism
3.3.1.1 Recommendation Optimism Research Design
In this section, we examine our first research question: whether analysts employed at IRFs
issue less biased recommendations to firms in the financial sector. More specifically, since
equity deals provide fees that are an important source of revenue for investment banks,
does the incentive to maintain a friendly relationship with other firms in the financial sector
prompt the investment bank analysts to issue biased recommendations to them? IRFs
generally have no incentive to issue biased recommendations to other firms in the financial
sector in return for being included in equity deals in the future. The following empirical test
addresses this question.
We estimate the following logit regression model in which we relate the optimism







= β0 + β1 · IRFB,t + β2 · ANA CHAi,t + β2 ·BRO CHAB,t−1
+ β3 · FIR CHAF,t + β4 · TIM CHAF,t + FirmF + Y eart + εi,F,t (1)
where in year t , analyst i works for brokerage B and issues a recommendation to firm
F , a firm in the financial sector. We are interested in whether the probability of a
hold/outperform/sell recommendation, Pi,F,t , is affected by the type of brokerage B . The
unit of observation in this model is one single recommendation. Since recommendations are
non-continuous from 1 to 5 on an ordinal scale, we aggregate the recommendations into two
groups: strong buy/ buy or hold / underperform/ sell. The dependent variable in this model
is an indictor variable for hold / underperform/ sell recommendations. If brokerage B is an
IRF, then IRFB,t is coded to be equal to one, and zero otherwise. We use this IRF indicator
variable we constructed in the data section as the independent variable of interest. To
examine whether recommendation optimism (pessimism) varies by brokerage type, we also
need to control for several measures associated with recommendation optimism identified
by previous studies. They include an array of observable characteristics of the brokerage,
BRO CHAB,t−1 , the analyst, ANA CHAi,t , the firm covered, FIR CHAF,t , and the
timing of the issuance, TIM CHAF,t , which we have described before as control variables.
In addition, we include fixed effects for firm F , the firm in the financial sector that received
the recommendation. If we find that firm F receives more optimistic recommendations from
some brokerages and more pessimistic recommendations from other brokerages, then we
might infer that some factors besides firm F ’s fundamentals induce the difference. Year fixed
effects are also included. All standard errors are robust standard errors. We test whether
the type of brokerage predicts the optimism of recommendations issued by its analysts,
conditional on observable characteristics and fixed effects. All else equal, we expect that
analyst i , who is employed by IRF, is less likely to issue favorable recommendations (or
more likely to issue unfavorable recommendations) for a firm in the financial sector.
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3.3.1.2 Recommendation Optimism Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the findings for the above equation using measures of recommendation
pessimism as the dependent variables. We estimate the results for above equation, separately
using different sets of control variables in Columns (1)-(3). In Column (1), we only
include control variables related to the observable characteristics of the brokerage and
the analysts. In Column (2), in addition to the control variables in Column (1), we also
include a set of variables related to the observable characteristics of the firm being covered.
Finally, in Column (3), we add control variables related to the timing of the issuance. In
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 2, the dependent variable is an indicator for hold/underperform/sell
recommendations. The positive and significant coefficient for the IRF indicator indicates that
brokerage B ’s analyst i is more likely to issue hold/underperform/sell recommendations to
firm F if brokerage B is an IRF. The estimates in Table 2 imply that when covering the
financial sector, analysts at IRFs make less optimistic recommendations and more pessimistic
recommendations than analysts at investment banks. In Column (3), the significant estimate
for the IRF indicator of 0.017 implies that the likelihood of issuing a hold/underperform/sell
recommendation is 50.8% for analysts at IRFs versus 49.1% for their counterparts at
investment banks, causing a relative increase of 3.5% (=1.70%/49.10%).
Consistent with earlier findings, we find that analysts with longer tenure issue less
biased recommendations. Also, analysts with more firm specific experience tend to be more
optimistic. The significant and negative coefficients of the variable analyst-firm experience in
Columns (1)-(3) imply that the longer the analyst follows a given firm, the more optimistic
his/her recommendations.
Overall, the evidence in Table 2 is consistent with the interpretation that analysts at
investment banks are more likely to refrain from issuing pessimistic recommendations to
other firms in the financial sector, while analysts at IRFs issue less biased and more objective
recommendations. The behavior of analysts at investment banks is likely driven by the
investment bank’s hope that it will maintain a good relationship with other firms in the
financial industry.
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3.3.2 Informativeness of Recommendations
3.3.2.1 Informativeness of Recommendations Research Design
Our initial set of analyses compares the optimism of recommendations issued by analysts
at IRF and investment banks. Subsequently, we examine the informativeness of their
recommendations.
As described in the data section, we measure the informativeness of recommendations
by comparing the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) in a two day window surrounding
the recommendation issuance date, starting on the day of the issuance. The dependent
variable in this section is the CAR (0,1) surrounding the recommendation issuance date.
The CAR is adjusted using the Fama-French 3-factor model. Similar to the last section,
we partition the recommendation sample into strong buy/buy and hold/underperform/ sell
recommendations. We examine whether the recommendations made by IRFs are more
informative than those issued by investment banks. The indicator variable IRF, takes the
value of one if the brokerage engages in research and does not engage in a material amount
of equity underwriting business. This independent variable of interest allows us to examine
the incremental amount of information provided by IRF recommendations.
We adopt the following model:
CAR(0, 1)i,F,t = β0 + β1 · IRFB,t + β2 · ANA CHAi,t + β2 ·BRO CHAB,t−1
+ β3 · FIR CHAF,t + β4 · TIM CHAF,t + FirmF + Y eart + εi,F,t (2)
where we regress CAR (0, 1)i,F,t on the indicator IRFB,t and an array of observable
characteristics of the brokerage, BRO CHAB,t−1 , the analyst, ANA CHAi,t , the firm
being covered, FIR CHAF,t , and the timing of the issuance, TIM CHAF,t , since these
factors could also contribute to varying degrees of informativeness. We also control for firm
and year fixed effects. We use the same set of control variables as in the last section.
3.3.2.2 Informativeness of Recommendations Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the results for equations (2) and compares the CAR (0,1) surrounding
optimistic and pessimistic recommendations issued by IRFs to those issued by
investment banks. The dependent variables in Columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) are
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CAR (0,1) surrounding strong buy/buy recommendations and hold/underperform/sell
recommendations, respectively. Columns (1), (2), (4), (5) present the base regression with
a limited number of control variables, and Columns (3) and (6) show the results involving a
more comprehensive set of control variables. The coefficients on the IRF indicator variable
capture the differential informativeness of recommendations issued by IRF analysts and
investment bank analysts. The positive and significant coefficients of the IRF indictor in
Columns (1)-(3) are consistent with recommendations issued by IRF analysts to firms in the
financial sector being more informative. Across Columns (1)-(3), the difference in market
reaction to optimistic recommendations between those issued by IRFs and by investment
banks is 19.6˜21.2 basis points. Columns (4)-(6) show an exception: the market finds
pessimistic recommendations issued by investment banks to firms in the financial sector more
informative.10 The pessimistic recommendations by investment banks outperform those by
IRFs by a significant and economically quite large 24.6˜29.4 basis points. In Column (6) of
Table 3, the pessimistic recommendations of IRFs generate a CAR(0,1) of negative 119 basis
points, this compares to a significantly negative CAR(0,1) of 148 basis points earned by
those of investment banks. Given that investment bank analysts are usually more optimistic
when covering firms in the financial sector, a pessimistic recommendation, which is costly
to the investment bank analyst who issues it, is a strong and credible signal to the market
that the fundamentals of the firm being covered are deteriorated such that even investment
banks can no longer hide this situation. Thus the pessimistic recommendation issued by
investment bank analysts causes a larger market reaction than a similar recommendation
issued by its counterparts at IRFs.
For the control variables, the coefficients generally have the expected signs. We find
that analyst-firm experience, brokerage age, and all-star indicator all contribute to more
informative recommendations. I also find that analyst coverage breadth is associated with
less informative recommendations, possibly pointing to a dilution of analysts’ time and effort.
In summary, while analysts at IRFs issue more informative optimistic recommendations,
analysts at investment banks issue more informative pessimistic recommendations.
10Note that the market reaction surrounding a pessimistic recommendation is generally negative; thus, a
significant and negative coefficient points to a more informative pessimistic recommendation.
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3.4 Forecast Optimism and Accuracy Tests and
Results
3.4.1 Forecast Optimism
3.4.1.1 Forecast Optimism Research Design
In this section, we examine the differences in forecast optimism (pessimism) across brokerage
types in multivariate settings to control for several factors associated with forecast optimism
in prior research. It is likely that investment banking analysts are less likely to be objective
not only in their recommendations but also in their forecasts.
The following multivariate model is used to examine the differences in forecast optimism
across brokerage types:
Forecast Optimism/Pessimismi,F,t = β0+β1·IRFB,t+β2·ANA CHAi,t+β2·BRO CHAB,t−1
+ β3 · FIR CHAF,t + β4 · TIM CHAF,t + FirmF + Y eart + εi,F,t (3)
where the dependent variable is either the forecast relative optimism or pessimism score,
Forecast Optimism/Pessimismi,F,t , described in the data section. The IRF indicator
IRFB,t equals one if the brokerage engages in research and does not engage in a material
amount of equity underwriting. The indicator’s coefficient measures the incremental
optimism (pessimism) exhibited by the forecasts made by IRF analysts compared to those
issued by investment bank analysts. If the IRF analysts’ forecasts are, on average, not as
optimistic as those issued by their counterparts at investment banks, the sign of the IRF
indicator’s coefficient will be negative for a regression in which the dependent variables
are forecast relative optimism scores. When the dependent variable is the forecast relative
pessimism score, we expect the IRF indicator to have a positive coefficient. Note that the
forecast relative optimism (pessimism) score compares analyst i ’s forecast to all outstanding
forecasts for a given firm-period issued by other analysts in the last 12 months. Thus, this
relative variable offers insights into the thought process of analyst i. Extreme values of the
relative forecast scores indicate that the analyst knows in advance that such a forecast does
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not conform with the consensus and will likely attract the attention of the covered firm.11
Prior research documents that analyst forecast optimism is associated with several
factors: horizon, analyst-firm experience (which we measure as the number of years the
analyst has been following the given firm), and brokerage size (which is the number of
analysts employed by the brokerage).
3.4.1.2 Forecast Optimism Empirical Results
In Columns (1)-(6) of Table 4, we examine whether there is any difference in forecast
optimism for IRFs and investment banks. The dependent variable is the forecast relative
optimism score in Columns (1)-(3) and the forecast relative pessimism score in Columns
(4)-(6). Across Columns (1)-(3), the IRF indicator’s coefficients are negative and significant,
indicating that after controlling for a varying set of variables, IRF analysts remain relatively
less optimistic than their counterparts at investment banks. For example, in Column (3), the
IRF indicator’s coefficient is -0.857 and is statistically significant. This estimate implies that
on average, the forecast relative optimism score of IRF analysts is 0.857 points lower on a
0-100 scale than analysts at investment banks. These results are consistent with the incentive
of investment banks to maintain a good relationship with other firms in the financial sector for
the sake of future investment banking opportunities, which outweighs the investment bank
analyst’s concern to be objective. The coefficients for the IRF indicator across Columns
(4)-(6) are positive but not significant, indicating that when examining all forecasts below
the 12 month consensus, IRF analysts do not appear to be more pessimistic than their
counterparts at investment banks.
For the set of control variables, we find that analyst-firm experience does affect forecast
optimism, as the coefficient is significant and positive in Columns (1)-(3). This suggests that
analysts who cover a firm for a longer time are more likely to rate it favorably relative to
their peers, pointing to the stronger relationship formed between the analyst and the firm’s
11Using the continuous forecast relative optimism (pessimism) score addresses the concern that pessimistic
forecasts in our sample could actually be attempts by the analysts to please the firm covered. Prior research
shows that forecast optimism declines slightly when approaching the date of earnings announcement to
“lower the bar” for the firm’s management. In these cases, the forecast (“the bar”) is lowered just enough
for the management to yield a positive surprise when announcing the earnings. Since we use a continuous
variable that consists of information about the rank of a given forecast, the slightly pessimistic forecasts that
are meant to “lower the bar” would not affect our results.
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management over the analyst’s tenure.
The results in this section provide evidence that IRF analysts tend to be less optimistic
when covering firms in the financial sector than investment bank analysts.
3.4.2 Forecast Accuracy
3.4.2.1 Forecast Accuracy Research Design
In this section, we use forecast error as a measure of analyst forecast performance. We
investigate whether IRF analysts issue more accurate forecasts to firms in the financial
sector. We argue that the prior expectation typically associates investment bank analysts
with more accurate forecasts, since investment banks are more resourceful and are able to
equip their analysts with better access to information that is normally not available to IRF
analysts. We examine whether this resource advantage outweighs investment bank analysts’
incentive to please covered firms in the financial sector or vice versa. To do so, we test
whether the forecast accuracy differs depending on the brokerage type, controlling for a set
of comprehensive variables. If we find that investment bank analysts are relatively more
accurate, it would be consistent with the hypothesis that investment bank resources explain
the relative accuracy. If we find that IRF analysts are relatively more accurate, it would
be consistent with the competing hypothesis that IRFs, which do not engage in a material
amount of equity underwriting and are thus free from investment banking pressure, are able
to issue relatively accurate forecast.
To test whether analysts employed by IRFs make more accurate forecasts relative to their
counterparts at investment banks, we estimate a model that is similar to the equation in
section 4.1.1.
Standardized forecast errori,F,t = β0 + β1 · IRFB,t + β2 · ANA CHAi,t+
+β2 ·BRO CHAB,t−1+β3 ·FIR CHAF,t+β4 ·TIM CHAF,t+FirmF +Y eart+εi,F,t
(4)
where we replicate the previous equation now with Standardized forecast errori,F,t as
the dependent variable. It is scaled by the beginning of quarter stock price to allow for
comparison between firms. The dependent variable is either the positive forecast error,
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with the regression sample restricted to forecasts with estimates larger than the earnings
announced, or the negative forecast error, with the sample restricted to forecasts with
estimates less than the actual earnings number. To compare analysts employed by IRFs
with those at investments banks, we include the IRF indicator IRFB,t in our regressions.
This indicator variable takes the value of one if the forecast comes from an IRF analyst and
zero otherwise. We estimate the model with firm and year fixed effects and control for a
comprehensive set of factors shown in the literature to affect forecast accuracy. One of the
controls we include is HORIZON, which measures the age of the forecast. Newer forecasts
are likely to be more accurate since they include updated information. We include this
control variable so that the forecast accuracy of either IRF or investment bank analysts is
not driven by younger forecast age. We control for not only an array of brokerage and analyst
characteristics, but also for characteristics of the covered firm, including leverage, natural
logarithm of market capitalization, earnings shock and an indicator for earnings loss. This
allows us to compare forecasts to different firms. In short, we use the same set of controls
as in our previous section in which we examine forecast optimism.
3.4.2.2 Forecast Accuracy Empirical Results
In Table 5, we report results of the equation in section 4.2.1. In Columns (1)-(3), the
dependent variable is the positive forecast errors. In Column (1), the coefficient of the
IRF indicator is negative but not significant. However, as we add more control variables
in Columns (2) and (3), the coefficient of the IRF indicator turns significant and negative,
indicating that among forecasts with estimates larger than the earnings announced, analysts
at IRFs are associated with higher forecast accuracy than analysts at investment banks. This
result is consistent with the hypothesis that IRFs, by not engaging in a material amount
of equity underwriting business, are able to provide more accurate forecasts. In Columns
(4)-(6), the dependent variable is the negative forecast error. Among forecasts with estimates
smaller than the earnings announced, we do not find that IRF analysts and investment
banking analysts differ in terms of accuracy.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, among the control variables, we find that analyst covered breadth,
measured by the number of stocks covered by a given analyst, has a positive and significant
coefficient in Columns (1)-(3). This is consistent with the explanation that analysts are less
accurate when their time and effort is diluted. HORIZON, the measure for the age of the
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forecast, has a positive coefficient in Column (3) and a negative coefficient in Column (6),
with both coefficients being significant. This points to a larger absolute forecast error for
older forecasts.
The results in Table 5 confirm the hypothesis that when covering firms in the financial
sector, IRF analysts, free from investment banking pressure, outperform their counterparts
at investment banks in terms of forecast accuracy.
3.5 Explaining the Inferior Performance by Investment
Bank Analysts
3.5.1 Differences in Performance for Bulge Brackets and
Non-Bulge Bracket Firms
In the previous sections, we find that compared to analysts at investment banks, analysts
at IRFs issue more objective, more informative, and more accurate recommendations and
forecasts. These results are very important to investors who read analysts reports. Yet it is
also important to examine why the performance of investment bank analysts is poor when
they cover firms in the financial sector. In this section, we hypothesize that there are at
least two potential explanations for the superior performance of IRF analysts compared to
investment bank analysts when covering the financial sector: (1) IRF analysts are better
than investment bank analysts at networking and gathering new information. Given, first,
that investment banks interact with each other when forming underwriting syndicates; and
second, that investment banks could attract more informative analysts with better access
to management using higher pay, this hypothesis is less credible; (2) the problem could be
that analysts at investment banks have an incentive to please extremely large investment
banks (bulge brackets) to pursue roles in future equity deals. Indeed, Ljungqvist, Marston,
Wilhelm (2009) finds that both the issuer and the “co-lead” brokerages contribute to the
choice of the “co-manager” brokerages in equity deals. They find that “co-lead” brokerages
might influence the issuer’s decision and steer the issuer to select a particular brokerage as
the “co-manager”. Note that by definition, investment banks in our study are brokerages
that engage in a material amount of equity underwriting business. Thus, more revenue from
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equity underwriting is likely to be very attractive for investment banks compared to the
cost associated with dishonest and biased research. Taking this into account, it is intuitive
that investment banks may avoid issuing pessimistic recommendations or forecasts because
they do not want to impair their relationship with bulge brackets, which have a say in
the selection of “co-manager” for the next big equity underwriting deal. Thus, this second
hypothesis would predict differences in recommendations and forecasts by firm type: bulge
brackets are likely to receive biased recommendations and forecasts from other investment
banks. If we do not observe that bulge brackets are treated differently by investment bank
analysts, then this should be consistent with our first hypothesis.
To examine whether the poor performance of analysts at investments is driven by biased
recommendations and forecasts issued to bulge brackets, we generate a sample that is made of
all recommendations (forecasts) issued to investment banks. We use the reputation variable
constructed in the data section, which measures market share, to distinguish between bulge
brackets and other firms in the financial sector. We identify all firms in the financial sector
receiving recommendations or forecasts and classify the firms based on their involvement
in equity underwriting, using SDC. Firms whose amount of equity underwriting business
accounts for more than a 10% market share in a given year are classified as a bulge bracket.
The rest of the firms in the financial sector are classified as non-bulge bracket firms at
this stage. Using the 10% criterion, we arrive at a set of 22 large investment banks and
classify them as bulge brackets.12 We supplement our SDC data with data from CRSP and
Compustat. Firms with market capitalization in the 99th percentile are reclassified as bulge






= β0 + β1 ·Bulge BracketF,t + β2 · IB analystB,t
+ β3 ·Bulge BracketF,t · IB analystB,t + β4 · ANA CHAi,t + β5 ·BRO CHAB,t−1
+ β6 · FIR CHAF,t + β7 · TIM CHAF,t + Y eart + εi,F,t (5)
where the dependent variable is the probability of a hold/outperform/sell
recommendation, Pi,F,t . The independent variables include an indicator variable for bulge
12The bulge brackets in our sample include Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan
Chase, Morgan Stanley, UBS, and Wells Fargo, among others.
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brackets, Bulge BracketF,t . The bulge bracket variable is set to one if the recommendation is
issued to a bulge bracket. Other independent variables include IB analystB,t , an indicator
variable that equals one if the recommendation is issued by an investment bank analyst.
The independent variable of interest is the interaction variable between the two indicator
variables. We expect the coefficient of the interaction to have a negative sign when the
dependent variable is the indicator for hold/underperform/sell recommendations.
The coefficient for the interaction variable represents the incremental optimism
(pessimism) exhibited by investment bank analysts while covering bulge brackets. We do
not include firm fixed effects since doing so would absorb our bulge bracket variable. All
other control variables and fixed effects are the same as the equation in section 3.1.1.
3.5.2 Empirical Results
The findings are reported in Table 6 for the recommendation optimism. In Columns (1)
and (3), we control for brokerage reputation. However, there is concern for multicollinearity
since we use the brokerage reputation variable to construct the bulge bracket variable.
Thus, in Columns (2) and (4), we do not control for brokerage reputation. In Columns
(3) and (4), we include issuing bank fixed effects instead of controlling for IB analystB,t .
We find that analysts at investment banks are less likely to issue hold/underperform/sell
recommendations to bulge brackets. In Columns (1)-(4), the bulge bracket variable has
coefficients ranging from -0.069 to -0.078, all statistically significant at 1% level. In Column
(2), for example, the coefficients imply that the probability of an investment bank analyst
issuing a hold/underperform/sell recommendation to bulge brackets is 14% lower than to
other firms in the financial industry. This suggests that investment banks are less likely to
issue hold/underperform/sell recommendations to bulge brackets, which could damage their
relationship with bulge brackets.
In Table 7, the dependent variable in Columns (1)-(4) is the CAR (0,1) to strong buy/
buy recommendations, while the dependent variable in Columns (5)-(8) is the CAR (0,1)
to hold/underperform/sell recommendations. In Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8), we do not
control for brokerage reputation because of multicollinearity concerns. In Columns (3), (4),
(7), and (8), we include issuing bank fixed effects in our regressions instead of controlling
for IB analystB,t . The coefficients in Columns (1)-(4) of Table 7 for the bulge bracket
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indicator are negative but insignificant. The coefficient in Columns (5)-(8) of Table 7 do
not yield consistent or significant results. The insignificant results suggest that it is unlikely
that the market and investors detected the bias exhibited in the recommendations issued by
IB analysts covering bulge brackets.
In Table 8, we examine the optimism and pessimism of forecasts issued by investment
banks to bulge brackets. Here, the dependent variable is the forecast relative optimism score
in Columns (1)-(4) and the forecast relative pessimism score in Columns (5)-(8). However,
we do not find that the forecasts received by bulge brackets differ significantly in terms of
optimism (pessimism) from the forecasts received by non-bulge bracket firms in the financial
sector. The lack of any significant difference in terms of forecast optimism could stem from
the fact that forecasts, by nature, are less biased than recommendations. When considering
the insignificant results in this table, we remind readers that analysts often produce two
main quantifiable outputs about the covered firm’s situation, namely, earnings forecasts
and recommendations. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) find that analysts have more
incentive to twist their recommendations than their forecasts. A forecast is in the form of
a continuous number, which is more difficult to interpret for the average investor and is
more geared towards institutional investors, who are better at detecting biases. While a
recommendation is scaled from 1-5 in the form of an integer (some brokerages issue coarser
recommendations with only 3 levels instead of 5 levels) and is more geared towards individual
investors who can more easily follow instructions like “buy” or “sell” and who can be easily
misled by biased information. Thus our insignificant results in this table are not surprising.
In Table 9, we examine whether investment banks give bulge brackets inaccurate forecasts
compared to the forecasts given to other firm in the financial sector. Here the model has
overall better explanatory power. In Columns (1)-(4), the coefficient for the bulge bracket
indicator is positive and significant at the 1% level, with the coefficient in Column (2)
being an exception. In Columns (5)-(8), the coefficient for the bulge bracket indicator is
negative and significant at the 5% level. Investment banks seem to perform worse when
giving forecasts to bulge brackets compared to the forecasts given to other firms in the
financial sector. This result is consistent with the prediction that investment banks want to
please bulge brackets with biased research, which makes their research less valuable.
Overall, our results indicate that the more biased, less informative, and less accurate
recommendations and forecasts by investment banks to firms in the financial sector is
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primarily driven by investment bank analysts’ intention to please bulge brackets. Compared
to recommendations and forecasts given by investment banks to other firms in the financial
sector, the recommendations given to bulge brackets are significantly more optimistic and
less pessimistic. The forecasts given to bulge brackets are significantly less accurate than
forecasts given to other firms in the financial sector. These new results combined with
our previous results on IRF analysts suggest that a brokerage’s engagement in the equity
underwriting business is detrimental to its objectivity when covering firms in the financial
sector. IRFs, by not engaging in a material amount of equity underwriting, are less worried
about straining their relationships with other firms in the financial sector and tend to blow
the whistle more often. For investment banks, whose main source of revenue comes from
underwriting and which would like to attract new underwriting business, the concern for
maintaining a good relationship with other firms in the financial sector, especially the bulge
brackets, outweighs the benefits associated with being unbiased.
3.6 Target Prices
Most analyst research reports contain three distinguishable measures: recommendations,
earnings forecasts, and target price forecasts. While previous research finds that
recommendations and earnings forecasts are often influential, recommendations and earnings
forecasts also have certain disadvantages when transferring information to investors.
Earnings forecasts are often issued shortly before the release of actual earnings and thus
cover a relatively short period of time. Since most recommendations follow a discrete five-tier
rating system, certain information might be lost when analysts issue recommendations that
fall into one of the five tiers.
Compared to earnings forecasts and recommendations, target prices have the following
advantages: 1) they explicitly tell investors about the analyst’s beliefs regarding the firm’s
expected value; 2) compared to recommendations, the continuous nature of target prices is
associated with less information loss before the information is transferred to investors. Recent
research attempts to examine the incremental contributions of target price forecasts and
whether analysts exhibit different abilities in making accurate target price forecasts. Brav
and Lehavy (2003) and Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) find that target price forecasts are
incrementally informative. They show that earnings forecasts, recommendations, and target
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price forecasts each bring independent information to the market. Since target price forecasts
do bring some incremental information to the market, they would then be relevant when we
examine analysts’ conflicts of interests and the potential biases exhibited by analysts.
In this section, we examine whether target price forecasts are more optimistic among
investment bank analysts when they cover firms in the financial industry and whether they
provide less accurate target price forecasts compared to their counterparts at IRF. The target
price forecasts over the years 1994 through 2013 are from IBES. We restrict our sample to
12-month-ahead target price forecasts, which is the most commonly used target price forecast
horizon. We follow Gleason, Johnson, and Li (2013) and remove extreme target prices to
mitigate the influence of errors in the original data. We winsorize our target price sample at
the 0.5% and 99.5% levels.
To examine the optimism of target price forecasts, we follow Brav and Lehavy (2003)
and use the implied target price-based returns (TP/P), which is the ratio of target price
announced by analysts (TP) to the current stock price (P). Following Bradshaw (2002), for
the current stock price (P), we use the stock price just one day prior to the announcement
of target prices. If the day prior to the announcement of the target price is a non-trading
day, we use the price two days prior instead. The implied target price-based returns measure
the belief of the analyst regarding the firm’s expected return in 12 months. The greater the
implied target price-based returns, the more attractive the stock looks to the analyst.
To access the accuracy of target price forecasts, we look at the long-term comovement
of stock prices and target prices. More specifically, we follow Bradshaw, Brown, and
Huang (2013) and construct the variable target price forecast error (TPERROR), which
is (TP-P12)/P, where P12 is the stock price 12 months following the target price forecast
announcement date. The closer the target price forecast error is to zero, the more accurate
the target price prediction is. Since both a very positive and a very negative target price
forecast error point to inaccurate target prices, we separate the target price forecast error
into two variables, as we did in section 4 for earnings forecasts.
To examine whether IRF analysts and investment bank analysts exhibit differences in
skills in forecasting target prices, we follow the regression setting for earnings forecasts in
section 4. We include the IRF indicator and the same set of controls in this regression for
target prices. The only exception is that we exclude the variable earnings shock and the
indicator for earnings loss, since they are not applicable for the examination of target prices.
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In Table 10, we report the results on the optimism of target price. The dependent variable
is the implied target price-based returns, TP/P. In Columns (1)-(3), we add different sets of
control variables. Through Columns (1)-(3), the coefficients of the IRF indicator are negative
but only statistically significant at the 5%-10% level. The level of optimism exhibited by
IRF analysts, as measured by the implied target price-based returns, appears to be less than
the level of optimism exhibited by their counterparts at investment banks.
In Table 11, we report the results on the accuracy of target prices. In Columns (1)-(3),
the dependent variable is the positive target price error. Among target prices with estimates
greater than the stock price 12 months following the target price announcement, we do
not find that IRF analysts and investment banking analysts differ in terms of accuracy.
In Columns (4)-(6), the dependent variable is the negative target price error. In Column
(4), the coefficient of the IRF indicator is positive but not significant. However, as we add
more control variables in Columns (5) and (6), the coefficient of the IRF indicator turns
to be significant at the 1% level, indicating that among target prices with estimates less
than the stock price 12 months following the target price announcement, employment with
IRF is associated with higher target price accuracy among analysts than employment with
investment banks. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that IRFs, by not engaging
in a material amount of equity underwriting, are able to provide more accurate target price
forecasts. The results in Tables 10 and 11 echo earlier findings in our paper drawn from the
recommendations sample and the earnings forecasts sample.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the recommendations and forecasts made by IRF analysts
covering firms in the financial sector differ from those made by investment bank analysts.
We evaluate several aspects of analyst performance: recommendation optimism and
informativeness, earnings forecast optimism and accuracy, and target price forecast optimism
and accuracy. We find that compared to investment bank analysts, IRF analysts offer less
biased, more informative, and more accurate recommendations and forecasts when covering
firms in the financial sector. We then make an effort to interpret the inferior performance
of the investment bank analysts. Conflicts of interests appear to play a significant role
when investment bank analysts cover other bulge bracket investment banks. This result
126
suggests that investment bank analysts are susceptible to institutional pressure related to
the underwriting business. The results of our study are potentially important not only
to academics but also to regulators and investors. Our study has potential implications
for policy debates on issues of objective research by analysts. We show that analysts at
investment banks, despite the establishment of the “Chinese Wall”, are less likely to achieve
an independent status compared to IRFs. It might be beneficial for regulators to recognize
the importance of IRF analysts covering firms in the financial sector.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the recommendations (Panel A) and forecasts (Panel B) issued to
firms in the financial sector in the Institutional Brokerage Estimation System (IBES) database for the sample
period from January 1994 to December 2013.
Regression Sample
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
Panel A: Recommendation Sample
Strong Buy/Buy 100024 0.4886 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000
Hold/Underperform/Sell 100024 0.5114 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000
S. Buy/Buy CAR (0,1) 44367 0.8748 4.7188 -93.7207 142.7559
Hold/Underperform/Sell CAR (0,1) 47466 -1.1890 6.7638 -124.4806 144.4748
Brokerage Size 100024 58.5631 58.3125 1.0000 329.0000
Brokerage Pressure 100024 0.2006 2.7965 -0.9984 196.5909
Brokerage Reputation 100024 0.0167 0.0332 0.0000 0.1522
Brokerage Age 100024 8.8165 5.3003 1.0000 20.0000
Brokerage Breadth 100024 382.7085 318.3789 1.0000 1577.0000
Analyst Experience 100024 5.4128 3.9390 1.0000 20.0000
Analyst-Firm Experience 100024 2.1629 1.6172 1.0000 17.0000
Analyst Breadth 100024 14.1276 10.8888 1.0000 112.0000
Analyst Forecast Frequency 100024 1.7623 1.0851 1.0000 13.0000
Ln(Market Capitalization) 97319 14.2412 1.7924 6.0270 19.4275
Analyst Following 100024 7.7114 5.1848 1.0000 30.0000
Leverage 76704 0.1808 0.2070 0.0000 5.9451
CAR (-22,-2) 91834 -0.0039 0.1248 -2.4628 4.4596
Friday 100024 0.1739 0.3790 0.0000 1.0000
Proximity 5 days 100024 0.1854 0.3886 0.0000 1.0000
Proximity 3 days 100024 0.1407 0.3478 0.0000 1.0000
128
Table 1: (Cont.)Descriptive Statistics
Panel B: Forecast Sample
Positive Forecast Error 104981 12.7838 208.2740 0.0000 41900.0000
Negative Forecast Error 95939 -1.8210 17.9468 -3730.0000 -0.0003
Forecast Relative Optimism Score 75275 50.0000 32.2247 0.0000 100.0000
Forecast Relative Pessimism Score 88948 50.0000 31.7914 0.0000 100.0000
Earning Loss 205954 0.0966 0.2954 0.0000 1.0000
Earning shock 185529 16.6264 692.8013 0.0000 159000.0000
Brokerage Size 212577 59.8256 58.2581 1.0000 329.0000
Brokerage Pressure 212577 0.1727 2.2096 -0.9984 196.5909
Brokerage Reputation 212577 0.0178 0.0341 0.0000 0.1522
Brokerage Age 212577 10.2979 5.4490 1.0000 20.0000
Brokerage Breadth 212577 376.1066 311.2088 1.0000 1577.0000
Analyst Experience 212577 6.2429 4.2233 1.0000 20.0000
Analyst-Firm Experience 212577 2.4607 1.8045 1.0000 17.0000
Analyst Breadth 212577 12.6890 9.0594 1.0000 112.0000
Analyst Forecast Frequency 212577 1.4822 0.8350 1.0000 13.0000
Ln(Market Capitalization) 207804 14.5960 1.8159 6.5965 19.4275
Analyst Following 212577 8.7604 5.7912 1.0000 33.0000
Leverage 169426 0.1350 0.1627 0.0000 1.6586
Friday 212577 0.1872 0.3900 0.0000 1.0000
Horizon 207053 193.2559 104.4844 -340.0000 2009.0000
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Table 2: Optimism of Analyst Recommendations
Table 2 provides logit regression results testing whether the optimism of recommendations varies by broker-
age type. The dependent variables are indicator variables for hold/ underperform/ sell recommendations in
columns (1)-(3). The independent variables include IRF indicator, analyst general experience, analyst-firm
specific experience, number of stocks covered by the analyst (analyst breadth), analyst forecast frequency,
analyst all-star indicator, brokerage size, brokerage pressure, brokerage reputation, brokerage age, number of
stocks covered by the brokerage (brokerage breadth), log(market capitalization of the firm being covered),
number of analysts following the firm, firm leverage, cumulative abnormal return in the time window (-22,-2)
before the issuance of recommendations, indictor for Friday announcements, proximity indictor which equals
one if time between the date of recommendation issuance and the date of earnings announcement is less than
five-days (three-days). Firm and year fixed effects are included. Each column represents a separate regression.
Marginal effects are displayed. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP: Indicator variable for
Hold/Underperform/Sell
(1) (2) (3)
IRF 0.027*** 0.019*** 0.017***
(7.387) (3.259) (2.964)
Analyst Experience -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(-8.477) (-3.313) (-2.922)
Analyst-Firm Experience 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(7.931) (3.210) (2.831)
Analyst Breadth 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000**
(4.383) (2.458) (2.028)
Analyst Forecast Frequency -0.001 -0.003** -0.004**
(-0.599) (-2.393) (-2.545)
All Star -0.017*** -0.013** -0.013**
(-3.147) (-2.455) (-2.504)
Brokerage Size 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.515) (1.614) (1.399)
Brokerage Pressure 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.557) (1.039) (1.030)
Brokerage Reputation 0.574*** 0.409*** 0.350***
(10.130) (3.464) (3.113)
Brokerage Age 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(7.093) (2.955) (2.605)
Brokerage Breadth 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(1.966) (2.060) (2.211)
130
Table 2: (Cont.)Optimism of Analyst Recommendations
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Market Capitalization) 0.006** 0.007***
(2.374) (5.625)








Proximity 5 days -0.003
(-0.689)
Proximity 3 days 0.009*
(1.809)
Year FE YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: Optimism of Target Price Estimates
Table 10 provides regression results testing whether the optimism of target price estimates vary by brokerage
type. The dependent variables (TP/P) are the ratios of the announced 12 month target price (TP) to the stock
price outstanding one day prior to the announcement (P). The independent variables include IRF indicator,
analyst general experience, analyst-firm specific experience, number of stocks covered by the analyst (analyst
breadth), analyst forecast frequency, analyst all-star indicator, brokerage size, brokerage pressure, brokerage
reputation, brokerage age, number of stocks covered by the brokerage (brokerage breadth), log(market capi-
talization of the firm being covered), number of analysts following the firm, firm leverage, indictor for Friday
announcements, proximity indictor which equals one if time between the date of price target issuance and the
date of earnings announcement is less than five-days (three-days). Firm and year fixed effects are included.




IRF -0.020** -0.005* -0.005*
(-2.331) (-1.876) (-1.913)
Analyst Experience 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(2.794) (10.052) (10.092)
Analyst-Firm Experience 0.008*** -0.001 -0.001
(3.815) (-1.179) (-1.061)
Analyst Breadth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.588) (-1.261) (-1.155)
Analyst Forecast Frequency -0.022*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(-7.034) (-9.191) (-9.267)
All Star 0.023* 0.004 0.004
(1.813) (0.946) (0.962)
Brokerage Size -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-4.731) (-8.058) (-8.106)
Brokerage Pressure 0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(1.964) (-1.089) (-1.181)
Brokerage Reputation -0.489*** -0.178*** -0.182***
(-3.876) (-4.601) (-4.721)
Brokerage Age -0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.486) (0.879) (0.977)
Brokerage Breadth 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(3.675) (5.350) (5.303)
146
Table 10: (Cont.)Optimism of Target Price Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Market Capitalization) 0.010*** 0.010***
(3.213) (3.218)






Proximity 5 days -0.011***
(-2.852)
Proximity 3 days 0.002
(0.432)
Year FE YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Observations 109,647 91,913 91,913
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data Appendix For Chapter 1
Variables from the Gallup State of the States poll.
Well-Being measures:
Overall Well-Being The Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index score is made up of five elements
of well-being that are the core components of the best possible life: purpose, social, financial,
community and physical
% Feel active and productive The percentage of state residents who report having felt active and
productive every day in the last seven days
% Worried about money The percentage of state residents who report having worried about money
in the last seven days
% Community recognition The percentage of state residents who report having received recognition
for helping to improve their city or area in the past 12 months
% Exercise frequently The percentage of state residents who report exercising for at least 30 minutes
three or more days per week
Religion related measures:
% Very religious The percentage of state residents who say religion is important in their lives and
say they attend religious services weekly or nearly weekly
% Nonreligious The percentage of state residents who say religion is not important in their lives
and say they seldom or never attend religious services
Politics related measures:
% Republican/Lean The percentage of state residents who identify as Republicans or who identify
as independents but say they lean Republican
% Democrat/Lean The percentage of state residents who identify as Democrats or who identify as
independents but say they lean Democratic
Democratic advantage The difference between the percentage of state residents identifying as
Democrats or leaning Democratic and the percentage identifying as Republicans or leaning
Republican
% Conservative The percentage of state residents who describe their political views as conservative
% Liberal The percentage of state residents who describe their political views as liberal
150
Conservative advantage The difference between the percentage of state residents describing their
political views as conservative and the percentage describing their political views as liberal
151
Chapter 1 APPENDIX
Table 1: APPENDIX: Robustness Checks: MSAs on state borders and pharma-
ceutical stocks
In this table, we present results of additional robustness checks. In Appendix Table 1 column 1, we exclude
MSAs on the border of two, three, or four states. In column 2, when generating the state stock index, we
exclude pharmaceutical stocks (SICCD code equals to 2834 or NAICS code equals to 325412). All dependent
variables, independent variables, controls, and fixed effects are the same as in Table 2 column 4. Each
column represents a separate regression. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at MSA level. In
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at MSA level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP: Log(Antidepressant with Diagnosis(t))
Exclude MSAs on state borders Exclude pharmaceutical stocks
(1) (2)
Market Return (t-1,t) -0.403** -0.419**
(-1.979) (-2.245)
Month Fixed Effects YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES
MSA Fixed Effects YES YES
Control: Unemployment Rate YES YES




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: APPENDIX: Independent Research Providers
Source: Buslepp, W., Casey, R., and G. R. Huston, 2013, ”Did they get what they paid for? The Global
Analyst Research Settlement and analyst research quality,” Working paper, table Appendix B, page 26. Firms
in bold are available in I/B/E/S.
Bear Stearns BNY Jaywalk
Credit Suisse First Boston Renaissance Capital
BNY Jaywalk
Standard & Poor’s
Goldman Sachs Standard & Poor’s
Morningstar
Renaissance Capital
J.P. Morgan Chase Morningstar
Renaissance Capital
BOE Securities
Lehman Brothers BNY Jaywalk
Merrill Lynch Morningstar
BNY Jaywalk




















Table 4: APPENDIX: GRS Provisions eliminated and remained in place
The sanctioned banks proposed that all provisions of the GRS to be eliminated, but the SEC believed that to
retain certain provisions was in the public interest. Other provisions are now imposed by NASD and NYSE
rules and are thus eliminated from the GRS. For the provisions eliminated but not covered by the new rules,
the SEC and the sanctioned banks stated that elimination of these provisions would be consistent with the
public interest. Source: U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Litigation Release No. 21457,
March 19th, 2010.
GRS provisions remained in place and approved by Judge Pauley:
The physical separation of research analysts and investment banking;
A requirement that communications to the sales force be to have a reasonable basis;
A requirement that Research analysts be able to express their views to a commitment committee on a
proposed transaction outside the presence of investment banks working on the deal;
A prohibition on investment banking input into company-specific coverage decisions and into research budget
decisions A requirement that the Research oversight committees to ensure the integrity and independence of
ratings, targets, and the overall quality of research;
A prohibition on Communications between investment banking personnel and research analysts concerning
a proposed transaction, unless a chaperone from the firms legal department is present.
GRS provisions no longer in effect:
An obligation that customers be provided with independent third-party research;
A prohibitions against investment bankers’ influence over research compensation and over evaluations of
research personnel;
A prohibitions against research participation in efforts to solicit investment banking business;
A prohibitions against research participation in road shows;




Table 1: APPENDIX: Optimism of Analyst Recommendations Issued to Non-
Financial Sector Firms
Appendix Table 1 provides logit regression results testing whether the optimism of recommendations varies
by brokerage type. The sample includes recommendations issued to firms not in the financial sector in the
Institutional Brokerage Estimation System (IBES) database for the sample period from January 1994 to
December 2013. The dependent variables are indicator variables for hold/ underperform/ sell recommendations
in columns (1)-(3). The independent variables include IRF indicator, analyst general experience, analyst-firm
specific experience, number of stocks covered by the analyst (analyst breadth), analyst forecast frequency,
analyst all-star indicator, brokerage size, brokerage pressure, brokerage reputation, brokerage age, number of
stocks covered by the brokerage (brokerage breadth), log(market capitalization of the firm being covered),
number of analysts following the firm, firm leverage, cumulative abnormal return in the time window (-22,-2)
before the issuance of recommendations, indictor for Friday announcements, proximity indictor which equals
one if time between the date of recommendation issuance and the date of earnings announcement is less than
five-days (three-days). Firm and year fixed effects are included. Each column represents a separate regression.
Marginal effects are displayed. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP: Indicator variable for
Hold/Underperform/Sell
(1) (2) (3)
IRF -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.041***
(-10.390) (-9.098) (-8.449)
Analyst Experience -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(-8.444) (-6.701) (-5.541)
Analyst-Firm Experience 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(11.688) (9.281) (7.642)
Analyst Breadth 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(15.916) (11.929) (10.770)
Analyst Forecast Frequency 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.737) (1.005) (1.315)
All Star -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011**
(-4.140) (-2.934) (-2.443)
Brokerage Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000***
(-1.072) (-1.037) (-2.781)
Brokerage Pressure -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.016***
(-8.937) (-8.273) (-8.084)
Brokerage Reputation 0.456*** 0.624*** 0.666***
(12.078) (11.158) (11.456)
Brokerage Age 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(6.793) (5.223) (6.217)
Brokerage Breadth -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.315) (-1.284) (-0.174)
160
Table 1: (Cont.)APPENDIX: Optimism of Analyst Recommendations Issued to
Non-Financial Sector Firms
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Market Capitalization) -0.022*** -0.015***
(-6.089) (-3.582)








Proximity 5 days -0.011
(-1.488)
Proximity 3 days 0.036***
(4.450)
Year FE YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: APPENDIX: Optimism of Target Price Estimates - Incremental Infor-
mation
Appendix Table 5 provides regression results testing whether the optimism of target price estimates vary by
brokerage type, conditioning on optimism level of earnings forecasts. The dependent variables (TP/P) are
the ratios of the announced 12 month target price (TP) to the stock price outstanding one day prior to the
announcement (P). The independent variables include IRF indicator, analyst general experience, analyst-firm
specific experience, number of stocks covered by the analyst (analyst breadth), analyst forecast frequency,
analyst all-star indicator, brokerage size, brokerage pressure, brokerage reputation, brokerage age, number of
stocks covered by the brokerage (brokerage breadth), log(market capitalization of the firm being covered),
number of analysts following the firm, firm leverage, indictor for Friday announcements, proximity indictor
which equals one if time between the date of price target issuance and the date of earnings announcement is
less than five-days (three-days). We control for the Relative Forecast Score of earnings forecast issued up to
90 days before the announcement date of the target price estimates by the analyst to the firm. Firm and year
fixed effects are included. Each column represents a separate regression. *, **, and *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
DEP: TP/P Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
IRF -0.021 -0.012** -0.012**
(-0.935) (-2.232) (-2.254)
Analyst Experience 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(3.011) (3.909) (3.921)
Analyst-Firm Experience 0.007 0.000 0.000
(1.607) (0.059) (0.089)
Analyst Breadth 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.562) (0.035) (0.055)
Analyst Forecast Frequency -0.022*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(-3.156) (-3.777) (-3.800)
All Star -0.057 -0.006 -0.007
(-1.622) (-0.610) (-0.623)
Brokerage Size -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***
(-1.398) (-2.887) (-2.875)
Brokerage Pressure -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(-0.906) (-1.433) (-1.448)
Brokerage Reputation -0.251 -0.236*** -0.242***
(-0.967) (-2.749) (-2.820)
Brokerage Age -0.001 0.001 0.001
(-0.536) (1.450) (1.491)
Brokerage Breadth 0.000 0.000** 0.000**
(0.933) (2.207) (2.168)
168
Table 5: (Cont.)APPENDIX: Optimism of Target Price Estimates - Incremental
Information
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Market Capitalization) 0.022* 0.022*
(1.807) (1.806)






Proximity 5 days -0.008
(-1.435)
Proximity 3 days -0.002
(-0.305)
Relative Forecast Score Control YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES
Observations 65,018 55,450 55,450
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Ivković, Z., & Weisbenner, S. (2007). Information diffusion effects in individual investors’ common
stock purchases: Covet thy neighbors’ investment choices. Review of Financial Studies, 20(4),
1327-1357.
Kahneman, D., & Deaton, A. (2010). High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional
well-being. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(38), 16489-16493.
Kamstra, M. J., Kramer, L. A., & Levi, M. D. (2000). Losing sleep at the market: The daylight
saving anomaly. American Economic Review, 90(4), 1005-1011.
Kang, J. K., & Stulz, R. M. (1997). Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio
equity ownership in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 46(1), 3-28.
Kaplanski, G., & Levy, H. (2010). Sentiment and stock prices: The case of aviation disasters.
Journal of Financial Economics, 95(2), 174-201.
Keller, M. B., Klerman, G. L., Lavori, P. W., Fawcett, J. A., Coryell, W., & Endicott, J. (1982).
Treatment received by depressed patients. The Journal of the American Medical Association,
248(15), 1848-1855.
Kniesner, T. J., Powers, R. H., & Croghan, T. W. (2005). Provider type and depression treatment
adequacy. Health Policy, 72(3), 321-332
175
Lin, H., Ketcham, J. D., Rosenquist, J. N., & Simon, K. I. (2013). Financial distress and use of
mental health care: Evidence from antidepressant prescription claims. Economics Letters, 121(3),
449-453.
Lydiard, R. B. (2001). Irritable bowel syndrome, anxiety, and depression: what are the links?.
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 62(8), 38-45.
Ma, W., Chen, H., Jiang, L., Song, G., & Kan, H. (2011). Stock volatility as a risk factor for
coronary heart disease death. European Heart Journal, 32(8), 1006-1011.
Mark, T. L., Kassed, C., Levit, K., & Vandivort-Warren, R. (2014). An analysis of the slowdown
in growth of spending for psychiatric drugs, 1986–2008. Psychiatric Services, 63(1), 13-18.
Markou, A., Kosten, T. R., & Koob, G. F. (1998). Neurobiological similarities in depression and
drug dependence: a self-medication hypothesis. Neuropsychopharmacology, 18(3), 135-174.
Masand, P. S., Kaplan, D. S., Gupta, S., Bhandary, A. N., Nasra, G. S., Kline, M. D., & Margo,
K. L. (1995). Major depression and irritable bowel syndrome: is there a relationship?. Journal of
Clinical Psychiatry, 56(8), 363-367.
McCullough, M. E., & Larson, D. B. (1999). Religion and depression: a review of the literature.
Twin Research and Human Genetics, 2(02), 126-136.
McInerney, M., Mellor, J. M., & Nicholas, L. H. (2013). Recession depression: mental health effects
of the 2008 stock market crash. Journal of Health Economics, 32(6), 1090-1104.
Mechanic, D., Schlesinger, M., & McAlpine, D. D. (1995). Management of mental health and
substance abuse services: State of the art and early results. The Milbank Quarterly, 73(1), 19-55.
Mojtabai, R., & Olfson, M. (2011). Proportion of antidepressants prescribed without a psychiatric
diagnosis is growing. Health Affairs, 30(8), 1434-1442.
Mojtabai, R., & Olfson, M. (2014). National trends in long-term use of antidepressant medications:
results from the US National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. The Journal of Clinical
Psychiatry, 75(2), 169-177.
Musick, M. A., & Wilson, J. (2003). Volunteering and depression: The role of psychological and
social resources in different age groups. Social Science & Medicine, 56(2), 259-269.
Nawrot, T. S., Perez, L., Künzli, N., Munters, E., & Nemery, B. (2011). Public health importance
of triggers of myocardial infarction: a comparative risk assessment. The Lancet, 377(9767), 732-740.
176
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1991). A prospective study of depression and posttraumatic
stress symptoms after a natural disaster: the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 61(1), 115.
Ohayon, M. M., Caulet, M., & Lemoine, P. (1998). Comorbidity of mental and insomnia disorders
in the general population. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 39(4), 185-197.
Ojeda, V. D., & McGuire, T. G. (2006). Gender and racial/ethnic differences in use of outpatient
mental health and substance use services by depressed adults. Psychiatric Quarterly, 77(3), 211-222.
Okulicz-Kozaryn, A., Holmes IV, O., & Avery, D. R. (2014). The subjective well-being political
paradox: Happy welfare states and unhappy liberals. Journal of Applied Psychology, 99(6), 1300.
Pagura, J., Katz, L. Y., Mojtabai, R., Druss, B. G., Cox, B., & Sareen, J. (2011). Antidepressant
use in the absence of common mental disorders in the general population. The Journal of Clinical
Psychiatry, 72(4), 494-501.
Patten, S. B. (1999). Long-term medical conditions and major depression in the Canadian
population. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 44(2), 151-157.
Pelz, M., & Merskey, H. (1982). A description of the psychological effects of chronic painful lesions.
Pain, 14(3), 293–301.
Perneger, T. V., Allaz, A. F., Etter, J. F., & Rougemont, A. (1995). Mental health and choice
between managed care and indemnity health insurance. The American Journal of Psychiatry,
152(7), 1020.
Puri, M., & Robinson, D. T. (2007). Optimism and economic choice. Journal of Financial
Economics, 86(1), 71-99.
Ormel, J., Jeronimus, B. F., Kotov, R., Riese, H., Bos, E. H., Hankin, B., Rosmalen, J. &
Oldehinkel, A. J. (2013). Neuroticism and common mental disorders: meaning and utility of a
complex relationship. Clinical psychology review, 33(5), 686-697.
Quigley, E. M. M., Locke, G. R., Mueller-Lissner, S., Paulo, L. G., Tytgat, G. N., Helfrich, I., &
Schaefer, E. (2006). Prevalence and management of abdominal cramping and pain: a multinational
survey. Alimentary Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 24(2), 411-419.
Rentfrow, P. J., Gosling, S. D., Jokela, M., Stillwell, D. J., Kosinski, M., & Potter, J. (2013).
Divided We Stand: Three Psychological Regions of the United States and Their Political, Economic,
Social, and Health Correlates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105(6), 996-1012.
177
Rick, S. (2011). Losses, gains, and brains: Neuroeconomics can help to answer open questions
about loss aversion. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 21(4), 453-463.
Rosenthal, N. E., Sack, D. A., Gillin, J. C., Lewy, A. J., Goodwin, F. K., Davenport, Y., Mueller,
P. S., Newsome, D. A., & Wehr, T. A. (1984). Seasonal affective disorder: a description of the
syndrome and preliminary findings with light therapy. Archives of General Psychiatry, 41(1), 72-80.
Rost, K., Smith, G. R., Matthews, D. B., & Guise, B. (1994). The deliberate misdiagnosis of major
depression in primary care. Archives of Family Medicine, 3(4), 333.
Ruhm, C. J. (2000). Are Recessions Good for Your Health? The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115 (2): 617-650.
Schwandt, H. (2014). Wealth shocks and health outcomes: Evidence from stock market fluctuations.
Working paper.
Schwartz, B. G., Pezzullo, J. C., McDonald, S. A., Poole, W. K., & Kloner, R. A. (2012). How the
2008 stock market crash and seasons affect total and cardiac deaths in Los Angeles County. The
American Journal of Cardiology, 109(10), 1445-1448.
Seasholes, M. S., & Zhu, N. (2010). Individual investors and local bias. The Journal of Finance,
65(5), 1987-2010.
Shiller, R. J. (1999). Human behavior and the efficiency of the financial system. Handbook of
Macroeconomics, 1, 1305-1340.
Shrestha, S. S., Zhang, P., Li, R., Thompson, T. J., Chapman, D. P., & Barker, L. (2013). Medical
expenditures associated with major depressive disorder among privately insured working-age adults
with diagnosed diabetes in the United States, 2008. Diabetes Research and Clinical Practice, 100(1),
102-110.
Sirey, J. A., Bruce, M. L., Alexopoulos, G. S., Perlick, D. A., Friedman, S. J., & Meyers, B. S.
(2001). Stigma as a barrier to recovery: Perceived stigma and patient-rated severity of illness as
predictors of antidepressant drug adherence. Psychiatric Services, 52(12), 1615-1620.
Spielmans, G. I., Berman, M. I., & Usitalo, A. N. (2011). Psychotherapy versus second-generation
antidepressants in the treatment of depression: a meta-analysis. The Journal of Nervous and
Mental Disease, 199(3), 142-149.
178
Stambaugh, R. F., Yu, J., & Yuan, Y. (2012). The short of it: Investor sentiment and anomalies.
Journal of Financial Economics, 104(2), 288-302.
Sung, J. J. Y., Kuipers, E. J., & El-Serag, H. B. (2009). Systematic review: the global incidence
and prevalence of peptic ulcer disease. Alimentary Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 29(9), 938-946.
Sweet, E., Nandi, A., Adam, E. K., & McDade, T. W. (2013). The high price of debt: Household
financial debt and its impact on mental and physical health. Social Science & Medicine, 91, 94-100.
Tetlock, P. C. (2007). Giving content to investor sentiment: The role of media in the stock market.
The Journal of Finance, 62(3), 1139-1168.
Thompson, W. G., Longstreth, G. F., Drossman, D. A., Heaton, K. W., Irvine, E. J., &
Müller-Lissner, S. A. (1999). Functional bowel disorders and functional abdominal pain. Gut,
45(suppl 2), II43-II47.
Vlahiotis, A., Devine, S. T., Eichholz, J., & Kautzner, A. (2011). Discontinuation rates and
health care costs in adult patients starting generic versus brand SSRI or SNRI antidepressants in
commercial health plans. Journal of Managed Care Pharmacy, 17(2), 123-132.
Wade, R. L., Kindermann, S. L., Hou, Q., & Thase, M. E. (2014). Comparative assessment
of adherence measures and resource use in SSRI/SNRI-treated patients with depression using
second-generation antipsychotics or l-methylfolate as adjunctive therapy. Journal of Managed Care
Pharmacy, 20(1), 76-85.
Weiss, A., Sutin, A. R., Duberstein, P. R., Friedman, B., Bagby, R. M., & Costa, P. T. (2009).
The personality domains and styles of the five-factor model are related to incident depression in
Medicare recipients aged 65 to 100. The American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 17(7), 591-601.
Walsh, D. C., & Egdahl, R. H. (1985). Treatment For Chemical Dependency And Mental Illness:
Can This Utilization Be Managed?. Health Affairs, 4(3), 128-135.
Wiechers, I. R., Leslie, D. L., & Rosenheck, R. A. (2014). Prescribing of psychotropic medications
to patients without a psychiatric diagnosis. Psychiatric Services, 64(12), 1243-1248.
Wu, C. H., Erickson, S. R., Piette, J. D., & Balkrishnan, R. (2012a). The association of race,
comorbid anxiety, and antidepressant adherence among Medicaid enrollees with major depressive
disorder. Research in Social and Administrative Pharmacy, 8(3), 193-205.
179
Wu, C. H., Farley, J. F., & Gaynes, B. N. (2012b). The association between antidepressant dosage
titration and medication adherence among patients with depression. Depression and Anxiety, 29(6),
506-514.
180
References B for Chapter 2:
Agrawal, A. and M. A. Chen, 2008, “Do analyst conflicts matter? Evidence from stock
recommendations,” Journal of Law and Economics, 51(3), 503-537.
Barber, B. M., Lehavy, R., and B. Trueman, 2007, “Comparing the stock recommendation
performance of investment banks and independent research firms,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 85.2, 490-517.
Bradley, D. J., Jordan, B. D., and J. R. Ritter, 2008, “Analyst behavior following IPOs: the
“bubble period” evidence”, Review of financial studies, 21(1), 101-133.
Buslepp, W., Casey, R., and G. R. Huston, 2013, “Did they get what they paid for? The
Global Analyst Research Settlement and analyst research quality,” Working paper .
Buslepp, W., Casey, R., and G. R. Huston, 2014, “Did they get what they paid for? The
Global Analyst Research Settlement and analyst research quality,” Working paper .
Casey, R. J., 2013, “Do independent research analysts issue more or less informative recom-
mendation revisions?” Advances in Accounting, 29(1), 36-49.
Clarke, J. E., Khorana, A., Patel, A., and P. R. Rau, 2011, “Independents’ day? Analyst
behavior surrounding the Global Settlement,” Annals of Finance, 7.4, 529-547.
Clement, M. B., 1999, “Analyst forecast accuracy: Do ability, resources, and portfolio com-
plexity matter?” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27(3), 285-303.
Cliff, M. T., 2007, “Do affiliated analysts mean what they say?” Financial Management,
5-29.
Corwin, S. A., Larocque, S. and M. Stegemoller, 2016, “Investment Banking Relationships
and Analyst Affiliation Bias: The Impact of the Global Settlement on Sanctioned and Non-
Sanctioned Banks.” Working paper .
Cowen, A., Groysberg, B., and P. Healy, 2006, “Which types of analyst firms are more
optimistic?” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1), 119-146.12.
Dambra, M., Field, L. C., Gustafson, M., and K. J. Pisciotta, 2016, “Pre-IPO Communica-
tions and Analyst Research: Evidence Surrounding the JOBS Act.” Working paper .
181
Dubois, M., Fresard, L., and P. Dumontier, 2014, “Regulating conflicts of interest: The effect
of sanctions and enforcement,” Review of Finance, 18(2), 489-526.
Gleason, C. A. and C. M. Lee, 2003, “Analyst forecast revisions and market price discovery,”
The Accounting Review, 78(1), 193-225.
Gruber, J., 1994. “The Incidence of mandated maternity benefits,” American Economic
Review 84, 622-641.
Guan, Y., Lu, H., and M. F. Wong, 2012, “Conflict-of-interest reforms and investment bank
analysts’ research biases,” Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 27(4), 443-470.
Iskoz, S., 2003, “Bias in underwriter analyst recommendations: does it matter?” Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Working paper .
Jacobsen, S. E., Stefanescu, I., and X. Yu, 2013, “The’Real’Value of Conflicted Analyst
Coverage,” Working paper .
Jegadeesh, N., Kim, J., Krische, S. D., and C. Lee, 2004, “Analyzing the analysts: When do
recommendations add value?” The Journal of Finance, 59(3), 1083-1124.
Kadan, O., Madureira, L., Wang, R., and T. Zach, 2009, “Conflicts of interest and stock
recommendations: The effects of the global settlement and related regulations,” Review of
Financial Studies, 22.10, 4189-4217.
Ljungqvist, A., Marston, F., Starks, L. T., Wei, K. D., and H. Yan, 2007, “Conflicts of
interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 85(2), 420-456.
Madureira, L., 2004, “Conflicts of Interest, Regulations, and Stock Recommendations,” The
Wharton School. Working Paper .
Michaely, R. and K. L. Womack, 1999, “Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter
analyst recommendations,” Review of Financial Studies, 12(4), 653-686.
Michaely, R. and K. L. Womack, 2006, “What are analysts good at?” Dartmouth University.
Working paper .
Mikhail, M. B., Walther, B. R., and R. H. Willis, 1997, “Do security analysts improve their
performance with experience?” Journal of Accounting Research, 131-157.
182
Shumway, T., 2001. “Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: A simple hazard model,”
The Journal of Business, 74(1), 101-124.
Sorescu, S. and A. Subrahmanyam, 2006, “The cross section of analyst recommendations,”
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41(01), 139-168.
Stickel, S. E., 1992, “Reputation and performance among security analysts,” The Journal of
Finance, 47(5), 1811-1836.
Stiglitz, J., 2009, “Regulation and Failure”, in New Perspectives on Regulation, D. Moss
and J. Cisternino, eds., Cambridge, MA: Tobin Project, 2009, pp 11-23.
Womack, K. L., 1996, “Do brokerage analysts’ recommendations have investment value?”
The Journal of Finance, 51(1), 137-167.
Wu, M., Wilson, M., and Y. Wu, 2015, “Was the Global Settlement Effective in Mitigating
Systematic Bias in Affiliated Analyst Recommendations?” Journal of Business Ethics, 1-19.
183
References C for Chapter 3:
Agrawal, A., & Chen, M. A. (2012). Analyst conflicts and research quality. The Quarterly Journal
of Finance, 2(02), 1250010.
Asquith, P., Mikhail, M. B., & Au, A. S. (2005). Information content of equity analyst reports.
Journal of Financial Economics, 75(2), 245-282..
Barber, B. M., Lehavy, R., & Trueman, B. (2007). Comparing the stock recommendation
performance of investment banks and independent research firms. Journal of Financial Economics,
85(2), 490-517.
Bradshaw, M. T., Brown, L. D., & Huang, K. (2013). Do sell-side analysts exhibit differential
target price forecasting ability? Review of Accounting Studies, 18(4), 930-955..
Brav, A., & Lehavy, R. (2003). An empirical analysis of analysts’ target prices: Short-term
informativeness and long-term dynamics. The Journal of Finance, 58(5), 1933-1968..
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009). Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007–2008. The Journal
of economic perspectives, 23(1), 77-100.
Casey, R. J. (2013). Do independent research analysts issue more or less informative
recommendation revisions?. Advances in Accounting, 29(1), 36-49.
Clarke, J., Khorana, A., Patel, A., & Rau, P. R. (2007). The impact of all-star analyst job changes
on their coverage choices and investment banking deal flow. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(3),
713-737.
Clarke, J. E., Khorana, A., Patel, A., & Rau, P. R. (2011). Independents’ day? Analyst behavior
surrounding the Global Settlement. Annals of Finance, 7(4), 529-547.
Clement, M. B. (1999). Analyst forecast accuracy: Do ability, resources, and portfolio complexity
matter?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27(3), 285-303.
Clement, M. B., & Tse, S. Y. (2005). Financial analyst characteristics and herding behavior in
forecasting. The Journal of Finance, 60(1), 307-341.
Cliff, M. T. (2004). Do independent analysts provide superior stock recommendations?. Available
at SSRN 540123.
184
Cohen, L., Lou, D., & Malloy, C. (2013). Playing favorites: How firms prevent the revelation of
bad news (No. w19429). National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper.
Cowen, A., Groysberg, B., & Healy, P. (2006). Which types of analyst firms are more optimistic?.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1), 119-146.
De Nicolo, G., & Kwast, M. L. (2002). Systemic risk and financial consolidation: Are they related?.
Journal of Banking & Finance, 26(5), 861-880.
DellaVigna, S., & Pollet, J. M. (2009). Investor inattention and Friday earnings announcements.
The Journal of Finance, 64(2), 709-749.
Dugar, A., & Nathan, S. (1995). The effect of investment banking relationships on financial
analysts’ earnings forecasts and investment recommendations. Contemporary Accounting Research,
12(1), 131-160.
Feng, M., & McVay, S. (2010). Analysts’ incentives to overweight management guidance when
revising their short-term earnings forecasts. The Accounting Review, 85(5), 1617-1646.03.
Firth, M., Lin, C., Liu, P., & Xuan, Y. (2013). The client is king: Do mutual fund relationships
bias analyst recommendations?. Journal of Accounting Research, 51(1), 165-200.
Gleason, C. A., Bruce Johnson, W., & Li, H. (2013). Valuation model use and the price target
performance of sell-side equity analysts. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(1), 80-115..
Gu, Z., & Xue, J. (2008). The superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts. Journal
of Accounting and Economics, 45(2), 289-316.
Hong, H., & Kubik, J. D. (2003). Analyzing the analysts: Career concerns and biased earnings
forecasts. The Journal of Finance, 58(1), 313-351..
Jacob, J., Lys, T. Z., & Neale, M. A. (1999). Expertise in forecasting performance of security
analysts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 28(1), 51-82.
Jacob, J., Rock, S., & Weber, D. P. (2008). Do Non-Investment Bank Analysts Make Better
Earnings Forecasts?. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 23(1).
Kadan, O., Madureira, L., Wang, R., & Zach, T. (2009). Conflicts of interest and stock
recommendations: The effects of the global settlement and related regulations. Review of Financial
Studies, 22(10), 4189-4217.
185
Karam, P. D., Merrouche, O., Souissi, M., & Turk, R. (2014). The Transmission of Liquidity
Shocks: The Role of Internal Capital Markets and Bank Funding Strategies. Working paper.
Kolasinski, A. C., & Kothari, S. P. (2008). Investment banking and analyst objectivity:
Evidence from analysts affiliated with mergers and acquisitions advisors. Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis, 43(04), 817-842.
Lin, H. W., & McNichols, M. F. (1998). Underwriting relationships, analysts’ earnings forecasts
and investment recommendations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 25(1), 101-127..
Ljungqvist, A., Marston, F., & Wilhelm, W. J. (2006). Competing for securities underwriting
mandates: Banking relationships and analyst recommendations. The Journal of Finance, 61(1),
301-340.
Ljungqvist, A., Marston, F., & Wilhelm, W. J. (2009). Scaling the hierarchy: How and why
investment banks compete for syndicate co-management appointments. Review of Financial
Studies, 22(10), 3977-4007.
Loh, R. K., & Stulz, R. M. (2011). When are analyst recommendation changes influential?. Review
of Financial Studies, 24(2), 593-627.
Malmendier, U., & Shanthikumar, D. (2014). Do security analysts speak in two tongues?. Review
of Financial Studies.
Michaely, R., & Womack, K. L. (1999). Conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter
analyst recommendations. Review of Financial Studies, 12(4), 653-686.
Mikhail, M. B., Walther, B. R., & Willis, R. H. (1999). Does forecast accuracy matter to security
analysts?. The Accounting Review, 74(2), 185-200.
Sonney, F. (2009). Financial analysts’ performance: Sector versus country specialization. Review
of Financial Studies, 22(5), 2087-2131.
Stickel, S. E. (1995). The anatomy of the performance of buy and sell recommendations. Financial
Analysts Journal, 51(5), 25-39.
Trueman, B. (1994). Analyst forecasts and herding behavior. Review of Financial Studies, 7(1),
97-124.
Viswesvaran, C., Ones, D. S., & Schmidt, F. L. (1996). Comparative analysis of the reliability of
job performance ratings. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81(5), 557.
186
Viswesvaran, C., Schmidt, F. L., & Ones, D. S. (2005). Is there a general factor in ratings of
job performance? A meta-analytic framework for disentangling substantive and error influences.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(1), 108.
187
